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SECTION 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The development of the procedures and policies for the validation 
and certification of aircraft with an advanced electronic flight-control 
system will be one of the most important tasks that Must be accomplished 
l~afore the considerable advantages of these systems can be realized. 
It will be necessary to develop the validation methods as early as 
possible so that the der.1-gners of these advanced control systems will 
fully understand the r.eli<1bility requirements and the means that will 
be available to demonstrate that reliability. The regulatory authorities 
will also need to be aware of what is being developed and anticipate 
the data and testing they will require to demonstr.ate compliance with 
the regUl.pt.Jions. The authorities will be very reluctant to certify 
a new system for which there is no precedent without ample assurance 
that flight safety can be assured. On the other hand, airframe companies 
and the airline customers will be reluctant to commit to the use of an 
advanced system, in spite of large potential advantages, unless flight 
safety can be assured and there are no large risks and unreasonable 
costs in obtaining certification. In order to give both the users 
and the regulatory authorities the necessary confidence, it is necessary 
for the validation methods to be developed along with the development 
of the systems themselves. 
The following report gives an account of the experience of the 
NASA Dryden Flight Research Center (r:.~RC) and The Charles Stark 
Draper Laboratory (CSDL) in validating ~ digital fly-by-wire (DFBW) 
system. The experience was gained from the development and testing of 
a DFBN system that is being extensively flight tested in alii! F-8 air-
craft. This report is written in the hope that the expedeTlce gained 
wil.l contribute to the confidence that must be established in these 
systems before they can be put into commercial service. 
This report was written in support of the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) Advanced Integrated Flight Systems (AIFS) 
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Technology Program. This program was established by the FAA in 
anticipation of the impact of advanced systems technology on air-
worthiness standards and certification procedures. The objectives 
of the AlFS Technology Program are to: 
(1) Evaluate and assess advancing technology for impact on FAA. 
(2) Support the development of airworthiness standards and 
certification procedures. 
(3) Disseminate technical information within FAA. 
Critical issues relating to airworthiness considerations being addressed 
by the FAA are: 
(1) Systems failure modes and failure effects. 
(2) Hardware and software reliability, including verification 
and validation. 
(3) Lightning, electromagnetic, and other transient effects. 
(4) Aircraft flight characteristics and performance. 
(5) Structural aspects of active controls. 
~he AlFS program consists in large part of the monitoring of 
relevant activities of interest at NASA, Department of Defense, and 
industry. The NASA/DFRC Advanced Flight Control Program on the F-8 
aircraft is one such activity that has been selected to support the 
AlFS program. 
This report first gives a general discussion of the directions 
in which advanced avionics systems are moving (Section 2). This dis-
cussion includes the great expansion in critical functions proposed 
for these systems and the advances in technology that make these func-
tions possible. A brief outline is then given of some of the other 
advanced systems being developed to provide a context for understanding 
the F-8 DFBW system. Section 3 contains a brief history of the NASA 
Advanced F'light Control Program. The system requirements and the 
qualification requirements for the system are given in Section 4. This 
section also includes a description of the system in order that the 
qualification process might be better understood. Section 5 gives the 
system flight-qualification experience which is the primary purpose of 
the report. The qualification experience includes the validation of the 
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design, hardware testing, software verification, the total system valida-
tion using both ground testing in an "iron-bird" system and flight tests. 
The report concludes with general comments on validation methods, in-
cluding a review of validation techniques and tools, comments on the 
special conside~ations for software, and comments on the formation of 
a total validat~~n program and what goals and requirements it must 
meet. 
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SECTION 2 
DIRECTIONS IN ADVANCED AVIONICS SYSTEMS 
This section will give a brief discussion of one view of the new 
emerging technology of advanced avionics systems. The primary purpose 
of this overview is to define the context into which the NASA F-8 Digital 
Fly-By-Wire (DFBW) program fits. It is hoped this discussion will con-
tribute something to an increased mutual understanding of just what 
kind of equipment and systems are beginning to evolve and to help define 
some of the concepts and terms. 
It is helpful to define the context of the F-B program to arrive 
at a realistic assessment of where this experience would apply and where 
it would not. It is not desired to create the impression everything 
that was done applies to all fly-by-wire systems. On the other hand 
much of this experience will be applicable to many aspects of the systems 
that will be introduced into commercial aviation. 
This overview will briefly describe the developing advanced avionics 
syst~ms from two different viewpoints: one is the new and expanding func-
tions that these new systems are expected to perform: the other is the 
change in the technology used in the equ.}pment that performs these func-
tions. These viewpoints will then be combined to give some typical sys-
tem configurations. In all of these discussions particular emphasis will 
be placed on the implications for validation and certification. Before 
beginning these diSCUssions, brief definitions are given for some of the 
terms used. 
2.1 Definitions and Terminology 
One of the first steps toward understanding a new technology and 
entering into fruitful f,ialogue is to define the terminology used: see 
Table 2-1. In many cases, there may not be complet~ agreement within 
the aviation industry on the meaning of some of these terms. This 
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Acceptance 
Active Control 
System 
Assembler 
Assembly 
Language 
Autopilot 
Central System 
Certification 
Command Augmentation 
System (CAS) 
Compiler 
Computer, 
Table 2-1. Definitions. 
Definition 
The determination by the user (customer) that 
the product meets his requirements. 
A system which actively commands the mo~e~ent 
of control surfacell on the basis of Sl~nsor 
inputs to provide siome function or char.acter-
istic ngt available in the aircraft passively. 
A program which translates mnemonic assembly 
language instructions into the binary instruc-
tions used by the processor, assigns values 
to named addresses, and performs other 
functions as an aid b:> the programmer in 
writing a software program. 
A programming language which uses the set of 
processor executable instructions in 
mnemonic format to write the software program. 
Equipment which automatically performs 
functions that were normally performed by a 
pilot, such as maintaining heading or altitude. 
A system where the majority of functions is 
performed with a central computer system. 
The determination by a regulatory authority 
that a product meets the regulations for 
that product. 
An active control system that augments the 
pilot's control inputs with sensor inputs 
to provide him direct control of aircraft 
motion rather than control surface position. 
A program which translates a higher order 
language into the language of a particular 
computer and performs the assembler functions. 
A system containing a processor, variable 
storage memory, program storage memory, 
'input and output interface circuits, and 
support circuits including control, 
timing, power supply, etc. The computer can 
perform a large variety of functions by the 
sequential execution of a set of basic 
operations in the processor. The commands 
for the set of operations is called the 
software program and is stored in the program 
memory. (The hardware necessary to convert 
input signals to the proper digita,1 form 
and also the hardware necessary to convert 
the output signals 'to the proper form is 
usually included within the definition of a 
computer. ) 
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Term 
Control Configured 
Vehicle (CCV) 
Control Law 
Coverage 
Distributed System 
Elastic Mode 
Suppression (EMS) 
Electrical Command 
System 
Fail-Operational 
Fail-Passive 
Fail-Safe 
Fail-Soft 
Failure 
Fault 
Fault Tolerant 
Federated System 
Table 2-1. Definitions. (Cont. ) 
Definition 
An aircraft whose basic aeffodynamic and/or 
structural design includes 'the use of 
an active control system. 
A set of equations which define control 
surface position as a function of sensed 
inputs. 
The probability that, given a fault, the 
system continues to perform the required 
function. 
A system where the functions are distributed 
to a number of different computers. 
Active control to increase the damping of 
lightly damped structural bending modes 
excited by gusts. 
A system in which electrical signals provide 
the primary contrel commands but a mechanical 
backup system is retained. 
A system which is able to continue to provide 
critical functions after one failure. 
A system that does not cause an unsafe 
condition after a failure. There is no 
disruption in the aircraft performance. 
The function just ceases to be performed. 
A system that does not cause an unsafe condi-
tion after a failure. Immediate pilot 
corrective action may be necessary. 
A system that does not cause an unsafe 
condition after a failure. Pilot corrective 
action may be required within for example 
6 seconds • 
A condition which can give rise to a fault, 
usually considered permanent. 
An anomaly in the performance of a system. 
A system which is able to continu\~ to 
pr.ovide critical functions after the 
occurrence of a fault. 
A system where different functions are 
performed by different computers anj all 
are connected together into a total system. 
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., Table 2-1. Definitions. (Cont. ) 
Term 
Flutter Suppression 
Fly-By-toJire 
(~imited definition) 
Fly-By-Wire 
(broader definition) 
Gust-Load Allevia-
tiCm (GLA) 
Higher Order 
Language 
Integrated System 
Maneuver-Load 
Control (MLC) 
Microprocessor 
Processor 
Qualification 
Redundancy 
Management 
Relaxed Static 
Stability (RSS) 
Definition 
Active control to suppress aeroelastic flutter 
modes. 
The use of electrical signals to connect the 
pilot's control devices with the control 
surfaces. 
The use of electrical control connections 
with no mechanical backup linkages and 
providing the pilot direct control of air-
craft motion rather than control surface 
position. 
Active control to reduce loads due to gust. 
A language which enables a programmer to use 
simple English phrases in writing a software 
program. It is not dependent on the 
particular computer and is more universal 
than assembly lang·uage. 
A system in which the design has been 
integrated to allow the optimum synergistic 
arrangement for the performance of functions 
and the use of resources. 
Active redistribution of the increased loads 
due to maneuvers in order to reduce structural 
loads. 
A processor contained within one large-scale 
integrated (LSI) circuit or a small set of 
LSI circuits. 
Electronic circuits capable of sequentially 
performing a set of basic arithmetic, logical, 
and control operations. A processor is 
the central element of a computer. 
A formal process whereby a system or aircraft 
is defined to be ready for flight operations. 
The process of managing redundant elements 
in order to identify a failure and then 
reconfiguring the system to remove the effects 
of the failed element and continue operation 
with unfailed elements. 
The use of active control to allow the static 
stability of the basic unaugmented airframe 
to be relaxed. The aircraft with the active 
system operating will have the normal 
stability margins. 
7 
, " 
... 
" . 
Term 
Ride-Control 
Sy~tem (RCS) 
Software Progriarn 
stability 
Augmentation 
System (SAS) 
Transient Fault 
Validation 
Verification 
Table 2-1. D~finitions. (Cont. ) 
Definition 
Active. control to improve the quality of 
the ride for the crew and passengers. 
The set of processor-executed instructions 
stored in the memory of a co~puter which 
cause the computer to perform the desired 
functions. 
An active control system which augments 
the natural stability of an aircraft. 
A temporary anomaly in the performance of a 
system. 
The determination that a resulting product 
meets the objectives that led to the 
specification for the product. This 
determination usually includes operation 
in a real environment. 
The determination that a design 
specification. Verification is 
part of the validation process. 
environment is often used. 
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" list will be at least give the understand~;hg, held by those associated, 
with this program, which it is hoped, willI make this report more readable 
and will contribute to more understanding within the industry. 
2.2 Expansion of Functions 
One of the more important things that is happening in advanced 
avionics systems is a significant expansion in the number and complexity 
of the functions performed, and in the importance of these functions to 
fll.'ght safety. (l-S} 0' '11 't' 1 'I' d ' ' rl.gl.na y noncrl. l.ca aUX1 l.ary an convenl.ence 
tasks, tnese functions are now becoming flight critical, meaning ulti-
mately that a complete electronic failure would cause the loss of the 
aircraft. This expansion is both broadening the scope of the systems 
validation effort and increasing the importance of the validation. 
Most avionics system functions fall within the broad categories 
of flight control, navigation, communication, and aircraft systems 
control and monitoring. This report is concerned almost e~clusively 
t'!ith the flight-control functions, which can be further roughly divided 
into those related to augmenting or providing aircraft stability, 
controlling the path of the aircraft, reducing or controlling the 
structural loads, and providing the basic control surface linkages. The 
following subsections briefly describe the functions performed in each 
of these categories, and include some of the related certifications 
implications. 
2.2.1 Active Stability Control Functions 
One of the most basic functions of flight-control equipment is to 
provide or supplement the basic stability of the aircraft. This function 
was performed by very early control equipment almost from the beginning 
of powered flight. An example is the airplane stabilizer of 'the early 
1900s. (6) The equipment performing these functions employs some 
form of sensor, which measures aircraft motion. This sensor data is 
processed and the results are applied to actuators, which automatically 
move the aircraft control surfaces. The result is a modification of the 
natural aerodynamic characteristics of the vehicle. 
The nature of the modification of these characteristics covers 
;1ide ranges of complexity and importance. One of 'the most basic 
'modifications is the use o~) vertical-gyro output to control the ailerons 
;/ 
9 
,1 
. t 
< 
j 
: , ... J. 
and hold the wings level. Another modification in this category, which 
is in very common use today, is a yaw damper to reduce Dutch roll, 
oscillations. 
At the present time, advances in technology and confidence in 
flight-control equipment have developeCi sufficiently to make possible 
a more significant role, for this equipment. Automatic equipment has 
J <~ 
been proposed with enough reliability that the basic design of the 
aircraft can be configured with the assumption that active control is 
used. These:vehicles are called control configured vehicles (CCVs). 
One active control functi?n in this class is to supplement o£,,~:provide 
longitudinal stability. '.chis mode has been called relaxed static 
stability (RSS); when active control equipm,ent is assumed, the aero-
dynamic designer can be relieved from providing inherent stability 
c-~'" in the airframe itself. 
One advantage of this feature is that trim drag can be reduced. 
To provide stability, most aircraft require that the center of gravity 
be in front of the center of pressure of the wing (see Figure 2-1). 
Thus, a negative lift is required on the horizontal stabilizer to main-
tain balance. There is a contribution to drag both from the negative 
lift of the tail and the additional lift required from t~he wing to 
compensate for the tail. This drag can be reduced by ~oving the cent,l?r 
.) 
of gravity nearer to the center of pressure and then providing the 
required stability with an active control system. Reduced stability 
also has the advantage of :~~Jcreasing maneuverability, which is particu-
larly valuable in military aircraft. The first production aircraft to 
employ these functions was the Air Force F-l6. There are many 'other 
examples bf specific active stability control functions, which will 
not be discussed in detail. All these fUnctions have the same general 
characteristic: a system made up of a sensor, computer, and ~ontrol 
surface actuator, an"d used to mOd, ify theb~!sic aerodynamic characteris-
\\ tics of the vehicle. 
The validation and certification requiren)ents fot:, these newer 
more advanced systems can be much more demanding tha~~ those currently 
in use. It will be necessary for the validatiorl, to feflect the degree 
" 
to which the function being performed, is critical to the safety of 
the aircraft. It is reasonable to expect that the regUlatory authorities 
will demand that it be shown thy,t flight safety will be at least no 
worse than it is' now. If the,/;ircraft is ar,:tually unstable or is very 
(! 
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POSITIVE STATIC STABILITY RELAXED STATIC STABILITY 
Figure 2-1. Aircraft forces with positive and relaxed 
static stability. 
difficult to fly when the system is not working, then the system would 
have to demonstrate a reliability that is comparable to the current 
reliability of a basic airframe with conventional controls. This 
expanded role for the flight-control system will also expand the scope 
of the certification process. Flight-control equipment has normally 
been handled as auxiliary equipment with l~ttle interrelationship with 
the certification of the airfri:ime itself. In many future cases, it 
will be likely that the aircraft characteristics necessary to meet 
the regulations will be present only if an electronic system is installed 
and operating. Thus, the flight-control system will be involved from 
the beginning in the certification process, and other engineering capa-
bilities besides system specialist will be at least indirectly involved 
with electronic systems. For example, aerodynamic and stability special-
ists will have to become familiar with the operation of the ele9tronic 
active control ~quipment. 
2.2.2 Load-Control Functions 
Another class of new active control functions similar to stability 
control functions is the class of load-control functions. This class 
includes maneuver load control (MLC), gust load alleviation (GLA) , 
elastic mode control, and flutter suppress':"o1'1o The MLC and GLA modes 
are normally used with multiple aerodynamic controls along the span 
of the wing. When a significant maneuver is commanded or a large load 
is sensed due to a gust, the automatic system redistributes the lift 
along the span by reducing the lift of the tip and increasing lift at 
the root in order to reduce wing-bending moments (see Figure 2-2). 
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Figure 2-2. Load redistribution with active controls. 
Flutter suppression uses a sensor such as an accelerometer near the 
part of the structure where flutter needs to be controlled. This 
sensor data is then processed and applied to a control surface that 
will provide damping for the critical structural modes. A function 
very similar to GLA is a ride-control system (RCS) except that in the 
RCS the object is not the reduction of structural loads but an increase 
in the quality of the ride for the passengers and crew. 
The certification situation for these load-control functions will 
be similar to that for stability functions. As with any equipment, 
the system must show that, in itself, it will contribute no significant 
hazard. The further certification requirements will be a matter of the 
degree of criticality of the fUnction being performed. Load relief 
may be used only as an auxiliary function to provide, for example, longer 
structural life. In this case, in order to meet structural requirements, 
the existence of the active control is not assumed, and thus no more 
than the basic no-hazard certification requirements are required. How-
ever, if the active control is assumed for the aircraft to meet basic 
structural requir9ments in all or some regimes of flight, then the 
equipment will have to demonstrate a higher level of reliability. The 
level of reliability that must be demonstrated will be proportional to 
the probability that the function will be flight critical. For example, 
if a wing is designed structurally such that a flutter-suppression system 
is required even at cruise speeds, the probability that the function is 
flight critical is essentially 1. The system would thus have to be 
shown to be very reliable. However, it will be necessary to show that 
the use of active control hardware does not increase the total probability 
of catastrophic failure of the aircraft. The reliability requirement 
12 
E.lasily fits the 'extremely imp7.'obable" category. On the other hand, if 
the wing is designed to have no flutter mode up through maximum operating 
velocity (VMO ), but does need an active system between VMO and dive 
velocity (V
o
)' the functional reliablity requirement would not have to be 
quite as high. To maintain the same level of reliability, the probability 
that the airc'.raft simultaneously exceeded VMO and the system failed would 
have to be shown to be extremely improbable. If the control system is not 
continuously monitored, the system reliability used in these failure 
calculations will have to include all possible failures since the last 
time the equipment was tested. However, if the system is monitored and 
a failure is detected! the operational envelope of the aircraft can be 
reduced, for example, by slowing it to greatly reduce the probability 
that VMO is exceeded. In this case, it will be necessary to consider 
system failure only during the time the aircraft is operating above 
Vr.10. For this short time, system reliability will be very high. 
2.2.3 Automatic Flight-Path Control 
Another major category of flight-control functions is that which 
comprises the guidance and control conunands necessary to cause the 
aircraft to follow or maintain a desired flight path. These functions 
are sometimes called the "outer loop" functions; the stability 
augmentation functions are the "inner loop". These outer-loop functions 
also cover a wide range--from simple heading hold and altitude hold, 
to the complete control of the aircraft in four dimensions from takeoff 
to landing. 
The basic functions of heading hold and altitude hold have been 
used for a long time. Their primary purpose is to relieve the pilot 
from the tedious job of constantly maintaining heading or altitude 
during long periods of cruise flight. The certification requirements 
for these basic functions are well known and present no new problems. 
These functions are not necessary for safe flight. It is thus only 
necessary to show that there is sufficient warning of a system failure 
for the crew to disable the system and switch to an alternate system or 
take over control of the aircraft manually. Any "hard over" failure 
that would put the aircraft in danger would have to be extremely im-
probable. 
Automatic fU,:.'ht control has been expanded more recently in in-
clude other flight regimes besides cruise. The most important example 
is automatic landing, which is intended primarily to allow landings 
13 
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when the visibility is too low for manual landings. The automatic 
system must control the aircraft through the most critical phase of 
flight where the immediate detection of any failure is important and 
where the possibility of taking over operation manually is extremely 
difficult.·or impossible. An unsafe landing due to a system failure 
must be extremely improbable. Because a single electronic system does 
not have sufficient reliability to meet the requir~ments, a fail-
operational system is used that can continue to operate after any single 
failure or combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable. 
The validation and certification process to assure that the system 
meets these requirements can thus become very involved. 
2.2.4 Electronic Control Linkage 
An additional function baing proposed for the electronic flight-
control equipment is the linkage between the cockpit controls and 
the aerodynamic control surfaces. This electronic linkage would replace 
the present mechanical linkage. This function is what is meant by 
fly-by-wire to many people. However, fly-by-wire is often used as a 
more general term to include several of the other active flight-control 
functions that have been discussed. A NASA/Air Force understanding 
defines fly-by-wire as a full-time flight-col1ltrol system with no mechan-
ical reversion with active control which allows the pilot to command 
aircraft motion directly. 
The removal of the mechanical control cables, bell cranks, push 
rods, etc. has some obvious advantages. One of the primary advantages 
is the reduction in weight. There is also the potential for reducing 
maintenance problems due to stretching, bending, and wear in the 
linkages. The design of the rest of the aircraft can be simplified by 
removing the constraints imposed by the control cables. The simplifi-
cations may be particularly helpful in the cockpit area where the pilot 
controls may be reduced to improve visibility and usefulness of the 
instrument panel. Fly-by-wire can also simplify the impl.ementation of 
some of the more complex active control modes such as maneuver load 
control, gust load alleviation, and direct lift controls. These modes 
require the coordinated movement of several control surfaces. 
The need for mechanical linkage may have been reduced by the lack 
of any effective direct link to tnl.~ actual cont;rol surface on many of the 
latest aircraft. The control lii'lkage moves only the control valves on 
.1 
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the hydraulic actuators. A complete hydraulic failure will thus also 
give a complete control failure. 
The primary hindrance to the adoption of electronic control is 
the difficulty of designing an electronic system with adequate relia-
bility, and then providing the validation of tp.at reliability to the 
degree necessary to obtain certification and the acceptance by the 
industry. The basic requirement of extreme improbability would still 
have to be met. The most stringent requirements for flight control to 
date have been for autoland. The requirements for a full-time fly-by-
wire are much more stringent in two respects. First, the exposure 
time to a flight-critical failure is greatly increased from less than 
1 minute to the time of the entire flight. Also, the consequences of 
a fault would be much more severe. A complete failure of the automatic 
·system during an autoland will not necessarily be catastrophic. How-
ever, the complete failure of the flight-control linkage will almost 
certainly be catastrophic. There can be no passive failures. The 
challenge of design, validation, and certification will be correspond-
ingly greater. 
2.2.5 Summary of Reliability·Requirements for Expanding Active Control 
Functions 
The increasing functional reliability required by expanded active 
control is summarized in Figure 2-3. In this figure, the major factors 
contributing to the overall reliability are shown for several repre-
sentative functions. The numbers shown are to illustrate the concepts. 
They are intended to be as realistic as possible, but they are not the 
result of analysis for any ~articu1ar system. 
The probability of a catastrophic result from the failure of a 
function is assumed to be made up of three major elements: 
(1) The probability that a failure is catastrophic. 
(2) The exposure time. 
(3) The failure rate of the hardware. 
The first element is the probability that a functional failure will 
cause loss of the aircraft or a major loss of life. For example, 
it is assumed that .it is improbable that tho failure of a cruise auto-
pilot function will be critical. The probability that ex failure 
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FUNCTION 
CRUISE AUTOPILOT 
RELAXED STATIC STABILITY (RSS) 
COOPER-HARPER RATING 5· 
WITHOUT ACTIVE SYSTEM 
GUST LOAD ALLEVIATION 
AUTO LAND 
RELAXED STATIC STABILITY ,(RSS) 
COOPER-HARPER RATING 9·· 
WITHOUT ACTIVE SYSTEM 
FLY-BY-WIRE 
* PROBABILITY THAT 
FAILURE OF FUNCTION 
CAUSES CATASTROPHE 
.. 
6 EXPOSURE TIME 0 REQUIRED SYSTEM 
(FRACTION OF HOUR) PROBABILITY OF FUNCTIONAL 
FAILURE PER HOUR 
·PILOT RATING OF MODERATELY 
OBJECTIONABLE CONTROLLABILITY 
··PILOT RATING OF UNACCEPTABLE 
- MARGINALLY CONTROLLABLE 
Figure 2-3. Reliability requirements for 
typical flight control. 
of the autoland function will be catastrophic is much higher, but still 
not certain. To distinguish between equipment failure and functional 
fa,ilure, it is assumed that a fail-operational system is used for the 
auto land function so that there is no effect from the first equipment 
failure. A functional failure would only result from a second hardware 
failure. However, a large percentage of these second hardware failures 
will not have tragic results during au·toland. A majority of the failures 
would be passive, some causing minor damage. It is assumed that at 
most 1 in approximately 30 functional autoland failures will be 
catastrophic. It is, however, assumed that any failure of the fly-by-
wire function will be likely to cause the loss of the aircraft. There 
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can be no passive failure when the lost function is the ability to 
control the aircraft. 
The second element contributing to a catastrophic result is the 
exposure time-,-the percentage of time that the function is used and that 
a failure will have any effect. It is assumed that a cruise autopilot 
is used almost all the time, so that the exposure factor for this 
function is 1. The exposure factor for fly-by-wire would also be 1. 
On the other hand, an aut~land function is critical for less than 1 
minute. For a gust-load-alleviation system, the exposure time would be 
the probability that a gust is encountered, which causes loads greater 
than the allowed design loads with the active control system inoperative. 
The exposure time has to include all of the time since the last time 
the operation of the function was tested. For failure modes that are 
continuously monitored, the: exposure time would be only the time of 
the gust itself. At the 01:her extreme, if the function is not tested 
at all, the exposure factor becomes essentially 1. Any equipment 
failure before the time of the gust would not be known, and would 
cause that function not to be available when needed. It is assumed in 
this example that the function is monitored almost continuously so that 
the exposure time is the probability of a gust exceeding the limit. 
The last element is the required probability of a system failure 
causing loss of a function. In a single-channel system, a functional 
failure would be the same as a hardware failure. In a multiple-channel 
redundant system, a functional failure would be the failure of all 
channels, any common mode failure, or any other failure that inhibits 
the operation of the remaining channels. 
Figure 2-3 clearly illustrates how the expansion in flight-control 
functions requires progressively more reliable systems. The effort 
required to validate this higher reliability is also increasing in a 
corresp8~ding way. section 2.3 discusses the technology that makes 
these reliable systems possible. 
2.3 Technology Developments: Digital Technology 
The significant change in the technology used to implement the 
flight-control functions has been due to the fantastic development in 
electronic technology, especially digital technology. (7) Everyone 
who has debated the question of when they should buy a calculator cannot 
help but be impressed by both the increase in functional capability 
17 
and the decrease in price. It is only natural that these developments 
would also have a significant impact. on flight-control systems. 
It is not the intention of this report to give a review of the 
current developments in eleccronic technology or to attempt to predict 
future developments. HO\>TeW;:!r, a few basic trends will be mentioned to 
',' IA,\ 
increase the awareness,,»f khq significance of the implications on 
flight-control equipmel!t". S,6me of these implications will be dis-
cussed with particul,<Ar elttpl{asis on validation and certification 
impact. 
2.3.1 Trends in ~ital Technology 
The most significant trend in digital technology is the continual 
increase in the number of equivalent components th;lt can be placed on 
a single semiconductor chip. fi The costs per chip remains relatively 
constant, whichl means that the cost per function is dropping signifi-
cantly. These. trends are shown in Figure 2-4. (7) Complexity has been 
doubling every year for the past several years. Some of the factors 
allowing .this increased density are beginning to reach their theoretical 
limits, which is likely to slow the growth rate by half. However, a 
doubling of capability every 2 years give~ Some fantastic possibilities 
for the future. Chips are now being developed with 25,000 to 30,000 
transistoLS. These new chips are giving rise to the new term--VLSI 
(very-large-scale integration). 
The mo,3t important component made from this technology is the 
microprocessor. Predicted trends for the computing speed and the cost 
of a complete microcomputer made from a microprocessor chip is shown 
in Figures 2-5 and 2-6. Their rapid pace of development will be signi-
ficant for aircraft systems in at least two ways. On the low end, the 
microprocessors that currently exist are getting less expensive. This 
trend will encourage the use of a much larger number of microprocessors 
in atypical system. Processors are likely to be embedded within 
sensors, actuators, displays, etc., which will increase their effective-
ness. On the high end, microprocessors are getting more capable and 
will be able to take over the central flight-control computer functions. 
High-end microprocessors do not exist yet, but they are expected soon 
and will be able to 
(1) Perform more than a half-million instructions per second. 
(2) Address more than a million a-bit bytes of memory. 
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{3} Operate on 16-bit data. 
{4} Have a large instruction set, including multiply and divide. 
{5} Have on-chip program memory of up to 32,000 bits. 
The advances in technology that are making the cost per function 
significantly less does not necessarily mean that total systems costs 
are going down. It is most likely that the costs for total flight-
control electronics will stay constant or even rise. The big change 
will be in the capabilities of the systems. The real significance of 
the technical advances is that the high performance and very high fault 
tolerance needed for the advanced active control functions can be ob-
tained for reasonable costs. The compatibility of these two trends 
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toward lower cost and greater complexity are well illustrated by 
Figures 2-7 and 2-8. In Figure 2~7, the forecast of cost per packaged 
logic gate is given. In Figure 2-8 (taken from Reference 8), the 
increased complexity of more advanced flight-control equipment is shown 
when analog technology is used. The significant thing to note in this 
figure is that the tremendous increase in complexity is due to the 
redundancy requirements and not the control functions themselves. 
This reference assumes that the electronics needed to perform the 
advanced control functions would be only about three times as complex 
as a single conventional channel. However, the total complexity would 
be 25 to 60 times a single channel to achieve the dual fail-operative 
capability that would be required for flight-critical active control 
21 
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F'igure 2-7. Forecast of cost per packaged gate. 
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Figure 2..;.8. Forecast of increased complexity for future 
flight-control systems. 
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functions. It can thus be seen that this tremendous increase in com-
plexity would not be feasible wIthout the simplifications and reduced .. 
cost provided 'b¥ digital technology. 
The costs for this great increase in complexity are not completely 
compensated for by the reduced cost of the hardware i'tself. The engi-
neering cost to develop these complex systems will be significant. The 
hardware cost for a digital system can become low because of the high 
production rates of identical digital chips. However, the thing that 
makes these identical chips perform the complex functions is software 
programs. The high cost of designing a complex system has not gone 
away, it has just moved from hardware to software. To illustrate this 
shift, the cbst of a memory can be compared ''lith the cost of the program 
in that memory with a medium-complexity program of 32,000 instructions. 
Figure 2-4 predicts that memory costs are expected to approach 0.1 cent 
per bit, giving a hardware cost of $500 for 32,000 16-bit instructions. 
Figure 2-9 gives the rising cost of programming. The cost for coding 
alone for a 32,000-instruction program would be at least $250,000. If 
a total of 500 units is produced, which is not unusualJ,y small for 
\.:1 
commercial avionic equipment, the amortized cost of the program equals 
the hardware costs. 
In summary, it can be said that the expansion of flight-control 
furrctions and the explosion of digital technology are going hand-in-
hand to cause significant changes in flight-control systems. On the 
one hand, the expansion of functions is requiring more complex electronic 
systems. On the other hand, the development of more complex and less 
expensive equipment is encouraging the u~e of this new equipment to 
perform functions that had not previously been considered possible. 
section 2.3.2 outlines some of the ways digital technology is likely 
to impact flight-control systems, particularly from the viewpoint of 
validation and certification. 
2.3.2 Impact of Digital Technology 
The introduction of digital technology can impact flight-control 
systems in two ways: the hardware used to perform a traditional function 
~~:n change, and new technology can encourage the introduction of new 
functions. In the second case, the impact on the validation and certifi-
cation process is more related .to the new function being performed than 
to the technology being used to perform the function. The new t~hnology 
=] 
, 
! 
, 
i , 
-! 
'-I 
.' I 
1 
.i 
~ 
.!! 
8 
7 
~6 
z 
o 
t 
:J 
~ 
Z 
~ 6 
8 
4 
3~--------~------~--------~--------~--~ 1950 -~9GO 1965 
YEAR 
1970 1976 
Figure 2-9. Average programming cost per 
instruction. 
has only a second-order effect in that it makes the new function 
practical. Some of the implications of these new functions have already 
been discussed. In the first case, a change to digital technology to 
perform a traditional function may also have little impact on the 
certification process unless the change in technology changes the 
basic organization of the system. 
2.3.3 pigital Technology Within the Existing Organizational Structure 
If a particular functional box such as an autopilot channel is 
mechanized using digital technology instead of analog, there may be 
little change in the certification process. The basic validation tasks 
are: 
(1) To assure that, given the necessary inputs, the outputs 
from the unit have the required performance to execute 
the function. 
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(2) To analyze the failure modes of the unit to assure that 
the probability of failure for that function meets the 
requirements • 
. :tt is likely that the technology used will have little influence on 
the performance testing; the failure analysis will be more influenced 
by the technology. There will be different types of failure modes to 
be considered. There has been concern that lightning and other electro-
magnetic interference will have different effects on digital technology 
than they did on analog. There has also been concern for software 
validation. However, for a single functiom\l unit such as an autopilot 
channel, the software would likely be implemented in a fixed memory 
and would be analogous to the circuit design 'Of an analog system. In 
fact, current analog autopilots contain much dedicated digital logic 
to implement much of the mode-switching and failure-monitoring functions. 
Microprocessors are now so inexpensive that if a design engineer were 
asked to implement the same functions that exist in the current genera-
tion of autopilots, he would probably use microprocessor chips with 
little thought that anyone would care. Although digital technology 
must be well understood, particularly for fault analysis, it may have 
no more impact on the basic certification process than other changes in 
technology, for example going from ac to dc autopilots. Thus, little 
change is expected in certification if only the technology inside a 
box is changed with little change in the function or organization of 
the boxes, and only noncritical systems are considered. 
It cou.1d thus be argued that digital technology itself might have 
little effect on the certification process. If a new function is 
performed, the certification of that new function may not be influenced 
by what technology performs the functions. On the other hand, if a 
unit continues to perform a traditional function with only the change 
in the technology inside the box, again the certification may be little 
influenced by the technology. However, there is another potential 
effect of digital technology that could have significant influence on 
the entire certification process. This effect is the influence digital 
technol()gy might have on the way avionics systems are organized. 
2.3.4 The Development of a New Digital structure: The Contrast B~tween 
Traditional Structure and Digital Structure 
As digital technology is introduced, the natural tendency is to 
continue to maintain the same basic structure for the avionics system. 
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i~he tradi tioIl!al avionics system structure is based on a collection of 
functional uni~~. There has been a natural and automatic assumption 
that a function i,s equivalent to a box. Thus, the design, manufacturing, 
maintenance, and cextification of a function is equated with performing, 
these functions on the box that executes that function. The total 
functional requirements for the aircraft are thus performed by a 
collection of boxes each providing the required functions. This is the 
natural consequence of electl,""Ol-:lechanical or analog technology. However, 
this is not necessarily the 9ptimum organization when digital processors 
are used. The ideal objective is to design the entire avionics system 
to perform all req~ired functions in the -most effective way and also to 
meet all other requirements for reliability, maintainability, etc. 
The possibility for a different organization results from the basic 
character of a digital processor. The heart of a processor is a group 
of circuits, which sequentially execute a set of general ar.ithmetic 
and logical instructions. There is a memory to store the set of inst.ruc-
tions (software program) necessary to porform the function. There must 
be interface circuits to bring in the required information and convert 
it to the digital form necessary for use by the particular processor. 
There must also be circuits to convert the results of the digital 
operations to the form necessary to implement the function. There is 
also memory to store the input, output, and intermediate data until it 
is used by the sequential logic circuits. This basic structure of 
arithmetic logic, memory, input interface, and output interface is 
presently independent of the function to be performed. This basic 
structure in block diagram form is shown in Figure 2-10. 
iNPUTS 
INPUT 
INTERFACE 
FIXED 
PROGRAM 
MEMORY 
i----i~ SEQUENTIAL 
PROCESSOR 
DYNAMIC 
VARIABLE 
MEMORY 
OUTPUT 
INTERFACE 
OUTPUTS 
Figure 2-10. Basic structure of a digital system. 
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A basic difference between systems that use a digital processor 
and those that do not can be explained as follows. In a system without 
a processor, circuits are dedicated full time to the performance of a 
particular function. In systems with a processor, the same g~neral­
purpose logic circuits sequentially perform a set of basic or,~rations, 
which together perform many functions. 
2.3.5 Consequences of the Digital structure 
One of the consequences of this basic difference in structure is 
that in many cases it may be relatively easy to implement more than one 
function in one processor. Some of the implications of multifunction 
digital systems can be illustrated ~y an example of a system where the 
heading, attitude, air data, and basic autopilot functions are combined. 
This system is shown in simple block diagram form in Figure 2-11. The 
choice of which functions to combine is completely arbitrary and is made 
only to illustrate the idea. However, a system like this could be easily 
assembled with today's technology. Alt}lough the implementation of this 
system can be rather straightforward, there are aspects that would make 
it difficult to handle within traditional procedures. Some of the 
characteristics of this system will be described to illustrate the 
potential difficulties. 
INPUT OUTPUTI----....,-...c 
INTER-I--'l-.t SEQUENTIAL t--I-.tINTER- L-_--' 
FACE PROCESSOR FACE 
Figure_!2-ll. Basic diagram of a multifunction 
avionics system. 
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The outputs of the sensor units will be direct measurements of ,the 
individual sensors and will not be in a form that can be used directly 
or in the conventional form covered by the applicable regulations. For 
example, the output of the air-data sensors would be dynamic pressure, 
static pressure, and temperature. Air speed, altitude, or Mach number 
would be produced by a program stored in memory and executed by the 
processor. The vaJ.ues of altitude and air speed would be stored as 
digital words in the dynamic memory, converted periodically to the 
appropriate form, ~nd sent to the display device. 
In a simiL:;1r way, the inertial sensors will produce raw data, not 
the conventional op~rational parameters. It is likely in a new system 
that the inertial sensors will be hard mounted or "strapdown" to the 
aircraft structure. Three single-degree-of-freedom gyros and three 
accelerometers would be used, and their outputs combined by the processor 
with the data from the flux gate to produce attitude and heading. 
The autopilot function would be performed almost entirely within 
the processor. Autopilot commands would be received from a control 
panel. The reference air data, attitude, and heading would already be 
in the computer. The computed commands would be converted to the 
proper form and sent to the control actuators. 
To obtain the most efficient design, it may be desirable to mix 
data from different sensors. For example, vertical-speed output may 
be a combination of inertial data and air data to give a more instantan-
eous vertical speed. 
If all of these elements are combined into one line-replaceable 
unit (LRU), it may be possible just to combine all of the requirements 
for all the different functions and apply it to this new unit. However, 
this LRU may be too large or other factors are likely to make it unde-
sirable to put all of these dissimildr parts in one box. It is possible 
to assemble all necessary LRUs, consider them a system, and apply the 
requirements to the whole system. However, this process will become 
almost impossible if the different LRUs are built by different manu-
facturers. The customer may not want to obtain inertial sensors from 
the same people from whom he obtains air-data sensors. In this case, 
it will be necessary to develop criteria and standards that can be 
applied to the parts such that when the parts are put together the whole 
system meets the requirement. 
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It can thus be seen that digital technology makes new organiza-
tion structures possible, which can have a significant effect on how 
individual units are specified and certified. It is not yet clear 
what the most effective organizations will be. Some of the factors 
are discussed in the following subsection. 
2.3.6 Organization of the Total System Using Digital Technology 
One important question is how many different functions should be 
implemented in one processor. The extreme would be to perform all 
functions in one computer. This solution could be the most efficient 
fronl the hardware point of view, but would have many disadvantages from 
the reliability and maintainability point of view. This type of system 
seems to be the one envisioned by some in the commercial airline 
avionics industry when "integrated" digital avionics are proposed. They 
seem to envision a huge box with at least a thousand-pin connector with 
a mean time to failure almost as long as one flight. This box would 
nave to be removed almost every flight, would be very difficult to 
troubleshoot, and would have to be tested for every function it per-
formed before it was replaced in an aircraft. This image does not 
make integrated digital systems very attractive to the commercial 
communit.y. 
In spite of obvious disadvantages of extreme centralization, the 
equally obvious advantages of combining some functions into the same 
box is also clear. In fact, very practical systems are now being proposed 
for new aircraft using multifunction units. These proposed systems 
use several computers and group functions within computers using such 
criteria as flight critical vs. nonflight critical, dispatch vs. non-
dispatch, and the natural interrelationships between functions. Certi-
fication requirements also influence the choice of what to combine. 
An alternative organizational structure that might be even more 
efficient would take advantage of the natural organiZational structure 
of a processor and create the most effective LRU size by having separate 
processor modules, memory modules, input interface modules, output 
interface modules, sensor modules, etc. A standard digital-data-interchange 
system would be established, and the organization of the system would 
allow multiple processors to be used to provide the necessary capacity, 
failure protection, and dispatch reliability. The total set of functional 
requirements would thus be Inet by the total set of basic modules in the 
mo~t efficient way. 
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This kind of avionic system organization will, however, require 
new thinking and new techniques to provide the validation necessary to 
assure that all the different regulatory requirements are met for all 
the different functions. With this organization, no one unit will be 
primarily responsible for performing a particular function and most 
units will be involved in more than one function. For example, the in-
puts for a flight-control function may come in through two or more 
interface units depending on the type of signal. One interface unit 
may be involved with digital signals, while another would be involved 
with analog signals. Also, the same interface units will probably 
bring in other signals used by other functions besides flight control. 
For example, an analog-data-acquisition unit can accommodate additional 
signals very efficiently by multiplexing these signals into the same 
signal conditioners and analog-to-digital converters. One or more 
different units may be used to provide the necessary outputs for this 
flight-control funct.ion. The algorithms that produce the functions 
would be performed by a central complex of proc~:-,;s.Lng units, which 
would also be included in almost every other function. 
This type of organization would also allow the most effective 
utilization of sensor signals. For example, in a conventionally organ-
ized system an inertial-sensor unit would be required to produce roll, 
pitch, heading, and possibly ground speed. The ground speed would be 
used in a wind-sh~ar-detection function. with this conventional organ-
ization, the inertial sensors would have to be of sufficiently high 
quality to meet the requirements for each of these parameters. In a 
more integrated modular'·.system structure, the basic measurements of 
the individual sensors· would be interfaced directly into the processing 
complex. within the processors, all available sensor information would 
be .combined in the most efficient way to provide the basic information 
on the attitude, velocity, and position of the aircraft. This arrange-
ment makes it possible to use radio navigation or air data to improve 
and calibrate the inertial sensors. It is thus possible to meet the 
ultimate accuracy requirements for a particular parameter and use les.s 
expensive basic sensors. 
The operation of the system can become even more complex when 
potential failure modes are considered. Any flight-critical function 
is likely to be fail operational; that is, it will continue to function 
after anyone failure. This requirement means that for every unit 
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involved in a fail-operational function, there must be an alternate to 
provide the same operation.' In most cases there will be duplicate units. 
However, in other cases the same ultimate function may be provided by 
different types of units. For example, a combination of inertial and 
air data might replace radio data for short-term navigation. 
2.3.7 Implications of Digital Technology on the Certification Process 
The characteristics, described thus far-those that are made 
potentially very desirable by digital technology--do ha~e obvious impli-
cations on the certification process. One basic problem is to educate 
everyone involved in the design, building, operation, maintenance, and 
certification about the new concepts involved and the implications of 
these new concepts. Much of the current body of experience and pro-
cedures is built around a functional unit performing a basic flight 
fUnction. Most Technical Standard Orders (TSOs) envision a unit per-
forming a particular function. These TSOs give the testing required on 
the unit to validate its performance in supplying the desired flight 
function. It will be more difficult to define the test when these 
functions are performed by a cQllection of units. The difficulty will 
be increased when these units are involved in many other functions that 
must meet other TSOs, and particularly when the different units are 
made by different manufacture,rs. 
The potentiai new approaches to avionics system organization may 
require new validation and certification procedures or at least a new 
way of thinking. The processor may be involved in almost every function. 
However, instead of being tested in combination with many other units to 
see if it properly pe~forms the flight-operational function, it would 
be tested to assure that it performs properly its basic operations ,of 
add, subtract, multiply, and divide along with the associated logical 
functions. At some time by analysis or system test.i:ng, it will be 
necessary to show that when each unit performs its basic function pro-
perly and when these units are combined, the total system will meet all 
requirements. It may be necessary to develop new techniques to validate 
the individual units of a system in order for the certification require-
ments not to place unnecessary constraints on the design of the system. 
It wiLl be necessary to make the validation process clear early in the 
development of new aircraft so that these requirements can be fully under-
stood by ,the ,system designers and can be reasonably accounted .for in 
-'~---:':"'-': 
the initial design. 
32 
'. ,
2.4 Evolving System Organization 
2.4.1 Basic Organizational Consideration.s 
Functions that are performed by flight-control systems and the 
technology that is available to perform these functions have been dis-
cussed. The question to be considered now is: How can this technology 
be organized into a system that performs the desired functions? 
2.4~1.1 Reliability Considerations 
One of the most important factors influencing the configuration of 
the system is the required reliability for the function. All early and 
many present applications of electronic flight-control equipment perform 
auxiliary or supplemental functions. These functions are not flight 
critical: a failure can usually be easily recognized and the function 
taken over by the pilot. It is only important that they not fail 
"hard-over" or in some other way create a hazardous condition. In many 
cases, these functions are only a convenience, are not essential, and 
-(:hus are not required to dispatch the aircraft. In this situation, 'the 
,\ 
d~sign organization is usually straightforward. A single channel will 
be adequate for most applications. When a function is not too complex 
and can be accomplished in one major electronic LRU with associated 
sensors and actuators, a probability of failure per flight hour of 
approximately 10-3 to 10-4 can usually be achieved. This reliability 
is sufficient in these cases. 
When a high functional reliability is required, a more complex 
system organization is needed. In the extreme case where a catastrophic 
event results from a complete system failure, the probability of such a 
failure must be extremely improbable, i.e., on the order of 10-9 • If it 
were possible to build a simple syst~m with this level of reliability, 
the organization would not be affected by the increased reliability 
requirements. However, reliabilities of this magnitude are not pre-
sently practical in electronic equipment. The computer for the Apollo 
space vehicles was probably one of the most reliable single complex 
digital processors ever built. It has a demonstrated mean time between 
failure (MTBF) of 70,000 hours. The cost of achieving this reliability 
was very high. However, a system using this computer still would not 
meet the reliablity requirements for a flight-critical function in a 
commercial airplane. It is thus necessary to achieve the required 
reliability in some other way. 
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, 2.4.1.2 Hedundant;' Channels 
The only p:r:actical way of achieving the desired.'operational relia-
" bijd t~ is to user, redundant f.::hannElls. As discussed e;.irlier, one channel 
ol. e1i~ctronic fJ.ight-contro1 equipment can b/a expect;ed to have a pro-
qabi1ri·ty of fun.ctiona1 fai~l\lre of 10-3 to 10-4 per flight hour. Thus,. 
a m~n.imum of two channels would bepecessarv if a ,probability of failure 
,ot /0-6 were required and at least thre~c::hannels for 10-9 • More than 
thf~ minimum are needed if comparisons are used t() monitor for failures. 
Tli!e important question now is how to arrange the,se channels to assure 
th~ :'
(1) A failed channel has no effect on the output. 
(2') The failed channel can be identifi,ed. 
(3)' The prop'arly operating channels are used. 
(I!) There is .no common mode of failure. 
(5) No sin'::lle event that is not its/a1f extremely improbable 
I 
can cause all channels to fail~ 
The most 'I::ri tical problem is to aSf$Ure that a failed channel does 
not affect the output. There are two major approaches to this problem: . 
il. d' f . t' . v9fang an se.:_ '-mOnl_ ·or~ng. 
2.4.1.3 Vot:ing Systems 
To obtain a fail-operational capability with the probability of 
functional. failure down to 10-6 per hour using the voting method, three 
channels are used. A circuit that selects the middle value of three 
outputs is the usual method used 'co assure that a channel with a failed 
output is not used. The bad channel can be identified by comparing it 
wi th t.he result of this vote. The bad channf~l can then be removed and 
the b/o remaining channels continue 'co operate in a fail-passive mode 
by comparing with each other. If they disagree, they can both be dis-
abled. 
2. 4.1. 4 self-M6\itoring Systems 
The other major approach is self·-monitoring within the channel, 
which assures that failu']:es can be detecte.d and the channel can shut 
itself off. There are several ways this self-monitoring is accomplished. 
Special circuits called built-in test equipment (BITE) are used" .T~ese 
circuits can test the tolerance of power-supply levels and many other 
simiiartypes of failures within the channel. It is difficult, however, 
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to achieve more than 90 percent coverage of all possible faults. Another 
method of analog-system self-monitoring is comparison with an essentially 
identical model channel. This method is used when full coverage of all 
possible errors is necessa.J;:'y. This technique is basically very similar 
to voting between two channels. However, the redundant monitoring circuits 
are usually within the same LRU, and all circuits may not be duplicated. 
For example, in an autopilot, the circuits involved in the automatic 
landing mode would be duplicated, while the circuits only involved in 
cruise modes might not be duplicated. 
When~:~;l tal technology is used, self-test can be implemented more 
effectivi;-:ly and with less additional hardware. As was discussed earlier, 
systems employing digital processors are basically operated sequentially. 
That is, the same circuits are used to rapidly perform basic operations. 
The sum total of many basic operations produces the required functions. 
Since the same circuits are used repetitively, the proper operation of 
the circuits can be confirmed by performing test ope'rations. For 
example, a test software program can be performed, 'IOihich executes every 
instruction in the processor and compares the result with the correct 
answers. Using techniques like. this, the probability of an undetected 
failure in the processor can be made extremely small. nany of the support 
circuits are also multiplexed. For example, analog signals may be brought 
in through multiplexed signal conditioners and analog-to-digital converters. 
A test signal can also be brought in, which will test the operation of 
all cornmon circuits. Program memory Can be effectively tested by simply 
using a software test program that adds all permanent memory locations 
and compares the resulting sum with a predetermined check-sum. If any 
bit is gained or lost the sum will not check. To be sure the computer 
does not just quit or become hung in an infinite loop, a "watchdog" 
timer can be used. This timer has to be reset by the software program 
each time it completes its critical computation loop. If the timer is 
not reset, it will flag the computer as failed. 
2.4.2 Typical System Configurations 
Systems have been assembled to represent both the voting and self-
monitoring approaches, and various combinations in between. Brief 
descriptions are given of several different existing and proposed flight-
control systems that illustrate several different system organizations. 
It is not the purpose of this report to give a complete description of 
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of a dual-mon~tored digital flight-control system. A simplified block 
diagram' of the system is shown in Figure 2-14. It is designed to be 
fail-safe for all failures, and fail-operational for failures in the 
computer and memory units. The self-tests within the computer and 
memory are considered to be sufficient to identify their own failures 
to a high degree of confidence. The self-test monitoring functions are 
related to those developed for the Swedish Viggen fighter. The Viggen 
uses a sin.gle fail-safe system, which achieves a probability of cata-
strophic failure of 10-6 • 
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Figure 2-14. system block diagram for the 
Air Force DIGITAC A-7 system. 
The function of the DIGITAC system in the A-7 is to perform stability 
augmentation and pilot-relief autopilot modes. The mechanical control 
linkages were not removed, and the stability augmentation is not flight 
critical. The aircraft can thus be safely flown after a complete system 
failure. 
The flight tests were very successful in demonstrating the capability 
of digital flight-control system and in establishing a technology base 
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for the development of future systems. Development problems uncovered 
by this program are contributing to future del'ligns. One example is the 
problem of interaction between self-test routines. In one instance, a 
power-supply problem caused one computer to fail. An unforeseen timing 
situation in the self-test of the cross-computer data link caused the 
good computer to shut itself off. This problem was corrected. However, 
its existence shows t!1a.t these kinds of interactions must be studied 
very carefully. 
2.4.2.2 Triplex Configurations 
The other major configuration used in current systems is triplex 
with voting. Brief descriptions are given of the B-747, Air Force YC-14 
Advanced Medium S'l'OL Transport, and NASA F-8 DFm'l. 
1 
B-747--The fail-operational autoland option of the 8-747 flight-
control system is a triplex system ~sing analog technology. This sys-
tem useS three independent channels feeding three secondary actuators. 
With a single failure, the system continues to operate even if the failed 
channel is not disconnected. 
YC-14 Digital Flight-Control System--The YC-14 system uses a triple-
redundant set of electronics and multiple aerodynamic surfaces to achieve 
fail-operational/fail-safe performance. (12) A schematic of the system 
is given in Figure 2-15. A unique feature of this system is that the 
three computers are interconnected'with a fiber-optic system. Thus, 
there is no electrical connection between the three computers. The system 
provides automati) signal selection, failure detection, failure isolation, 
failure warning, and failure isolation confirmation during flight-critical 
operations. The input signal selection guarantees that all computers 
will use the same numbers and thus produce identical outputs. The output 
is selected as the midvalue of the three values. The system continues 
to operate after the first failure by taking the average of the two 
remaining systems. When the two remaining systems disagree, they are 
both disabled and the aircraft is flown manually. 
The YC-14 is intended to be a full-time system to enhance aircraft 
performance and to give it excellent flying qualities with low-workload 
conventional piloting techniques by compensating for the unusual STOL 
powered lift characteristics. The system is made fail-operational to 
give a low probability that the flight c'haracteristics will change. 
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Figure 2-15. YC-14 electrical flight-control system schematic. 
However, if there is a second failure, the aircraft ca n be flown manually 
with increased pilot workload and some l i mitations of the operational 
fli ght envelope. 
NASA F-8 DFBW System--The basic configuration of the F-8 DFBW system 
is shown in Figure 2-16. This system also has three primary digital 
channels . A major distinction of the system is that the backup control 
. 
system is also el ctronic. The mechanical linkage between the pilot's 
controls and the aerodynamic surfaces have been removed. The system is 
thus tru ly fly-by-wire. Another major distinction is that the primary 
system is fault tolerant with transient fault recovery capability. 
The critical input sensors are triplex, and the data from each of 
th redundant sensors is supplied to all ~hree computers . Identical 
si nal-selection programs are performed in each computer. This signal 
selection identifies nd removes the effects of failed sensors and 
produces identical input signals for a ch of the three comput ers. Th se 
identica l inputs ar used by the ~omputers to produce three control-
surface command outputs. The midvalue of th thr e commands is selected 
by three different servo-control-electronics channels. These three 
channels drive the three sections of triplex force-summed secondary 
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Figure 2-16. F-8 DFm;;r control system mechanization. 
actuators. These secondary actuators replace the function of the 
original mechanical linkages, and command the primary power actuators. 
The selection logic in the analog drive channels will identify and 
eliminate a failed digital channel if its cowmand signals deviate signifi-
0, 
cantly from the other tW0. The system will continue operating using 
~ 
the two remaining good channels. ~1any of the faults detected are tran-
sient and the system has the capability of restarting the failed channel 
and returnihg to full three-channel op,eration. If the fault is perma-
nent so that only two channels remain and they do not agree, the system 
reverts to a triplex direct analog coupling between the pilot commands 
and the servo drives. This computer bypass system does not provide 
stability augmentation, command augmentation, or autopilot functions. 
However, this system allows the aircraft to be safely flown manually. 
The triple digital system backed up by a triple analog system gives a 
probability of failure of the fly-by-wire function due to identified 
random failure sources that is lower than 10-9 • 
2.4.2.3 Emerging Configurations 
It can be seen from the previous examples that electronic f1.ight-
control systems are progressing from functions that are optional and, 
if used, are only flight critical for a very short time to those that 
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are flight critical all the time. FutUre systems employing more flight-
critical CCV modes or fly-by'-wire require configurations with progressively 
lower probabilities of complete system failure. Two such systems will 
be briefly discussed, which illustrate possible future configurations. 
One is now flying on the Space Shuttle and the other is a concept which 
indicates future trends. 
Shuttle Orbiter Computer system--Flight control of the Shuttle 
Orbiter is the responsibility of a highly complex integrated digital 
computer system. A simplified diagram of the system is 3hown in 
Figure 2-17. Five identical computers are used, which are connected to 
each other and to peripheral devices by a system of redundant serial 
data buses. There are seven groups of buses. The number in, each group 
is shown on the figure. Only three of these groups are involved in the 
flight-critical functions that could be compared with a system used on 
a conventional aircraft. The other buses and much of the peripheral 
equipment is involved with functions such as telemetry, launch operations, 
and payload systems. 
During approach and landing, the primary flight-control function 
is performed by identical programs in four of the five computers. Each 
of the redundant-sensor subsystems is connected to a different bus, which 
is controlled by one of the computers. However, since all computers 
are connected to all buses, the computers that are not commanding a 
particular bus can listen to the data being requested. In this way, 
identical data is available to all computers. Identical flight-control 
commands can thus be computed by each processor. Each channel of the 
voting actuators is connected to a different bus. The computer responsible 
for that bus sends the commands to that actuator, channel. Each computer 
monitors the command data sent out by each of the other computers. In 
order to prevent data skew of either inputs or outputs, a synchronization 
program is employed, which uses discrete signals sent back and forth 
between computers on the intercommunication bus. 
In order to guard against the possibility of a complete failure 
due to some generic fault in the system software, the fifth computer 
performs a backup function. This computer uses a different program 
developed by a different organization from the programs in the primary 
computers. In this way the Shuttle system has been able to place 
reliance on a completely digital fly-by-wire syste~ with no mechanical 
~ 
or analog backup means to control the vehicle. It thus represents the 
most flight-critical, pure digital control system in operation to date. 
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Onboard Survivable Integrated Redundant and Interface system--As the 
desire for more capable and more reliable flight-control systems increases, 
and as the technology that make these systems possible becomes available 
and less expensive, more effective and more complex system structt:Jres are 
likely to emerge. One example of the more advanced systems being con-
ceived and developed is called OSIRIS'--an Onboard Survivable Integrated 
Redundant Information System. (13) This system will be described briefly 
to give a glimpse of what kind of systems might be coming in the future. 
Elements of this system include a fault-tolerant multiprocessor, (14) 
a damage-and-fault-tolerant digital data information network, (15) dis-
tributed local processors, and operational software for fault detection, 
identification, and recovery, for the entire system. 
A diagram of the fault-tolerant multiprocessor (FTMP) is shown in 
Figure 2-18. The FTMP is made up of redundant sets of processors, memory 
units, and input/output interface units. These units are connected by 
redundant data bases. All processing is performed by triads of units. 
Three processors, three memories, and three buses are configured into a 
processing set, which performs identical operations. Using this technique, 
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Figure 2-18. Fault-tolerant multiprocessor. 
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any failure can be immediately detected and the failed unit removed. 
The total. processing requirement is met by combining several sets of 
these processing triads into a multiprocessor system. 
To illustrate the operation of the FTMP, assume that the total 
processing needs for the central controllers of an avionics system 
require three processor sets. This example system would be constructed 
with ten processors. Nine processors would be configured into a three-
set multiprocessor. The tenth would be a spare. The processors making 
up the triads would be continually reconfigured so that any failure of 
the spare processor would be quickly detected. If one processor· 
failed, it would be replaced by the spare and the system would continue 
to operate normally. When the second processor failed, many peripheral 
functions would be lost, but two new spares would be created making it 
extremely improbable that the system would ever retluce to only one 
triad. With only two sets operating, the system would not be able to 
perform long-term support functions, such as maintenance monitoring. 
However, two sets would provide almost all operational capability needed 
for a particular flight. Wit.h only one set working, much of the opera-
tional capability would be lost, but the aircraft could be safely flown 
and landed. The operational envelope may have to be reduced and pilot 
workload would be higher. Needless to say, the probability that there 
would not be enough processors to sjlpport one triad is extremely small. 
This multiprocessing design allows relatively low capability processors 
to be used, making possible efficient use of spare units and graceful 
degradation of capability. It is likely that future high-end micro-
processors will be able to perform this task. 
The FTMP forms the central controller to manage the entire OSIRIS 
system, but the FTMP is not intended to be a central computer performing 
all processing tasks in the system. The total system is built up of a 
hierarchical set of processors with tasks done at as low a level as 
possible to allow for the maximum practical functional independence. 
There would be local processors associated with particular sensors, 
actuators, and displays, and middle level processors associated with 
different fu~ctional groups such as navigation. 
All of the elements of the system would be connected by a network 
of communication links between each of the nodes in the system. A very 
simple eight-node network is shown in Figure 2-19. This network is so 
designed that any node can communicate with any other node if any link 
is lost or if any node fails. 
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Figure 2-19. Simple eight-node network. 
2.4.3 Implications of Different Configurations 
Different system configurations will have different implications 
for the validation and certification process. Some systems will be 
relatively straightforward and easy to understand so ,that the magnitude 
of the analysis task will not be unusually large. Other systems, by the 
nature of their configurations and design philosophies, will be much 
more difficult to analyze. This situation presents a challenge and a 
responsibility to the system designer and the certification authority. 
The system designer must recognize that validation and certification 
are real system requirements. The system should be designed to make 
these steps as easy as possible within the constraints of other competing 
system requirements. On the other hand, the certifying authority mU.st· 
have the capability and willingness to understand and perform the extra 
effort necessary to certify a complex system if that complex systen can 
be shown to be more cost effective. 
Two of the currently most common configurations--dual-monitored 
and triplex-voting--could have significantly different validation 
requirements. For example, a triplex-voting system can be more straight-
forward. Since fail-operational capability is usually obtained by a 
majority vote, it may not be critical to identify and analyze the nature 
of all possible failure modes within each channel. No matter what the 
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failure is, if it has a significant effect on the output, the effect 
will be detected and eliminated by the voting process, and the failed 
channel can be identified. It is important in this configuration' to 
assure that; there are no common mode failures and that the voting process 
itself is not the source of a critical failure. 
On the other hand, the dual-nonitored system may require considerably 
more analysis of failure modes and effects. It is necessary to assure 
that all failure modes have been identified and that all with potentially 
critical effects are either extremely improbable or that the system is 
capable of detecting the fault and eliminating its effects. The analysis 
required to gain' the necessary assurance that all failure modes have 
been properly accounted for may be much greater than the equivalent 
triplex system to achieve the same confidence of fault tolerance. The 
reward, however, would be one less channel of. hardware. On the other 
hand, the complications necessary to assure full monitoring in a dual-
monitored system may be more expensive than the third channel. The 
design eng.ineer and certifying engineer should understand each other's 
responsibility enough that the technical~y most efficient design is 
• • • • r'»( 
obtained without any artl.fl.cl.al constraul;t:;s. 
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SECTION 3 
NASA ADVANCED FLIGHT-CONTROL PROGRAM 
The F-8 DFBW flight experiment is a research flight-test program 
being carried out within NASA to provide the technology required for 
implementation of Advanced Digital Fly-by-Wire control systems in 
future aircraft, permitting, greater operational capability and in-
creased performance. The program is being carried out using an F-8 
test aircraft. 
3.1 Brief History of the Program 
The program has been divided into two major phases. The first 
phase, which began in 1971 and concluded in 1973, successfully demon-
strated the feasiblity of using DFBW systems for the primary control 
of aircraft. This was accomplished by flight testing a single-channel 
DFBW system in the F-8 test aircraft. A surplus Apollo guidance and 
navigation computer was used for the primary flight-control system, 
and the basic F-8 mechanical system was completely removed. Forty-
two flights were accomplished during this phase by six evaluation 
pilots, and a total flight time of 58 hours was accumulated. Histor-
ically, this was the first recorded flight of an aircraft using as 
its primary means of flight control a Digital Fly-bY-Wire system, 
with no mechanical backup means. 
The second phase of the program began in 1973 and is currently 
underway. The overall Phase II program objective is to establish 
a data base which can be used in the design and development of practi-
cal DFBW systems for future aircraft. To accomplish this objective, 
the simplex Phase I system has been replaced with a triplex multi-
channel DFBW system, which uses fully programmable state-of-the-art 
digital processors for primary flight control. The first flight with 
the Phase II system occurred in August 1976, a!~d sincs that time, over 
/' 
50 flights have been successfully accomplished. The flight-test pro-
gram has been successful both in demonstrating a practical DFBW 
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design concept that works, and in developing required operational pro-
cedures. This is also the only airplane primary flight-control DFBW 
system currently in operation that does not employ a means for mechanical 
reversion in the event of failure. 
One of the tasks accomplished during Phase II has been the implemen-
tation and flight-test verification of certain basic concepts to be utilized 
in the Space Shuttle control system, which is to be the first practical 
application of DFBW technology. Use of the F-8 as a test bed resulted in 
early availability of redundancy management flight-test experience, as 
well as the verification of other concepts of particular concern in support 
of the Space Shuttle Orbiter Development Schedule. It is a tribute to the 
flexibility of DFBW systems in general to have accomplished a multitude of 
tasks relatively easily in terms of cost and schedule constraints. 
The F-8 DFBW program is managed out of the Electronics Division of 
the Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology (OAST) at NASA Headquarters. 
The project office resides at the Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC), 
which has functioned as the lead center during the entire program. Other 
NASA centers have been jointly involved. The Langley Research Center (LARC) 
has been responsible for development of certain advanced control law con-
cepts for fliqht-test evaluation of the Phase II system. The Johnson Space 
Center (JSC) has been jointly responsible for coordinating all shuttle-
related flight tests. 
3.2 Brief Summary of the Flight-Test Program 
A summary of the flight-test program accomplishments to date is pre-
sented in Figure 3-1. During the 50 flights accomplished thus far, all 
control modes have been engaged and evaluated using the various control 
tasks that are listed. The various data generated during the accomplish-
ment of these flights has contributed greatly to expanding the technology 
data base for the DFBW controls, and in accomplishing the F-8 DFBW program 
objectives. Of primary significance is the fact that at no time during 
ground or flight tests of the flight-qualified system has a total DFCS 
failure occurred requiring use of the analog bypass system for aircraft 
control. 
The current flight-test schedule for the F-8 DFBW program is shown 
in Figure 3-2. This includes completion of the remotely augmented vehicle 
facility development during the current year (1978) and using this capability 
as a means to evaluate an advanced adaptive control law concept. Also in~ 
eluded are low sampling rate investigations. An Analytical Redundancy 
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• NUMBER OF FLIGHTS . .. . .. ...... .•.•... . . .... ..... . 60 
• TOTAL FLIGHT TIME . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • . . • . . . . . . . 55 h 
• MAXIMUM SPEED ............... .. . • . .••.. ....... . . MACH 1.2 
• MAXIMUM ALTITUDE ........ .. . .......• .. .... . ..... 12.200 nl 
• MAXIMUM ACCELERATION ......... . .. . . . ••. . .. . .. ... 8, 
• NUMBER OF PILOTS .............. . .. . ... • . . . ....... 4 
• CONTROL MODES EVAL UATED 
- DIRECT 
- STABILITY AUGMENTATION (SAS' 
- COMMAND AUGMENTATION (CAS' 
- AUTOPILOT : 
MACH HOLD 
ALTITUDE HOLD 
HEADING HOLD 
ATTITUDE HOLD 
- RIDE SMOOTHI NG 
- MANUEVER DRAG REDUCTION (MDR ' 
- REMOTE AUGMENTATION (R AV' 
- SIDE- STICK CONTROLLER 
- ANGLE-OF - ATTACK LIMITER 
• EV A LUATION TASK S 
- ROUTINE FLIGHT 
- HANDLING QUALITIES INPUTS 
- FORMATION 
- TRACKING 
- MODERATE~EVERETURBULENCE 
- SIMULATED SHUTTLE LANDI NGS 
• FLIGHT- TEST V ERIFICATION OF SHUTTLE RM SOFTWARE 
• EVALUATION OF PILOT WORKLOAD DURING SHUTTLE LANDING MANU EVER 
• ESTABLISHED HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES FOR 
DFBW SYSTEMS 
• FOUR IN- FL IGHT COMPUTER FAILURES - DEMOt~STRATED VALIDITY OF 
FAILURE DETECTION AND RECOVERY ALGORITHMS 
• NO TOTAL SYSTEM FAI I.URE REQUIRING USE OF ANALOG BYPASS SYSTEM. 
Figure 3-1. Fligh t -test summary. 
BASELINE CONTROL- LAW TESTS 
REMO TELY AUGMENTED FACILITY 
DEV~LOPMENT 
LOW SAMPLE RATE TESTS 
ADAPTI VE CONTROL LAW 
ANA LYTICAL REDUNDANCY 
MANAGEME NT ALGORITHM 
LIGHTNING SUSCEPTABILITY 
T ESTS (NASA/AIR FORCE' 
BACKUP SOFTWAR~ & TEST 
Fi gure 3-2. 
CY 
Current flight-test schedule. 
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Management (ARM) algqrithm is to be evaluated in flight during 1979, in 
addition to assessing th~susceptibility of the Phase II system to 
induced lightning transients. The lightning susceptibility tests will 
be carried out on the ground using special equipment and techniques 
,I) 
developed by the Air Force EMI Hazards Division of the Flight Dynamics 
Laboratory (FDL). Special backup software algorithms are to be developed 
and tested during the. 1980 time period, addressing the generic software 
failure problem associated with redundant digi"'tal systems. 
" 
)./ 
'/, I) 
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SECTION 4 
DIGITAL FLY-BY-WIRE PROGRAM EXPERIENCE 
This section first describes the system requirements. These require-
ments include both those specific to this program and those more generic 
specifications that would be typical of an advanced ,primary flight-control 
system. The requirements that must be met in order to qualify the system 
for flight are then given. Finally, a description of the system is given. 
This description includes a brief overview of each of the units in the 
system, how they are installed in the aircraft, and how they are integrated 
into an operating system. Particular emphasis is placed on how fault 
tolerance is achieved to~provide a very high level of functional reliability. 
4.1 System Requirements 
4.1.1 Mission-Specific Specifications 
The requirements for the F-8 DFBW system can be divided into two 
categories: mission-specific and generic. The mission-specific reqJire-
ments (shown in Figure 4-1) are those determined by operational considera-
tions, installation constraints, program funding and schedule guidelines. 
The system was specified to be triplex, using government-furnished general-
purpose digital computers, because a triplex configuration would present 
all the problems of multicomputer operation and could be installed within 
the volume available in the F-8. 
Program funding did not permit the procurement of an inertial 
platform set, as might have been desirable in this program. Therefore, 
aircraft-quality rate gyros and accelerometers were specified. The 
sensor and command lines were specified to be dedicated hardwire. Multi-
plexing was not possible within program funding. 
Experience in the Phase I program and a state-of-the-art assessment 
in actuator stabilization resulted in the specification that this stabili-
zation be done using analog components, outside of the digital computer, 
53 
, 
~ 
l' i 
• TRIPLEX COMPUTERS/INTERFACE UNIT 
• GOVERNMENT-FURNISHEO COMPUTERS 
• AIRCRAFT -QUALITY MOTION SENSORS 
TRIPLEX: INNER-LOOP CONTROL 
DUPLEX: AIR DATA, AUTOPILOT 
• NO INERTIAL PLATFORM 
• NO SENSOR OR COMMAND SIGNAL MULTIPLEXING 
• ANALOG STABILIZATION/EQUALIZATION OF ACTUATORS 
• ASSEMB L Y -LANGUAGE; PROGRAMMING 
• INDEPENDENT ANALOG FLY-BY-WIRE SYSTEM FOR EMERGENCV BACKUP 
• CCMPUTER/IFU ON CENTRAL PALLET 
Figure 4-1. Mission-specific requirements. 
due to the sample rate requirements and computational burden. Current 
microprocessor technology makes digital control of actuators feasible 
and attractive. The use of a secondary actuator to drive the existing 
F-8 power. actuators ins~ead of a new integrated actuator was dictated 
by the burden of requalifying the primary actuation system of the F-8, 
including flutter clearance. 
Assembly-language programming was specified for the F-8 DFBW 
system. This was due to the fact that a qualified high-order language 
was not available for the flight computer at the time programming ,was 
initiated. 
!rh~ research nature of the primary DFBW flight-control system re-
quired an independent dissimilar backup control system. The primary 
motivation was to protect against a common-mode software error that would 
disable the entire primary system. 
Finally, the available volume in the F-8 required custom packaging. 
The computers and interface units were specified to be mounted in a 
removable pallet asoembly. Flight-control sensors were to be installed 
in easily accessible locations. 
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4.1.2 Generic Specifications 
The generic specificatio~s are those that tend to be independent 
of the particular: application. The'y represen't the fundamental operating 
characteristics of the system. In the case of the F-S DFBW system, 
these requirements were selected to both tax the technology and to 
represent realistic and achievable specifications for a primary flight-
control system. 
4.1.2.1 Overall Fault Tolerance 
The key system fault-tolerance issues can be stated in the following 
manner: 
(1) No single faul~ in the primary digital system shall cause 
degraded inner loop performance. 
(2) No second fault in the primary system shall result in a 
hazardous situation. 
(3) No sequence of sensor or display failures shall result in 
an automatic transfer to the bypass system. 
(4) No single fault in the primary digital system shall result 
in a transfer to the bypass system. 
(5) The loss of two computing channels in the primary system 
shall result in an automatic transfer to the bypass system. 
(6) No primary system fault sequence shall prevent manual 
transfer to the bypass system. 
Figure 4-2 shows the fault-tolerance requirements for each major 
system. Generally, fail-operational requirements were ,c;pecified for 
each system. A second like fault in any system has ~iffering conse-
quences, depending on the actual device faulted. 
4.1.2.2 Primary-Digital-System Generic Requirements 
The requirements for the primary digital system are of particular 
interest. Figure 4-3 lists the major requirements that were imposed 
on the primary system. The overall fault-tolerance requirement, as 
explained previously, was fail-operational, with the second like maj;;r 
channel failure resulting in an automatic transfer to the bypass system. 
Single-channel digital operation was not permitted in the F-S 
DFBW aircraft because of the experimental nature of the system. Automatic 
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PRIMARY DIGITAL SYSTEM 
r---~-
I 
I 
INNER-LOOP SENSORS INTERFACE DIGITAL 
CONTROLS AND HARDWARE COMPUTERS 
INTERFACE 
DISCAETES 
I FAIL-OP FAIL-PASSIVE FAIL-Of' FAIL-O? FAIL-OP, FAIL PASSIVE r- (SOME TO CBS) FAIL-PASSIVE FAIL-PASSIVE 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
r-----------------~ 
OUTER-LOOP SENSORS I INDIVIDUAL-CHANNEL CONTROLS AND I BYPASS ELECTRONICS DISCRETES 
r--
FAIL-PAse'VE OR I FAIL-OP 
UMITED FAIL-OP I FAIL-SAFE CRITICAL POWER I 
L ~ _______ ,J f 
BASIC F-SC SYSTEM FAIL-OP, FAIL-OP 
PFCSPOWER r------, 
FAIL-OP FAIL-PASSIVE 
-(FAIL ,0 BYi>ASS) I I SECONDARY 
I POWER ACTUATOR I ACTUATORS 
I I FAIL-OP FAIL-DP FAI L-CONDITIONAL I ·;:-~!L-SAFE I t I 
• HYDRAULIC POWER I HYDRAULIC POWER I 
FAIL-OP I FAIL-OP 
FAIL-CONDITIONAL I FAIL-OP L _____ ~J 
Figure 4-2. Overall system fault-tolerance req:lirements. 
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AREA REQUIREMENT IMPLICATIONS 
FAULT'rOLERANCE • FAIL-oP/FAIL-SAFE • NO SINGLE-CHANNEL OPERATION 
,oj • SECOND FAIL TO BACKUP • REDUNDANT POWER SOURCES 
TURN-oN/OFF AUTOMATIC INITIALIZATION FROM NO CREW ACTION PERMITTED FOR STAAT-
ARBITRARY TURN-oN/OFF SEQUENCE UP 
rAULT DETECTION • HARD FAILURES TO BE NO PROVISION FOR REINITIALIZATION BY 
DETECTED WITHIN 200m. PILOT 
• HARD FAILURE DECLARATIONS TO BE IRREVERSIBLE 
RECONFIGURATION AUTOII1ATlC NO CREW ACTION ASSISTANCE PERMITTED 
IN FAULT ISOLATION 
TRANSIENT FAULT RECOVERY FULLY RESTARTABLE IN ANY CONTINUeD OPERATION FOLLOWING: 
CONFIGU~ATION/MODE 
• TEMPORARY POWER LOSS 
• TRANSIENT HARDWARE/SOFTWARE PROBLEM 
IMMUNITY TO FALSE ALARMS DESIGN TO BE HEAVILY WEIGHTED NO QUANTITATIVE REQUIREMENT 
TO AVOID FALSE ALARMS 
OUTPUT COMMAND VOTING ANALOG VOTING OF SURFACE NO SOFTWARE VOTE OF SURFACE 
COMMANDS COMMAND 
COMPUTER INTERCOMMUNI- MINUMUM POSSIBLE REDUCE COMMON-MODE ERROl;! SOURCES 
CATION 
SYNCHRONIZATION FRAME OR MINOR CYCLE ONL Y 
CONTROL-LAW INTERFACE MULTICOMPUTER STRUCTURE TO CONTROL LAWS WRITTEN AS FOR SINGLE 
BE TRANSPARENT TO CONTROL LAWS COMPUTER 
SYSTEM 'INTEGRITY • FULL TIME MAN-RATING REQUIRED PRIOR TO FIRST 
• FULL CONTROL SURFACE 
FLIGHT 
AUTHORITY 
.. FLIGHT CRITICAL CONTROL 
• NO MECHANICAL REVERSION 
Figure 4-3. Generic system design requirements. 
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initialization from any arbit.rary turn on/off sequence was specified so 
as to exclude the crew froni any special action. 
The 200-millisecond hard-failure fault-detection time was based 
on F-8 dynamic response at high dynamic pressure flight conditions. Hard 
failures were to be irreversible, with no provision for pilot reselection. 
All reconfiguration logic was to be automatic with no pilot participation 
permitted in the fault-isolation process .• 
The system was to be fully restartable in any mode following a 
transient fault. This meant that a channel or channels would be restored 
to normal operation followinq unspecified transient faults. There is 
always a problem in defining a transien.t fault. In the F-S digital 
system, transient faults were divided into two categories: power loss 
(or apparent power loss) and all others. 
The transient survivability times were defined as: 
(1) Single-channel external-source power 10ss--no time limit. 
(2) Multichannel power 10ss--40 milliseconds. 
(3) Detected fault any type--200 milliseconds. 
This meant that a single channel was required to be restored to normal 
operation after being powered down for any indefinite period of time. 
This requirement is also necessary in order to be able to turn the 
system on. If power was lost by two or three channels for less than 
40 milliseconds, the primary system was to be restored to normal 
operation and continue to be in control of the aircraft. If this 
power loss occurred for more than 40 milliseconds, the bypass system 
was to effect an automatic takeover. It should be noted that the pri-
mary system was still required to be restored to normal operation 
following a long power interruption, even though command had been 
handed over to the bypass system. 
For detected faults, that is, for conditions where execution is 
apparently continuing, but where an abnormal clondi tion has been detected, 
including an internal power supply fault, the transient time was 
specified to be 200 milliseconds. This is based on 10 attempts to 
restore normal operation at the nominal 20-millisecond minor cycle, and 
is the maximum time a fault can be tolerated at critical F-8 flight 
conditions. These requirements are illustrated in Figure 4-4. 
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EXTERNAL POWER FAILUR,E (flUS) 
>40 ml- CONTROL TRANSFER TO BYPASS 
POWER CHANNEL A 
NO POWER- ____ '-____ .1 
u u CHANNELB 
u ....... -_1 CHANNELC 
OTHER FAULT 
-I <2ooml I- >200 ms - HARD FAILURE TO BE DECLARED . 
NOFAULT ... I Jr--;'~(~'\---'L 
FAULT -------' ,':' ""---t---~":'""'"------
Figure 4-4. Transient fault survivability requirements. 
False-alarm immunity was recognized to be a critical characteristic 
of the DFBW system. A requirement was imposed that the system was to 
be weighted in favor of continued or restored operation in all cases 
possible. It was not known how this requirement could be proven 
analytically, thus no quantitative specification was given. Actual 
operating experience would give an insight into this feature of the 
system. 
In the preliminary design it became apparent that special con-
sideration had to be given to the problem of undetected digital system 
failures occurring in a sequence that would cause hazardous commands 
to be generated. The solution chosen was to require analog output 
voting on the digital-system surface commands. This approach was taken 
to protect against a catastrophic fault sequence in a manner independent 
of digital system software or failure-detection logic. 
In an attempt to reduce the possibility of interchannel fault 
propagation, it was specified that intercomputer communication was to 
be kept to an absolute minimum, with design approaches deliberately 
avoiding complex computer intercommuncations. 
S9 
Synchronization was specified explicit.ly to be frame or minor 
cycle only. Thus the computers, while being tightly synchronized, would 
not be in exact step. This was specified in order to permit a simpler 
interface unit design and to permit a "looser" more tolerant system 
operation. 
The control-law or applications software was specified to be inde-
pendent of the multicomputer structure, with the redundant hardware trans-
parent to application routines. 
Fin~lly, overall system characteristics were specifi~d. The digital 
system was to operate full-time and in fact be the primary (albeit 
experimental) flight-control system of the airplane. It would be used 
during the first takeoff and landing. The flight-critical system was 
to be given full surface authority in all three axes. The mechanical 
system had already been removed during the first phase of the F-8 DFBW 
program. It would not be available. These requirements meant that the 
primary system would have to be fully man-rated and flight qualified 
prior to the first flight. 
4.1.2.3 Application Software Specification 
The application software was specified to be a set of control 
modes typical of those projected for future active control vehicles. 
These control laws, in the form of a detailed software specification 
included: 
(1) Pitch-Command-Augmentation system 
(2) Lateral-Dire(~tional Augmentation 
(3) Angle-of-Attack Limiter 
(4) ~ide-Smoothing system 
(5) Maneuver Flap System 
(6) Standard Autopilot Functions 
(7) Control-stick Steering 
Figure 4-5 illustrates the major control-law functions and the 
control surfaces involved. Additional control laws were to be examined 
as part of the advanced control research program. 
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MACH HOLD 
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Figure 4-5. F-8 DFBW baseline control system. 
4.1.3 Miscellaneous Requirements 
An interactive built-in preflight test program was Spe9ified that 
would assure primary system integrity prior to flight. This test would 
not test software itself, but the system interfaces with the software. 
Figure 4-6 illustrates those interfaces to be examined in the preflight 
test, and the source of signal activation. The preflight test program 
was to be a non-obstrusive test routine, which, as much as possible, 
would utilize the actual operating software. sequencing of the test 
was to be via the Cockpit Computer Input Panel. For hangar testing or 
postflight analysis, hard-copy test results were -to be available. For 
the ramp preflight test, test results were to be logged, with the 
software making a Go/NO-Go decision on t:ne test data. 
Several other requirements were specified because of the experi-
mental nature of the primary digital system. These included: 
(1) Real-time displays for ground testirlg. 
(2) Extensive logging of computer and sensor redundcfncy 
I 
management operation. /1! 
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Figure 4-6. Preflight self-test software interfaces. 
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(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
Logging of alarms representing abnormal performance. 
Data link to an onboard tape recorder of 1000 32-bit words 
per second. 
various pilot-initiated programs for the Computer Input Panel. 
4.2 Flight-Qualification Requirements 
Flight qualification involved all the steps in the process whereby 
the DFBW system was determined to be ready for first flight. This pro-
cess included hardware, software, and system qualification. Much of 
the hardware qualification, especially that for the nondigital elements, 
involved practices conunonly used and well understo~d, and hence, is 
only lightly treated in this report. 
Figure 4-7 illustrates the overall flight-qualification process 
for the F-8 DFBW system. For purposes of illustration, the hardware 
and software paths are shown completely distinct, although that is 
somewhat misleading. In fact, where there is not a very close technical 
and organizational interface between the two paths, success is impro-
bable. While there are some unique aspects of software, it should be 
90inted out that the de-:;'eicopment and qualification processes are very 
\\ 
similar to those of hardwar~. That is, there are parallel and analogous 
'steps in the two paths. In this respect, software development is more 
like hardware development than like something else. The .fullowing 
sections describe the requirements that were imposed as part of the 
overall qualification process. 1\ 
.\ 
4.2.1 Design Requirements 
Configuration control was required in the design of b6~h hardware 
and software. For hardware, standard practice was followed ih. the design 
\\ by the use of revision control for drawings and documents, engineerihg-
':. ~(h4nge report forms, and an overall configuration contrDl plan • 
\" 
III the case of software, similar requirements I were impo~ed prior 
t(}oftware design. These were composed of the following specific 
items: 
(1) Flow Charting: It is exceedingly difficult to det~El~t:ine, 
whether the software design meets the intent"-'orthe specifi-
cation if the software engineer never explicitly reveals 
his intent. In software, more so than in hardware, it is 
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Figure 4-7. Flight qualification process. 
,,~ 
necessary to describe what is intended to be done~ in the 
F-8 program, flow charting was required for all but the most 
obvious fUnctions. 
(2) Design-Change Documentation: Prior to coding, design changes 
were incorporated into the software specification, the 
(3) 
ruling document. 
Engineering Documentation: 
document the rationale for 
it was not straightforward. 
A memorandum system was used to 
algorithm implementation where 
These· documents were invaluable 
in the ensuing months and years when changes were considered. 
(4) Modular structure: This favorite expression is meaningless 
unless explicitly defined. Formal structured programming 
principles were not specified, but functional partitioning 
was required between the operating system (executi~:), system 
redundancy management, control laws, downlink, self-test, 
and I/O. It was desired that changes in these elements 
could be made independently. within the control laws, very 
specific modularity was specified which was mission-unique. 
(5) Built-In Test Points: ;One of the very critical qualities 
required of software ~b testability. If test points and 
test access are not de~ligned into the software, verification 
and validation are ham?ered, because special software must 
then be patched in or the flight code must be altered. 
Both options are undesirable as they occur late in the 
software build process and have a high potential for intro-
ducing errors into the flight software. In the F-B program, 
intermediate computations were required to be accessible. 
This increased timing and core requirements, but substan-
tially eased the verification job. In addition, several 
special displays and a data link were built in to provide 
real-time data recovery. 
The quality assurance steps in the design phase are carried out 
by designers insofar as they seek independent assessments of their 
design. This was not an explicit requirement, however. 
Two system-level reviews were held during the design phase. One. 
was a technical preliminary design review. Fo~ software, this involved 
the review of top-level flow charts. The secol)Q{Elview was part of 
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,the regular DE;RC Quality Assurance (QA) policy, and involved an inde-
pendent assessment of the design from safety, reliability, and mission-
success points of view. This review was conduqted by DFRC person~el 
not directly involved in the program •. 
"' 4.2.2 I)!'luild Require~~nts ~\I 
Whe;-eas the hardware build phase represents a relatively straight-
forward transformation of d~sign drawings to actual circuit layout, 
." " soft~!are build often involves a more artistic transformation of flow-
c~Frted des"ign into actual code. Good programming practice, experience, 
and an understanding of the problem.,~greatly reduce the artistic element. 
NASA DFRC did not specify coding strategy, but there were programming 
rules enforced within the programming team. 
Debug, representnlg elementary checkout of bits and pieces of the 
code to achieve execution, corresponds closely" to circuit checks that 
are made in hardware as it is built. Quality assurance in the hardware 
build is comprised of inspection. Software quality assurance is today 
only ~n emerging technique in this phase of software development. In 
the, F-8 program, independent inspection by other programmers comprised 
quality aSsurance. This was not required formally by NASA, however. 
The failure modes and effects analyses were to be carried out 
during this period of time. This consisted of analyses for the 
actuators, bypass system and servo electronics, and-for the primary 
digital system. An independent FMEA was not";required for the digital 
computer. Rather, fault detection capabilities within the computer 
software and hardware were considered in the system FMEA. 
The system critical design reviews are generally conducted before 
significant amounts of the hardware or software were built, (less than 
10 percent). Detail-level flow charts and skeleton code are reviewed 
in the case of the software. 
4.2.3 Stand-Alone"Tests 
pr~or ,to system integration, stand-alone hardware and software 
testing was required. For hardware, these tests were: 
11 
(1) Functional Tests: Te-sting of entire functions was required 
such as analog-to-digital input, and digital-co-analog 
output, signal processing, etc. Simple test software 
routines were used to drive the hardware • 
. " 
f . 
. t 
I 
(2) Environmental Tests: Temperature, altitude, and vibration 
tests were required on the entire flight hardware pallet. 
In these tests, it would be desirable to have software 
which exercised every function in ~he digital computer and 
in the interface hardware simultaneously. Such a program 
would have been very expensive to build and so compromises 
were necessary. Computer environmental tests were to be 
performed separately with the manufacturer-supplied functional 
test program which would thoroughly exercise the computer 
operation. Flight pallet environmental tests were to be 
conducted using special test software which would exercise 
the major system functions. 
(3) Initial Acceptance Test: This is a functional test using 
an operational software package. It was to be performed 
prior to delivery by the contractor, and after initial 
systems integration. The test was to demonstrate top-level 
functional operation and all hardware interconnections. It 
was to be performed in a stand-alone open-loop manner. 
(4) Reliability Test: The requirement was to have 100 continuous 
failure-free hours of operation within 200 hours of normal 
utilization. 
Stant;' -alone software testing was specified as consisting of module 
verification and program validation: 
(1) Module Verification: These tests were to show that the 
individual modules of code executed and met the requirements 
of the software specifications, such as the sensor read 
module. 
(2) Program Validation: These tests were to show that the 
collection of modules operated together to perform the 
intended functions of the Soft.ware Specification, such as 
computer synchronization. 
4.2.4 System-Level Tests 
i The system-level tests were to be accomplished at NASA DFRC and 
·lJ 
to/ere composed of: 
(1) Final Acceptance Test: This was to be similar to the Initial 
Acceptance Test except it would be accomplished with the 
system installed in the iron bird. 
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(2) Independent Verification and Validation: These tests would 
duplicate most of the module verification and program 
validation tests previously accomplished, but would be 
accomplished on an operational system. 
(3) System Validation Tests: These tests were for the purpose 
of establishing that the system met the mission requirements 
for closed-loop fault-tolerant primary flight control. They 
were to include dynamic control law tests, and fault-
tolerance tests. 
(4) Failure I·lodes and Effects Tests: These tests were to be 
accomplished to validate the failure modes and effects 
~nalyses. They were specified to be based on the manifesta-
tions of component faults, not on component faults themselves. 
Thus, this testing would not include a part-by-part fault 
test. Component faults within the computer were not to be 
induced. Thus, a computer was to be considered a single 
(5) 
item which could have categories of fault manifestations. 
EM! Tests: These modest tests were specified to aSSUre non-
interfering operation of the flight control system and other 
aircraft avionics, and to verify digital system immunity 
to noise induced on the power lines themselves. 
(6) Piloted Fr.lET: These tests were to demonstrate acceptable 
closed-loop reaction to categories of faults previously 
examined in the detailed failure modes and effects tests,. 
and to verify fault-tolerance requirem~nts of major 
subsystems, such as actuators, hydraulics, electrical power, 
etc .• 
(7) Piloted Mission: These tests were to demonstrate mission 
suitability of the DFBW system. It was specified that some 
of these tests would be accomplished using all flight 
hardwar~ in the iron bird. 
The technical software/system readiness review was identified to 
take place when all testing had been completed, and the system was 
technically considered ready for flight. The flight readiness review 
is a QA function which involves the concurrence of an independent I:;loard 
on the state of flight readiness. The final determination of flight 
readiness r~sts wit.~ the Flight Operations Directorate. 
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The "similLlt"itics beb-Jeen hardware and software development require-
ments far outweigh the differences. The form of the object under develop-
ment is, of course, different. The F-8 DFBN flight qualification require-
ments started in the design, as does any good flight qualification plan. 
It depended heavily on traceability, documented configurations, independ-
ent verification LInd validation, and independent mission safety assess-
ments. It also depended heavily on pilot assessment in the iron-bird 
simulation. 
4.3 The Phase II F-8 DFBN System(16,l7) 
The major components of the F-8 DFBN system are (refer to 
Figure 2-16 for the basic configuration): 
(1) Digital Computers (3) (see Figure 4-8). 
(2) Interface Unit (IFU) (3 independent sections in one chassis 
(shown with the computers in Figure 4-9). 
(3) Sensor Pullet (3 rate gyros on each axis and 3 accelerometers 
on each axis for n total of 18 sensors) (see Figure 4-10). 
(4) Additional Sensors (2 heading and attitude systems, 2 angle-
of-attack sensors, 1 slideslip sensor, and 3 sensors for 
each pilot control). 
(5) Cockpit Control and Display (Encoder/Decoder, Mode and Gain 
Panel, Annuncintor Panel, Digital Autopilot Panel, and 
Computer Input Panel) (see Figure 4-11). 
(6) Computer BypLlSS and Servo Electronic System (CBS) (3 
including comnmnd-signal voting and servo amplifiers) (see 
Figure 4-12). 
(7) Secondary Actuators (5 including right and left aileron, 
right and left elevator, and rudder) (see Figure 4-13). 
These major components will be described individually to give 
nn understanding of the basic characteristics and operation of each 
unit. The physical installation of this equipment in the aircraft 
will then be briefly outlined, and the overall operation of the system 
described. Particular emphasis will be placed on the failure-detection 
and redundancy management techniques. 
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Fig ure 4-8 . Central processo r unit. 
Figure 4-9. Pallet assembly containing the i nterface unit and 
thr c n r 1 p roc sors. 
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Figur 4-1 0. Inertial sensor assembl y . 
MODE AND 
GAINS 
ANNU NCIATOR 
Figure 4-11. Cockpit panel •• 
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Figure 4- 12. Computer bypass and s ervo electronics 
system ins tal led in airplane. 
rigur 4-13. Tr iplex s condary servoactuator assembly. 
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4.3.1 DFBW F-8 Major Components 
4.3.1.1 Computer 
The AP-IOI computer used in the F-8 DFBW is similar to that used 
in the Space Shuttle. This computer \>las developed over the 1972-1973 
time period. It is a general-purpose stored-program parallel machine. 
It works with both 16- and 32-bit words. It has a microprogrammed instruc-
tion set with 146 total instructions. These instructions include both fixed-
point and floating-point operations. The fixed-point add time is approxi-
mately 1. 5 microseconds, and multiply is approximately 5.5 microseconds. 
Fleating point add and multiply a1:e approximately 3 and 6 microseconds, 
respectively. The AP-I01 uses a magnetic-core memory with 32,768 36-bit 
words. The words include two parity bits and two store protect bits. The 
primary I/O for the computer is one 16-bit parallel channel with a 450,000 
halfword per second data rate. Direct-memory access is available through this 
chQnnel. There are also five external interrupts, four discrete inputs and 
outputs, and a real-time clock. The AP-IOI is basically one full ATR (19.3 x 
25.6 x 49.8 cm) and weighs 26 kg. Its primary power is 28 Vdc and it uses 
375 watts; it is cooled by individuaY blowers. Pigure 4-14 is an expanded 
view of the internal construction of the computer. The major char.acteristics 
are summarized in Table 4-1. 
4.3.1.2 Interface Unit (IFU) 
'I'he IFU con tains the equ ipment necessary to process and condition 
the I/O signals .Eor the three digital flight computers. The IFU was 
specially designed and built for the F-8 OFBN program. There are actually 
three electrically independent IFU channels, one for each processor. 
Because of F-8C installation requirements the three channels are packaged 
within a single enclosure. Each IFU channel is interfaced with only the 
one processor, and can be thought of logically as part of the processor. 
Each IFU channel is responsible for f6~i major functions: 
(1) To provide conditioning of input signals, convert the analog 
signals to digital form, and provide buffer memory for input 
data. 
(2) io process outP\lt signals and perform digita1-to-analog 
conversions. 
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Figure 4-14. Computer internal construction. 
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Table 4-1. Digital control computer characteristics. 
Component Characteristic 
I 
Central Processor Unit 
Number system 
'I:. 
Operation 
Fixed-point data 
Floating-point data 
Typical execution times, 
register to register: (ps) 
Fl;:Xed point: 
Addition 
totul tiplicil tion 
Division 
Floating point: 
AdditIon 
r.tul tiplica tion 
Division 
Average instruction rate 
(per second) 
Binary, fixed point, two's comple-
ment, fractional floating point 
Full parallel 
16 and 32 bits, including sign 
-32 bits (24-bit mantissa) and' 60{ 
bits (56-bit manti~sa) 
1.2 
5" 2 
9.0 
3.2 
6.0 
10.0 
480,000 
), 
'I 
I-~-Ia-~-'I-l-s--t-o-r-a-g-e----------------------+-----------------------------------------~ 
; 
I 'l'ype 
Capacity 
Cycle time (ns) 
Addressable unit 
Features 
I Input-Output 
Type 
Maximum data rate (per second) 
Discretes 
External Interrupts 
Random access, destructive readout, 
ferrite magnetic core, nonvolatile 
32,768 words, 36 bits pei'word 
900 read/write 
l6-bit halfword 
Parity and store protect on halfword 
Parallel halfword plus parity, 
multiplex, half duplex 
225,000 full words 
Four input, four output 
Five levels 
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Table 4-1. Digital control computer characteristics. (Cont. ) 
1-------------------,.----------------------, 
Component Characteristic .. 
-----.-------------------4------------------------~----~ 
I 
I 
l 
Physical Characteristics 
Size 
Neight (kg) 
Volume (m3 ) 
Power (I~) 
environment 
1 ATR (19.3 cm high x 25.6 cm 
wide x 49.8 ern deep) 
26 
0.025 
375 
MIL-E-5400 Class 2X 
(3) Provide for interchannel data transfer between computers. 
(4) Participate in fail detection and redundancy management. 
A functional diagram of the IFU is shown in Figure 4-15. 
Control-The IFU is desi']ned to provide as simple an interface 
as possible for the computer progranIDler, with a minimum load placed on 
the processOl:. Each channel contains a microproeJranmled controller that 
decodes the computer commands and performs the requcsted input 01' 
output [unction. Th0 AP-10l computer has two forms of I/O that are 
used in the P-S DFB\" syste!'l; Direct Output and Buffer I/O. The Direct 
Output is used by the computer to conIDlBnd the If'u to perform a particu-
lar input or Olltput apcrntian. The Buffered I/O form is used by the IFU 
to executa the requC'sted operntion. 'l'he TFU either writes input data 
tnto complltcl: m0mory or reads dnta out of computer IUcmory for use as 
output. 
~Ilt-rl'hc LFU receives three different types of input signals; 
analog, discreto, nnd serial digital. The IFU is capable of handling 
32 analog signals including dc, ~c, and synchro. A list of the analog 
si9n~ls used is given in T~ble 4-2. There is capability for BO discretes; 
Table 4-3 is a list of the input: discrotes tlsed. There are also sel:i.al 
data inputs used for altitude and the encoder/decoder, which provides 
the interfaco wi~l the pilot control panels. 
C\~I.!:r2.!:.-F:ach chnnnt::'l of the IFU has capability of outputting 10 
analog signals with la-bit resolution and 28 discretes. In the flight 
configuration, only four analog outputs are used. Three of these out-
puts go to the horizontal stabilizer. ailerons, and rudder. The fourth 
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Table 4-2. Input sensors. 
Sensor 
Pitch rate 
Roll rate 
Yaw rate 
Axial acceleration 
Lateral acceleration 
Normal acceleration 
Pitch center-stick position 
Roll center-stick position 
Pitch side-stick force 
Roll side-stick force 
Rudder pedal position 
Angle of attack 
Angle of sideslip 
Horizontal stabilizer actuator 
position 
Surface positions (5) 
Pitch attitude 
Roll attitude 
Heading angle 
Wing position 
Mach number 
Altit,l~de 
Computer temperature 
Redundancy 
Level 
3 
3 
3 
" 
';--3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
1 
3 
1 
2 
2 
2 
3" 
2 
2 " 
1 
Signal Type 
dc 
dc 
dc 
dc 
dc 
dc 
ac LVDT 
ac LVDT 
ac LVDT 
ac LVDT 
ac LVDT 
dc 
dc 
dc Potentiometer 
dc Potentiometer 
Synchro 
Synchro 
Synchro 
dc Potentiometer 
de Potentiometer 
Serial digital 
de 
is a command f6r sYl11IT1etric ailerons, \V'hich provides for flaps and can be 
used for direct lift control. serial digital data is provided for the 
en00der/decoder. Also in this experimental system is a serial output 
to n data recorder. 
Buffer Memo1J[--Each IFU channel uses three buffer memories. Each 
memory has a capacity of 64 16-bit words. One memory is for the data 
from the resident channel and the other two are for data froln the other 
two channels. These two memories are used to allow data from the other 
two channels to be available to each computer 
to-computer data transfer. A buffer memory is 
channel and unloaded by the receiving channel. 
IFU is described in the following paragraphs. 
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and also to allow computer-
loaded by the sending 
'[.'he operation o!t the 
.. 
;, 
t", 
i 
I 
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Table 4-3. Input discretes. 
Discrete Redundaricy 
Level 
" 
Mode select 3 
Autopilot panel 2 
/ Annunciator reset 2 
Trim 2 
Side-stick enable " 3 
CIP digits 1 
ClP enter/clear 2 
Wing up/down 3 
Weight on wheels 1 
Gain switches 1 
Gear position 3 
Autopilot disconnect 1 
Computer bypass status 3 
. 
Operation of the IFU--An input or output transaction is initiated 
by command from the computer. There are five commands: Data In, Data 
Out, Crosslink Out, Crosslink In, and Downlink. 
Data In-- When the computer commands Data In, the IFU converts 
the analog and discrete data into the proper form, placing it simul-
taneously in the buffer memory of that IFU chanel and in the buffer 
memories reserved for that data in the other ,two IFU channels. 
Figure 4-16 is a diagram of these connections. \-Jhen the IFU has completed 
conversion of the first analog par~meter, it prepares to send the data 
to the computer from all three buffer memories. However, the IFU 
channel must wait until the other channels have sent their first encoded 
analog parameter to their buffer memory. Operation Timeout counter pre-
vents the failure of one channel from preventing the data from being ob-
tained from the operating channels.' If the timeout expires before the 
first parameter is received, the channel goes ahead, sending the data 
that is available. The data from the three memories is loaded alter-
nately one word at a time so that the redundant·-sensor information will 
be in adjacent locations. The complete analog parameter format is shown 
in Table 4-4. The DRRAV parameters are associated with the remotely 
augmented vehicle inode, which will be discussed later. Most of the rest 
of the parameters are self-explanatory. 
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Figure 4~16. Input. 
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Data Out-~vhen the IFU receives the Data Out command, it reads 
data out of computer memory and routes the data to the proper place to 
provide serial digital data output, discrete output, or to signal the 
digital-to-analog converters to provide the analog outputs. The analog 
outputs are wrapped around as analog inputs to provide monitoring of the 
outputs. 
Crosslink out and Crosslink In-The Crosslink commands are used 
to transfer data between computers. The crosslink process is shown 
in Figure 4-17. 
DO\vnlink-The Downlink command is used to move data from computer 
memory to a special buffer in the IFU. This data is then sent to an 
onboard digital recorder. The buffer memory holds 128 17-bit words. 
Data can be recorded at a rate of 2100 halfwords per second. 
4.3.1.3 Sensors 
There is a sensor pallet that was assembled and installed in the 
aircraft specifically for the DFBW system. The DFBW system also used 
several other aircraft sensors. 
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Table 4-4. Analog parameter list. 
No. Channel A Channel B Channel C , 
I 
0 DRRAV A DRRAV B DRRAV C 
1 DERAV A DERAV B DERAV C 
2 DFRAV A DFRAV B DFRAV C 
3 DARAV A DARAV B DARAV C 
4 Pitch Rate A Pitch Rate B Pi.tch Rate C 
5 aoll Rate A Roll Rate B Roll Rate C 
6 Yaw Rate A Yaw Rate B Yaw Rate C 
7 Axial Accel A Axial Accel B Axial Accel C 
8 Latl Accel A Latl Accel B Latl Accel C 
9 Norm Accel A Norm Accel B Norm Accel C 
10 P Ctr Stk A P Ctr Stk B I? Ctr Stk C 
11 R Ctr Stk A R Ctr Stk B R Ctr Stk C 
12 Pitch S Stk A Pitch S Stk B Pitch S Stk C 
13 Roll S Stk A Roll S Stk B Roll S Stk C 
14 Yaw Pedal A Yaw Pedal B 'law Pedal C 
15 Alpha A Alpha B 
16 Beta A 
-
,-
17 L Elev Posn A L Elev Posn B r~ Elev Posn C 
18 R Elev Posn A R Elev Posn B R Elev Posn C 
19 Pitch Att A Pitch Att B -
20 Roll Att A Roll Att B -
21 Yaw Att A Yaw Att B -
22 Ning Posn A Wing Posn B Wing Posn C 
23 Mach Coarse A Mach Coarse B L Ail Cpt 
24 Mach Fine A Mach Fine B R AH Cpt 
25 Rudder cpt L Elec Cpt R Elec cpt 
., 
P" 
.. 
26 DAC 00 Wrap A DAC 00 B DAC 00 C 
27 DAe 01 Wrap A DAC 01 B DAC 01 C 
28 DAC 02 Wrap A DAC 02 B DAC 02 C 
29 DAC 03 Wrap A DAC 03 B DAC 03 C 
. ·f 30 +28 Vdc Bus A +28 Vdc B +28 Vdc C 
," 31 Comp Temp A Comp Temp B Comp Temp C 
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Figure 4-17. Crosslink. 
The sensor pallet consists of nine gyros and nine accelerometers. 
There are three gyro assemblies, with three gyros in each assembly. 
Euch qyro in an assembly is mounted parallel to one major aircraft axis. 
The roll-axis gyros have capability to 240 degrees per second and the 
other two ~xes use 70-degree-per-second gyros. The arrangement for the 
af cl~rometers is tho same as for the gyros. The normal accelerometers 
at. 10 g und the lateral and longitudinal accelerometers are 2 g. 
The operation of the gyros and accelerometers is tested during 
the preflight test procedure by torquing the sensors in each direction 
by a command from the computer through the IFU. The gyros are also 
monitored continuously by a spin-motor run-detection sensor, which gives 
D discrete input to the IFU when the wheel is turning. 
The DFBW system also uses several other sensors, which are dis-
triuuted about the aircraft. There are triple-LVDT stick-position 
sensors for both roll and pitch control and also triple-LVDT sensors for 
the rudder pedals. There is also an experimental side-stick controller. 
Thus, there are triple-LVDT force sensors for both roll and pitch from the 
side stick. The system receives inputs from two angle-of-attack sensors 
and one sideslip sensor. Two heading and attitude reference systems 
are used in the system. Each provides three synchro signals: one for 
pitch, one for roll, and one for heading. Mach inputs are obtained as 
dc signals from two Mach meters. Altitude is obtained as serial digital 
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signals from two altimeters. There are also position sensors on the 
control surfaces, the horizontal stabilizer actuator, and the wing. 
The F-8C has~ .:it1~0-position ,,,ing in order to reduce the attitude of. 
th0 fuselage during landing. 
4.3.1.4 Pilot Control and Display 
The F-8 DFB\" has four pilot control and display panels. These 
units allow adequate visibility and flexibility in an experimen1~al system. 
Nany of the functions ,,,ould not be necessary or desired 011 a production 
system. Each of the panels is interfaced to the IFU an(~ computers by 
the encoder/decoder unit. 
l>lodc and Gain Panel (sec Figure 4-11) 
The l>lode and Gain Panel provides control of the major modes of the 
system and allo\"s. pilot control of selected parameteJrs. There are 
separate mode controls for eilch channel: roll, pitch and yaw. Each 
switch has triple contacts; these mode switches allow manual switching 
between the digital and analog systems. IHth the digital syS'tem there 
is also the choice between the Direct ~lode and augmented modes. The 
Direct Node ~lives a direct connection bet,,'een the pilot controls and 
the aerodynamic control surfaces. 
In the pitch channel, there is simple stability-augmentation (SAS) 
mode and a more highly ilugmented commane-augmentation (CAS) mode. 
'I'here are also lateral-direction SAS modes. The mode s,,,itches are 
lighted to indicate which mode is active. These lights indicate the 
mode both when manually selected or when the mode changes automatically 
due to Jystem-detected faults. 
There are three five-position gain switches on the panel. 'rhese 
switches can be tied through software to any parameter for which adjust-
ment is desired during that particular test flight. 
Digital Autopilot Panel (see Figure 4-11) 
The Digital Autopilot Panel is very simjlar to traditional autopilot 
control panels. It has a magnetically latched e.ngage switch and mode 
switches for altitude hold, Mach hold and heading. It also has a turn 
control switch. 
Annunciator Panel (se~ Figure 4-11) 
The Annunciator Panel is capable of displaying 20 separate indica-
tions; four of the indicators have a switch for reset. These displays include: 
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(1) Hardware-Detected Failures: Channel A Fail, Channel B Fail, 
Channel C r'ail. 
(2) Software-Detected Resettable Failures: Trim, Downmode, 
Self-'rest. 
(3) Status and Software Detected Failures: A Temp, B Temp, C Temp, 
P R/'\V, R RAV, Y Ri,\V, Flap, Air Data, Alpha, Center stick, 
Side stick, Rudder Pedal. 
Computer Input panel (see Figure 4-11) 
The Computer Input Panel allows the pilot to i~~tiate ~reprogrammed 
soft\"are functions. 'l'hcs(' include the control of an extensive preflight 
test program. In flight, control-system options can also be selected. 
The panel has two thul'lbwheel switches to select the program. The 
selected program is displayed on a three-digit display. The prcgram 
is initiated \"hen the Cnter button is pressed. 
4.3.1.5 Encoder/Decoder Unit 
'1'ho Encoder/Decoder Unit provides the interface between the control 
anJ display panels and the IFU. Although housed in one chassis, the 
unit contains independent channels for failure protection. 
4.3.1. 6 Somputer Bypass and Servo Electronic System (CnS) 
The CBS consists of three independent units, which provide most of 
the analog electronics necessary for the operation of the control actuators. 
The CBS provides three basic functions: it contains the control~loop 
electronics for the actuators; the selection logic and basic output 
failure detection for the analog command signals from the digi,tal 
system; and an analon link from the pilot controls to the servo elec-
tronics to serve as n backup in case of complete digital system failure. 
An overall diagram of the functions performed in the CBS is shown 
in Figure 4-18. The CBS receives and conditions the analog servo-
position commands from the digital computer system. The CBS also 
receives the cockpit control position sensors directly. There is a 
switch to allow selection of either the command signal from the digital 
system or the direct computer-bypass signal. The signal is then com-
pared with the signals from the other two channels, and the middle 
value is automatically selected as the one that will be used to command 
the servos. The output of the midvalue select is then compared with 
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the original signal from that channel. A difference greater than the 
specified limit for longer thon 40 milliseconds indicates a failure 
in that channel, and is used to switch off the failed channel. Figure 4-19 
is a diagram of this part of the system for channel A. 
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Figure 4-lQ. BCS switching and selection logic. 
ThL' CBS contains servo electronics, shown in Figure 4-20. The 
servo amplifier receives inputs from the selected midvalue position 
conmlnnd, the actuntor shaft position feedback, and a delta ... pressure-
equalizer signal. The delta-pressure-cqualizer signal is obtained 
from the midvalue of the delta pressures from the three chambers of 
the secondary actuator. This signal minimizes the low-frequency force 
fight thOlt occur!: in the high-pressure gain system. This circuit acts 
to drive the delta pres~ure of each value toward the midvalue of all 
three. This difference between the selected midvalue delta pressure 
and the delta pressure for that channel is used for fault detection. 
This fault-detection circuit includes all system elements after the 
midvalue select logic, and includes the actuator itself. 
If a fault is detected, the engage solenoid is disabled, supply 
pressure is dumped to return, and a bypass path a~ound the piston in 
the failed channel is opened. Faults are annunciated in the cockpit, 
and reset capabilitiy is provided to the pilot. A second failure in 
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tho same ilctu~tor results in that actuator being turned off. Mechanical 
centering sprin~s move the disabled actuator to a safe static position. 
4.3.1. 7 ~e£<2.1~~iary < l\c tua tor 
The secondary actuator is triply redundant and is capable of pro-
viding a single fail-opcrational/fail-neutral force-sharing operatio!l 
for <my two similar l1onsimultaneous failures. The actuator has three 
independent clcctrohydraulic channels. Each channel incorporates the 
following features and components: 
(1) 
(2 ) 
(3 ) 
IndepenJcnt hydraulic fluid supply. 
Two-stage olactrohydraulic flapper nozzle servo valve to 
control the actuator motion • 
Solenoid valve to port pressurized fluid to the servo valve 
and to the actuator chambers. 
(4) Engage valve, which by being engaged (energizing of the 
solenoid valve) allows the servo valve to port pressure 
into the actuator chambers, and by being disengaged (de-
fJ' energizing of the solenoid valve) puts the actuator into 
a bypass mode preventing hydraulic lock. 
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(5) Pressure transducer for 6P sensing, failure detection, and 
channel synchronization. 
(6) LVDT for position output sensing and feedb&ck-Ioop closurE<. 
A schematic diagram of the servo actuator is shown in Fi~ure 4-21, 
and a more detailed schematic of the electrohydraulic servo valve is 
shown in Figure 4-22. Table 4-5 lists the characteristics of the 
secondary and primary actuators. 
The servo actuator has been de3igned to assure that all failures 
are detected and that no single failure will cause hydraulic lock. Any 
passive failure in the electrohydraulic servo valve is detected by the 
fact that a null bias is built into the valve's first stage. A current 
of 10 percent of full value is required to hold the valve at null. If 
there is any failure in the coil or electrical connections, the null is 
not held and a delta pressur.e is generated, \-;hich is detected in the 
servo electronics and causes the channel to be shut off. The system 
"ON" solenoid is electrically fail-safe. If there is any electrical or 
coil failure, the valve will shut, disabling that channel to a passive 
condition. If there is a mechanical failure such as a broken spring, 
the valve could remain open when it should be closed because of some other 
failure. However, the actuator will still operate, though with reduced 
performance, because the other two channels can overcome any i,rregularity 
in the faulted Chan(lel. Moreover, experience shows that this kind of 
mechanical failure is extremely rare. 
lIydraulic lock is normally prevented by the engage valve. When 
the engage solenoid shuts off hydraulic pressure or pressure is lost 
for uny other reason, the engage valve is moved by a spring to the bypass 
condition. If the spring in the engage valve breaks, the channel could 
be locked by the electrohydraulic servo valve also being at null. This 
condition is prevented because the second-stage servo valve is also 
spring biased; if hydraulic pressure is lost, this valve will move 
harn over and prevent lock. 
4.3.2 Installation 
The Phase II DFBW system is installed in a Navy F-8C aircraft, 
which is single engine and single place, and is capable of supersonic 
flight. It has a two-position variable incidence wing for reducing 
fuselage attitude during the landing approach. The modifications to the 
aircraft for this program were all internal; there were no basic structural 
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Figure 4-21. Phase II hydraulic schematic, triplex 
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Figure 4-22. Phase II two-stage electrohydraulic 
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Table 4- 5. Actua tor characteristics. 
Bandwidth Slew Rate lIysteresis Force o r 
(rad/s) (percent of Torque 
f ull stroke) Output 
125.0 30 cm/s 0 .2 10,000 N 
12 . 5 25 deg/s 0 . 1 3,000 N-m 
30 . 0 70 deg/ s 0.1 1,030 N-m 
25 . 0 120 deg/s 0.1 356 N-m 
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Stroke 
:t 2.5 cm 
+6.75°, 
-2 6.5° 
+45°, 
-15° 
:t 21° 
,-
.if. 
or aerodynamic changes. The major change was the removal of the mech-
anical control linkages. The only other changes were the addition of 
the flight control sensors, electronics, and actuators. 
The location of the major elements of the system is shown in 
Figure 4-23. The three computers and the IFU are mounted on a pallet 
that was shown in Figure 4-9. The pallet is installed just behind the 
cockpit at the top of the fuselage. The computer bypass and servo 
drive electronics are mounted in the lower left side of the fuselage 
behind the cockpit. The locations of the control and display units 
are shown in Figure 4-24. The encoder/decoder unit is mounted in the 
nose to minimize the wire run lengths. The gyro and accelerometer 
sensor pallet is located near the center of gravity in the belly of the 
aircraft. The angle-of-attack and side-slip sensors are located on 
a boom in the front of the aircraft. The secondary actuators are 
located with the primary actuators and essentially connect to the same 
position as the original mechanical linkage. 
Cockpit panels 
Autopilot EJJ 
MOde~ 
Pallet assembly - computer 
and Interface unit 
Secondary actuators 151 
[}, [}, !b 
gain V/ Computer Input 
~anel 
<l I I ~ 
''\. 
~.rT"---;:::=oo-=:::::e: 
Encoder/decoder dW~ 
computer bypass system Sensor pallet - gyros 
and servodrlve electronics and acr.elerometers 
Figure 4-23. F-8 DFBW hardware elements. 
Electrical power to the flight-control system is obtained from three 
independent, buses, which are supplied by a dedicated engine-driven dc gen-
erator. Each bus is backed up by a 40-ampere-hour battery. These batteries 
can power the full digital system for 60 minutes in the ~vent of a generator 
failure. Tl,e batteries are isolated from each other by diodes and cir-
cuit breakerB and supply power whenever their voltage exceeds the voltage 
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Figure 4-24. Cockpit panel assembly. 
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on the buses. A battery is always on an individual bus with no switching 
involved. The flight-control system is not connected to the existing 
aircraft power systems except for ac power, which is needed for the com-
puter and pallet bl.owers anr~ attitude and Mach. A ram air turbine can 
be deployed if necessary to supply emergency ac power for the blowers. 
Three separate hydraulic power supplies are used for the three 
channels of the secondary actuators. Two of these are the existing 
system for the two channels of the primary power actuators. The third 
is the utility system used for landing gear, speed brakes, etc. One 
of the hydraulic systems can be powered in emergencies by the ram air 
turbine. 
4.3.3 System Operation 
A functional block diagram of the primary digital flight-control 
system in shown in FigUre 4-25. The operation of the system is controlled 
by the software program that is executed in the digital computers. First, 
an outline is given of the basic structure of the software program. Then, 
~ 
the operation of the system is described, starting with computer fault 
detection and synchronization, and continuing with the basic flow of 
the fli9ht-control problem from sensor data input, to control law 
computation, to actuator command output. Special emphasis is placed 
on how the system manages the redundant elements in each stage of the 
process. 
4.3.3.1 Software Organization 
The software that is stored in memory is a sequence of instructions 
to the computer processor. These instructions are performed sequentially 
to perform the primary function of the system: to produce the proper 
commands to the actuators contrQ1ling the aerodynamic control surfaces 
on the aircraft. To perform this primary function succnssfully and 
reliably, the',software must perform many other supporting functions. 
These functions include: 
(1) Maintain a synchronized mode of operation between the channels 
in the system. 
(2) Recover operation of a channel which has sustained a 
momentary failure. 
(3) Determine and act upon a hard failure of a channel. 
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Figure 4-25. Primary digital system mechanization. 
Secondary 
actuator 
(4) Perform data selection and failure detection on input data 
aifId act accordingly. 
(5) Inhtialize I/O functions and test for failures. 
(6) Schedule and dispatch the various jobs performed by the 
software. 
The software can be divided into four major program sections: 
(1) Executive 
(2) Control Law 
(3) Redundancy lilanagement 
( 4 ) Auxil iary 
Each section has particular functions; together they interact and work 
to ensure the successful operation of the entire system-both hardware 
and software contained in the aircraft. 
The Executive section performs program initialization, computer 
synchronization, intercomputer data exchange, interrupt processing, 
job scheduling and dispatching, downlink of data, and I/O functions. 
The Control Law section mechanizes various aircraft operational 
modes--Direct, Stability Augmentation System, Command Augmentation 
System, Autopilot and Remotely Augmented vehicle modes--and genera:tes 
the commands to the aircraft control surfaces. 
The Redunr;'ancy Management section performs input data selection, 
conversion, scaling, and biasing, and determination of both analog 
and discrete input failures. 
The -Auxiliary section contains the Computer Self-Test routines, 
the InitiaL Program Load routine, and the Preflight Test Program 
routines. 
. ..... 
The approximate memory allocations for the major program elemen-cs 
are shown in Figure 4-26. The software is executed- c:.s a sequence of 
minor cycles, which are initiated by a timer interrup~ generated within 
the computer, causing the program to stop doing whatever it was doing 
and begin executing the basic minor-loop program. The nominal time 
period for the minor loop is 20 milliseconds. This time can be varied 
for experimental purposes; however, most of the basic program functions 
are performed within 20 milliseconds. Some outer-loop control computa-
tions are partially performed with~n each minor cycle so that the whole 
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Figure 4-26. Software memory allocation. 
function is cOinpletcd in an> integral number of minor cycles, forming a 
major cycle. The sequence of'·execution of the program elements is 
given in Figure 4-27. 
4.3.3.2 Computer Fault Detection anll Synchronization 
The f:i,rst step in ensuring the proper operation of a digital-
processor-based flight-control system is to assure that the computers 
are working properly. Once full confidence can be placed in the 
computers, their significant processing power can be used to monitor 
faults in the rest of the system, including sensors, actuators, and 
associated support equipment. 
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Figure 4-27. Software sequence and timing during one 
minor cycle: three channels, direct modes. 
Fault detection can be divided into two different categories. One 
~" is self-testt where a unit performs~tests to determine its own health. 
The other category involves monitoring or testing by other units. Fault 
detection in both of these categories is performed in a hi~rarchy of 
different levels. Faults are detected on as low a level as possible. 
However, for faults that cannot be detected on a low level and for 
protection against any failure of the lower level techniques, higher 
level tests are used. The total set of tests is designed so that each 
test complements the others; together, the tests are able to cover the 
entire system and assure the required level of system integrity. 
The computers in the F-8 DFBW system are tested at several levels 
by both self-testing and external monitoring. These tests are performed 
both by special hardware and software. 
Self-Test-Each computer/IFU channel determines its own condition 
by using hardware built."in test equipment (BITE) and by software self-
test programs. The computer BITE detects faults in the execution of 
instructions, loss of power, parity errors in memory and failure of a 
go/no-go counter to be reset. The go/no-go counter is reset by a 
software command. ;,'Thus, 'I\this test will detect any kind of hardware, or 
software problem that will keep the program f;om completing its basic 
computation cycle in the proper time. Problems detected by this test 
include the program getting caught in a continuous loop or branching 
to the wrong part of the memory. 
Th~\ BITE in the' I~tJ channel tests for time out, oscillator 
\\ .. , 
The timeout assures that the IFU performs failure, ~rd power fa~).u:te. 
its basic ~perations within certain maximum time li~its. 
i 
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There are two categori&s of response to the detection of a BITE 
fault. certain faults such as loss of power are potentially transient 
and it is desirable to attempt to regain normal operation. This is 
achieved by requesting a restart, which will be discussed later. 
Because other faults are considered to be permanent, a signal is 
generated to declare permanent failure of a channel. 
The other methods uned by the computer for determining its own 
health are self-test: software routines. There are t\\'O self-test rou-
tines. One routine is continually run during flight. The other rou-
tine is run only after an initial program load of the computers. This 
routine includes all flight te~ts plus certain other tests that could 
not be performed during normal operation without disrupting normal 
operation. These routines are designed to test the central processor 
Ilnit and memory functions with a detection error confidence of 95 per-
cent. 
'l'he computer/IFU channel also uses special circuits in conjunc-
tion with softwa:r-e programs to test the input and output interfaces. 
'rho ana log conunand signal, certain discrete bits, and bi ts wi thin 
tho serial data words going to the encoder/decoder are \.,ired back into 
the compu ter. Sof b.,are routines in the compu ter check these wrap-
around inputs and compare them with what the output should have been. 
This test checks the critical output interface hardware and a majority 
of the input interface hardware. 
§Lnchronization-The hardware and software self-test monitoi:~ 
in each computer/IFU channel will detect the majority of all possib~.e 
fnilures, .and, if a failure is detected, will produce a signal causfQ9 
tha t Channel to be disregarded. It is now possible to connect the thi:~e 
computers together in order for them to monitor e.ach other to detect 
any fault that might not be caugh!7 by the hardware and softvJare self-
test. The first step necessary to h~low the computers in the F-8 OFBW 
system to operate together is to synch~onize their operations so that 
they are performing the same operations at very nearly ttt;e same time. 
Synchronization is necessary to cause data to be rea.d fr(),lJI the sensors 
at the same time to allow fault detection by comparing redundant 
sensors. The synchronization ~, computations is also important to 
allow comparison Of the analog command outputs from the computer. This 
comparison is performed in the analog electronics within the CBS. 
Another important task performed by the synchronization is computer 
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fault detection. One of the best '''Ilys fOJ: each computer to determine 
the health of t:he othet- t,,,o is by their ubility to come into synchron-
ization. 'l'he computers arc s:,!'nchronized b:'!, a p,rogram in euch computer, 
which sends discrete signals to each of the other two computers 
(Figure '1-'28). '1'ho computers become synchronized '-lhen the progi;~m 
l.'uuds and verifies the discrates it: has r9ccivcd from the other qbmputers. 
" 
rf I n feel.' a short ,,,nit to n1.10\" for ske,,, between procQssors, one:icomputer 
'I fails to synchronize with the other t\'10 I thet\'1o remaining compliy~ers 
exit the sync Pt'Qgxll.m and continUE) normal Pt-ocessing. This syn9~lron­
iZ ... 1 Hon only occurs a t the beginning of each minor cycle. These 20-
millisecond cycles nrc begun within 10 to SO microseconds of each 
other. 
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Qut In Qut In Qut tn 
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t t 
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Figure 4-28. Synchronization discrates. 
Cl,'oss-Channt;\l Nonitoring-If the computers can be successfully 
sYI)(;hronized, thEl nc;>xt step it) their monitoring of each othel," is to 
truns.€er delta mnong themselves. '1'his transfcr of data is done through , 
the buffer mcmories in each IFU channel, and consis ts of six da ta ,.tords. 
The tI:'ansEerred data includes an identification of the gomputer channel, 
the computer's minor cycle count, the mode it is in, and its assess-
I""mt of the failUre status of I:.he other two computers. Failure 1:.0 
receive da~a from D synchroni~ed computer for 10 successive cycles 
r~sults in a "hard fail" declaration and thaI:. computer cannot be used 
aguin. \~herens fnilureto receive da tn from a nonsynchronizEld computer 
results in tho declaration of a "soft fail" and enables inclusion of 
this computer in the operating set when its sync discretes and data 
appoars. If a computer's data is not properly identified for 10 
succassive cycles a hard fail is declared. If a computer I s cycle c.ount 
and mode does not agree with tbe other two computers, it requests a 
restart. 
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Restart--Restart is requested by a computer for a number of reasons 
including: 
(1) Freshstart - initial power up. 
(2) Pow~r disruption. 
(3) Crosslink fail--I/O or data. 
(4) Software program and/or computer BITE detected errors. 
Whenever a rest.art is requested, the three computers, by way of 
the crosslink, exchange enough data to guarantee that they are in agree-
ment. This transmission includes the choice of the computer considered 
to have valid data and the data to be used by the offending computer. 
The data exchanged is 94 16-bit words, and includes such items as 
sensor and discrete failure history and contro;t.-law parameters. 
To prevent continuous restart: requests caused by a failure in the 
system, each computer maintains a count of all restart requests. If the 
number of restart requests made by any comptlter exc:eeds a prescribed 
tolerance, that computer is deelar'ed h<.)rd failed and ':U .... s r',equests are 
subsequently ignored. The ent ..ire,tes'cart process 'takes approximately 
8 milliseconds from recognJ .. tion of r""quest to resynchroni7;atio!l. 
Failure Voting--It is necessary for t;wo computers to agree before 
a third can be declared failed. If the self-test software or hardware 
in a channel declares itsl-;lf failed, it is inhibited from voting on 
th~ ol .. ber computers. A k,gi,cal diagram of the hardware within an IFU 
channel that implements this prOCess is §hown in Figure 4-29. The 
output signal which declares a channel f2iled is sent to ~he BCS and 
causes that channel to switch to the analog channe1. 
Command Signal Voting in CBS--The final level of fault detection 
for the digital system takes place within the analog Computer Bypass 
System (CBS). As described in section 4.3.1.6, the CBS selects the 
mid'ltalue of the control surface commands generated by each of the 
three computer/IFU channels for each control surface. This selection 
technique guarantees that if there is any fault that would have a 
danqerous result, it would not affect the output. The CBS also compares 
the selected midvalue with the corresponding command from the individual 
channel. If the difference is greater than the allowable tolerance, 
that particular channel is switched to the analog signal for that 
channel. The analogsJgnal is synchronized to follow the midvalue 
output, which is determined by the other two digital channels that are 
100 
r---__. No tonlputer activity 
con~Uteriiifiiilscieie 
-lEU" clOck tallu;;-"' 
COll1puter" I.EU ~pr lallure 
----- Hard'lall ~tmtion 
--',rome set channel A lallure 
Figure 4-29. Functional diagram of fault detection 
hardware in IFU (shown for channel AI. 
still operating. If there is a second failure of a digital channel, 
all channels are switched to the analog signal and synchronization 
is stopped. 
I"ith these multiple levels of co~iuter self-test and external 
monitoring, the probability that a computer faLl.ure will be undetected 
is axtremely small. with confidenc~ ~hus established in the computers, 
they can proceed with their primary task: control of the aircraft. 
'l'hc first step in the flight-control process is to obtain the necessary 
input signnl frOIll tho sensors and assure that no faulty input is used. 
4.3.3.3 §cnsor Data processing and Redundancy Management 
The data frolll all redundant sensors is available to each computer. 
The data is processed b~' redundancy management (run programs, which are 
performed in two phuses. The only function of the first phase is "tv -\1 
obtain the best estimate of the actua1 parameter value based on t~}le 
available mUltiple sensor inputs, and provide this data for use in 
the control-law computations. The second phase performs fault detection 
and identification, and controls the reconfiguration of the select 
logic used in the first phase. 
A typical triplex RN algorithm is shqwn in Pigure 4-30. The 
first phase begins as a midvalue select moda, changes to an averaging 
algorithm after the first hard failure, and finally degrades to a 
default output value after the second failure. A hard-sensor fault is 
declared by the second phase when a sensor differs from the selected 
value by an amount greater than the allowable tolerance for a given 
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number (N) of consecutive passes. Failure-stat,us logic monitors the 
results of the tracking test, and, throu9h ha~d~fail flags, causes 
,the mo~e or function using that se~u;or to be inhibited. For example, 
should the entire roll-rate-gyro det be lost, roll stability augmenta-
tion system (SAS) \"ould be inhibited. In some cases, annunciation is 
given to the pilot \"hen an entire sensor set has been lost. The first 
failures of sensors in a triplex set are not annunciated to the pilot. 
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Siqnal select 
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.! Mode conlrol 
------, ------
Tracking Control Fallure-
tesl ~tatus logic 
• Update 
Hard-Iall 
flags 
-
Selected 
outpul 
Annunciation 
Conlrollaw 
Inhibit logic 
Figure 4-30. Triplex analog sensor redundancy 
management algorithm. 
4.3.3.4 Control Laws 
The control laws mechanized for the F-8 DFBt~ aircraft were selected 
to include several functions projected for use in the futur~ active con-
trol applications that would required full-time full-authority control. 
The pitch, roll, and yaw axes have multiple pilot-selectable modes. 
Each axis contains a DIRECT mode, which provides un augmented control of 
the aircraft as shown in Figure 4-31 for the pitch axis. In this mode, 
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the surface commci'fld is the sum of stick and trim components. A pitch 
SAS mode uses scheduled pitch rate feedback to improve short. period 
damping as shown in Figure 4-32. These modes provide less complex con-
figurations in the event of failures in certain sensors in the more 
highly augmented pitch command augmentation system (CAS) and lateral-
directional SAS modes which contain the active control fUnctions. 
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CONSTANT 
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Figure 4-31. Pitch DIRECT mode. 
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Eigure 4-32. Pitch SAS mode. 
TO D/A 
CONVERTER 
All inner loop control law functions are computed at the minor 
cycle rate of 50 samples per second. Autopilot functions, schedUled 
gain updating, and other less time-critical operations are computed at 
the major cycle rate of 12.5 samples per second. 
11)3 
'I 
Pitch CAS Control Law--The pitch CAS mode includes several typical 
active control functions. If a new airplane were being designed, such 
control laws would be considered in the initial trade studies leading 
to the ultimat~ configuration. No structural or aerodynamic changes 
were made to the F-8C aircraft in conjunction with these control laws, 
.,howeveri therefore, it is not possible to extract performance tradeoff 
'. Information directly from the F-8 DFBW flight-test results. The control-
law research objective of the F-8 DFBW program is to evaluate the mutual 
1_:,\ 
interactions of the control functions in a full-authority flight-critical 
digital implementation. 
Figure 4-33 illustrates the command augmentation functions imple-
mented in the CAS mode. The basic controller combines a prefiltered 
stick deflection with pitch rate and normal acceleration. The resulting 
signal is routed to the actuation system by way of a variable gain (KC*)' 
which is scheduled with the dynamic pressure derived from altitude and 
Mach number. To minimize excessive stick forces during large changes 
in air speed, neutral speed stability is provided by an effective 
forward-loop integration. The integration is mechanized by the ca~cella­
tion of the position feedback signal of the secondary actuators at low 
frequencies. 
An active flap system provides both ride-smoothing and maneuver-
flap functions. The ride-smoothing system reduces the rigid-body 
normal acceleration response due to turbulence, and the maneuver-flap 
system positions the flaps to provide the optimum lift-to-drag~ratio 
maneuvering flight. 
The autopilot includes attitude, altitude, ~Iach, and heading-hold 
functions, an auto turn mode, and control-stick steering'. , 1\11. angle-
of-attack limi,ter keeps the aircra,ff from exceeding a preselected 
critical angle of attack by alw~Iys selecting the most favorable signal 
from either the normal controller or the a. controller. 
Lateral-Directional Control Laws--The lateral-directional con~' 
trol system cont1ins independently selectable roll and yaw stability 
augmentation systems which are designed to operate. together. The 
design goals for this system were to improve Dutch roll damping, and to 
provide good high angle-of-attack turn coordination. The lateral-
directional control system is illustrated functionally in Figure 4-34. 
The K(a.) designations represent functions which are scheduled with 
angle of attack. 
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Figure 4-34. Lateral-directional control system. 
The aileron command is composed of filtered stick position (pre-
viously shaped) and roll-rate feedback. The rudder command is composed 
of roll rate, yaw rate, and lateral acceleration in proportions which 
approximate sideslip rate. Rudder pedal commands and an interconnect 
command from the roll stick make up the pilot inputs. A small amount 
of integral feedback is used on the lateral acceleration signal to 
provide automatic directional trim in cruise flight, thus relieving 
the pilot of the necessity to trim the rudder. 
Remotely Augmented Vehicle Mode--In addition to the control laws 
that are implemented wi thin the airborne system, the F·-8 DFBlv system 
has a special remotely augmented vehicle (RAV) mode. This mode allows 
highly speculative and advanced control concepts to be programmed in 
a ground-based computer. The necessary data is transmitted to the 
ground and the computed commands are transmitted back to the aircraft 
as shown in Figure 4-35. The RAV mode is pilot selectable by axis. 
If there is any failure, the system automatically s~litches or can be 
manually switched back to the normal SAS mode. This capability allows 
the easy implementation and change of experimental control laws without 
disrupting the integrity of the flight system. 
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F-8 DFBW remote augmentation vehicle (RAV) concept. 
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SECTION 5 
SYSTEM FLIGHT QUALIFICATION 
A lnajor part of the F-8 DFBW effort involved the verification 
and validation activities necessary to qualify the system for flight. 
With the mechanical control linkages removed, an absolute commitment 
was made to the electronic flight-control system on the first flight. 
The aircraft does have an ejection seat; however, the potential risk 
of life and the risk of the 170ss of a one-of-a-kind research aircraft 
II 
is so serious that every effort was made to assure that the probability 
of failure was extremely small. 
The qualification program for the F-8 DFBW can be roughly 
divided into three stages. The first stage is design validation. In 
this stage, analysis is performed to determine if the design itself 
/1 
meets all requir:8Inents, assuming the hardware is built as designed 
and has the normally expected component failure rates. The next stage 
is the laboratory testing of the system's component parts to assure 
that they are actuci11y built as designed and meet all operational and 
environmental requirements. This stage includes both hardware and 
software. The final stage is the testing of the total integrated 
system. This testing takes place in the aircraft simulator (iron bird) 
oT.in the aircraft itself and invoives all elements of the system, 
. incl uding the special flight-control hard111are and software, sensors, 
actuators, electrical, and hydraulic power systems. The ultimate 
tests are the flight tests. 
In the following sections of the report the activities performed 
in each stage of the system qualification process are described. 
Special sections will emphasize the softwar:e and systems-level test 
facilities, software verifi-'::d::t'iol1, and the pilot's role in test a.nd 
/, 
eva.luation. 
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/5.1 Design Validation 
The first stage of the process of assuring that the F-8 DFBW system 
was qualified for ,~light was to validate the basic design of the system. 
Four of the steps done to validate the design will be discussed here. 
These include the theoretical reliability analysis, electronic design 
verification, failure modes and effects analysis, and sneak-circuit 
analysis. The software validation will be discussed in a separate section. 
5.1.1 Theoretical Reliability Analysis 
One of the first steps in validating the design of a flight 
critical ~ystem is to determine the approximate theoretical reliability 
of the sy~~em. This analysis is necessary to assure that the basic 
configuration chosen for the system has the inherent capability of 
meeting the reliability requirements for the functions to be performed. 
This reliability analysis is performed by obtaining the approximate 
reliability of each of the system's major component parts. These 
estimates are based on analysis and experience of the actual unit if 
it exists. If it is a new component, approximations are made based on 
the preliminary design of the unit and on experience with similar equip-
ment. The fundamental statistical and reliability equations are 
applied to the particular system configuration being studied. These 
equations give the probability of system failure in performing the 
required operations as a function of the failure rates of the compo-
nent units. The equations take into consideration the number of re-
dundant channels, the number of channels needed by the redundancy 
management scheme, the reliability of the self-test., and other factors 
affecting the probability of total failure. The computed probability 
of failure is compared with the requirements for the system to deter-
mine the adequacy of the system configuration and associated hardware. 
Theoretical reliablity analysis performs one of its most valuable 
roles in the configuration tradeoff studies. It becomes a major factor 
in determining the number of channels required, the methods used for 
redundancy management and failure detection, and in many other system 
design considerations. Once a configuration is chosen, this analysis 
gives the reliability requirements for the component parts of the 
system. It is particularly valuable in determining the sensitivity 
of the total probability of failure to the reliability of critical 
parts. This process thus identifies where particular care must be 
exercised in the design, verification, and validation of the syst,m. 
109 
Theoret:i.cal reliability analysis can also be useful after the 
design is complete by being performed on the actual hardware that is 
built. This analysis would use the detailed system configuration im-
plemented to give an updated estimate of the reliability actually 
expected for the system; it gives the baseline numbers against which 
the test results and actual operation of the system can be compared. 
There were two early reliability analyses that contributed ,to' i, 
the design of the F-S DFBW system. These will be discussed briefly 
with some of the typical results shown. 
5.1.1.1 Configuration Trbde Study{lS} 
The first study was a preliminary design analysis of the F-S 
DFBlv system. It was not a direct part of the design effort, but 
was an early study in support of the 9rogram. This study covers a 
wide range of probl~ms associated with the system, with ~articular 
attention paid to the secondary actuators. Of interest ~ere is the 
reliability analysis of several configurations options. Preliminary 
analysis was performed on a broad range of configurations, and mor~ 
detailed analysis on configurations that were most promising for 
particular applications. 
The preliminary analysis was performed on a number of different 
configurations. The simplified digital and analog backup channels 
and typical failure rates used in the analysis are shown in Figure 5-1. 
Assumptions made for this analysis are: 
{I} Failure rate of a digital channel in the range of 10-3 to 
-4 f '1 10 a~ ures per hour. 
{2} Failure rate of a three-axis analog channel of 4.5 x 10-4 
failures per hour. 
(3) Failures of the actuation function and electrical or 
hydraulic power not included. 
(4) Mission time of 1 hour. 
{5} Perfect comparison monitoring ahd switching. 
(6) operati.on required for two of three analog channels. 
The results of 'chis preliminary analysis are shown in Figure 5-2. 
The study st,:ows the failure-rate l),l:oh<.,bilities for various combinations 
110 
TWO-AXIS 
ACCEL 
TOTAL FAILURE 
PROBABILITY 
DIGITAL CHANNEL 13 AXES) 
THREE-AXIS THREE-AXIS f-I- RATE GYROS ~ PILOT CONTROLS 
TOTAL WORSE CASE: 10-3 
BEST CASE INO SENSORS): 10-4 
COMPLET,E ELECTRONICS 
PACKAGE ~ IINCLUD ES ANALOG & 
DIGITAL ELEMENTS) 
ANALOG BACKUP CHf.NNEL ISINGLE AXIS) 
~ 
RATE 
........ 
PILOT 
GYRO CONTROL 
.... 
MINIMUM 
ELECTRONICS f-+-
SERVO-VALVE 
INPUT 
TOTAL ~ 1.5 X 10-4 
Figure 5-1. Control channel models 
(failure rates per hour). 
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B • BACKUP ANALOG CHANNEL 
Figure 5-2. Probability of total system failure 
for different configurations (from 
Reference 18). 
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of digital and analog channels. The failure monitoring for the digital 
channels is either comparison voting or voting with self-test capable 
of detecting 95 percent of all computational faults. It can be seen 
that this analysis shows the need for at least two digital channels and 
three backup channels to meet a 10-9 probability of failure. The 
simplified analysis for the confi9'uration actually used in the F-8 DFBW 
(three digital and three analog channels) shows a higher theoretical 
reliability than is correCt for t~e actual system. In the actual system, 
much of the servo analog electronics is common both to digital and 
analog channels. Failure rates in these common circuits must be added 
to failure rates for the independent parallel analog and digital channels. 
Using the same assumptions as in the other cases; the reliabilit~(pre­
diction for the F-8 DFBt'1 configuration would be approximately 10-10 • 
More detailed reliability analysis was performed in this study 
on the configurations that were most promising. Only one part of the 
study will be given here to illustrate some of the analysis that was :; 
performed. This analysis shows that care must be exercised in the 
use of self-test. It can be seen in Figure 5-2 that self-test usually 
decreases the probability of failure. However, in erie case, self-test 
actually increases the probability of failure. In the configuration 
with dual digital channels and triplex analog channels, if one digital 
channel fails and the fciiiure is detected by self-test, the system 
can continue to operate on the other digital channel. However, if this 
channel fails and is not detected, the transfer to the analog backup 
channels is not m~~e. The percent of self-test thus has to be very 
high before there is a net increase in reliability. The probability 
of total system failure as a function of percent self-test is shown 
in Figu+G~3. This plot shows that adding any self-test immediately 
reduces reliability with a minimum at 50 percent self-test. Relia-
bility is not increased until the self-test in greater than 99.2 per-
cent. This disadvantage of self-test is not generally true for most 
configurations. However, this study does show that the efforts of 
self-test must;be carefully studied for the particular configuration 
to be sure the }Qal effects are known. 
"'" : 
5.1.1.2 F-S DFBN Configuration Reliability Analysis 
This theoreticii reliability anaiysiswas performed 
the program. This analysis gave initial estimates of the 
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of th d ' it 1 sys m and was us d to study v rious conti uration 
al In this study , th basic principles of probability 
and r liability w r ppli d to the system. Equations were derived 
to iv th probability that the digi tal system would fail and cause 
th syst m to revert to the an log backup system. These equations are 
a function of the probability of failure of all the dif~erent components 
and of the component or anization. 
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The results for a typical analysis are shown in Figure 5-4. This 
figure shows an example configuration and typical reliability calcula-
tions. It can be seen that the computer and IFU are the most critical 
components. For this analysis the computer and IFU were assumed to 
have MTBFs of 3000 hours and 6000 hours, respectively. This gives 
failure rates of 3.3 x 10-4 and 1.7 x 10-4 for a total of 5.0 x 10-4 
.failures per hour per channel. 
of 'f'ailure would be 1. 5 x 10-3 • 
For a 3-hour mission, the probability 
The digital system fails if any two 
.\ 
digi tal CharlJ1i1!ls fail. There are three possible combinations of ways 
giving a total of 3(1.5 x 10-3)2 or 6.8 x 10-~. two channels 
20F 3 20F3 20F 3 20F 3 
SENSORS CONTROL H IFU AP--101 SERVO ~ DISPLAY ELECTRONICS 
> , . , X· 1.5 X 10-3 
t i"' ~ r 
.,.,,- ~ ,/,,-
'. 
SENSORS CONTROL 
-
IFU AP-l01 SERVO DISPLAY ELECTRONICS 
X-1.5Xl0-3 
SENSORS ~~-{ CONTROL IFU AP-l01 SERVO ~ DISPLAY ELECTRONICS 
, 
+ 
Figure 5-4. 
+ + 
(2 OF 3) 3X2 • 6.8 X 10-6 
(TYPICAL CALCULATIONS) 
Typical results from the reliability analysis of 
Reference 19: probability of digital system 
failure for a 3-hour mission. 
The analysis was performed for s'9veral different configuration 
options. A comparison of the results was helpful in determining the 
sensi tivity of the reli&};ii lity of the total system to the different 
configurations and the reliability of the critioal components. 
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A typical analysis giving sensor interface options is shown in 
Figure 5-5. The different sensor computer configurations considered 
here are: 
(1) Each triplex sensor connected to one of the IFU channels 
with the data transferred to all computers through the IFU 
buffer memories. 
(2) Each sensor cros,§rstrapped into two IFU channels. 
(3) Two analog-to-digital converters used in each IFU. 
Failure rates \"ere assumed for the different components comprising the 
system. For these numbers, the sensor failure ,for the critical pilot 
inputs were: 
(1) 4.4 x 10-7 for single converters. 
(2) 2.S x,IO -7 for cross-strapped converters. 
" \ 
(3) O.S x 10-S for dual converters. 
There is some improvement for cross-strapping, but it is n9t signifi-
cant. In this analysis, the converter channel was assumed to be the 
same for each configuration. If the reliability of the converter 
channel were reduced 26 percent because of the added signal channels, 
the gain for cross-strapping would be wiped out. The use of two' 
analog-to-digital converters reduced the probability for input signal 
failure to essentially the failure rate of the sensor itself. However, 
con$iderably more hardware is added which may not be justified sin.cli:l 
this term is small relative to the failure rate of the computers. 
This example shows how theoretical reliability analysis can be used 
to help determine the best configuration; once a configuration is 
chosen, the analysis shows if the system has the theoretical capability 
of meeting the reliability requirements assuming the components have 
the expected failure rates and there is no error in implementing the 
design. 
5.1.2 Electronic Design Verification 
A further step in the qualification of the F-S DFBW system was 
to verify that there was no error in the design of the system. Once 
it has been assured that the basic syst;"in has th~oretical capability 
of meeting the reliability requirements, it must be assured that the 
detailed design meets the system requirements with no design faults. 
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(a) One converter for each set of sensors 
I FU Buffer 
IFU Buffer 
IFU Buffer 
( b ) Each sensor set is cross-strapped to two converters 
I FU Buffer 
I FU Buffer 
IFU Buffer 
( c ) Two converters for each sensor set 
Figure 5-5. Sensor-converter configurations. 
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In a digital system, both the hardware design and the software design 
are critical. The hardware design verification 
cribed briefly here. The software verification 
a later section. 
process will be des-
will be (~1scribed in 
The major units that were designed specifically for the F-8 DFBW 
system were the IFU and the Encoder/Decoder. The computer was designed 
by IBM for more general use and will not be discussed here. 
The first step in assuring that there are no faults is for the 
design engineer to generate a careful original design. However, to 
protect against any misunder'standing of requirements or human error, 
an independent review was made. For the F-8 DFBW units, each circuit 
Ii 
design was ··given to a design engineer with competence f~qual' to the one 
doing the original d~sign. This engineer reviewed the design in rela-
tion to the requirements for that design. A design review was then 
held among the reviewing designer, the original designer, and the 
design supervisor to resolve any discrepancies. 
Another aspect of design verification is to assure that the pro-
per parts are used. The parts were reviewed by the reliability staff 
to assure that they were adequate for the application. Where possible, 
parts are used with a proven reliability history. However, in an ad-
vanced development program there is a desire to use components that 
are as close to the state-of-the-art as possible. In these cases, 
the proven history may not be as great as would be desired. Exper-
ience on devices is monitored through industry and government-reliability 
exchange programs to help assess th~ risk. Any device that has shown 
a problem is watched carefully. 
Of course the design is continually verified through each succeed-
ing stage of the development program. The next test after the vp.rifi-
cation of the paper design is to build and test the breadboard proto-
type circuits. Design verification and validation continues implicitly 
through all of the hardware and systems testing that is described in 
the following sections. 
5.1.3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
Another important part of the analysis performed to validate the 
desiqn of the F-8 DFBW system was Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA). There were two primary FMEAs performed on the system: one was 
performed on the digital system and the other on the Computer Bypass 
System (CBS). An FMEA was also performed on the secondary hydraulic 
actuator. 
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The FMEA on the digital system was performed to BRsure that the 
design obj ecti ve was met. The obj ecti ve was to continn . ·jigi tal-system 
operatio~ after any single failure and to switch to the CBS system after 
any other failure that does not allow safe digital operation. 
This analysis was not performed to the detailed component level, 
but was a high-level analysis covering all,units and signals in the 
system. Single-failure analysis was performed for: 
(1) Input failures. 
(2) Output failures including signals to actuators and pilot 
displays. 
(3) Interchannel communications failures. 
(4) Engage logic failures. 
(5) Power failures. 
There was also analysis of related dual failures. Multiple fail-
ures in only one channel were not analyzed since t.hese failures could, 
at worst, cause thd loss of one channel .. Multiple failures ~hich were 
not related such that their combined effects could be obtained from 
the individual single failure tables also were not considered. Only dual 
failures in more than one channel were considered such as: 
(1) Dual serial I/O failures. 
(2 ) Dual input failures. 
(3) Dual output failures. 
(4 ) Dual interchannel communications failures. 
(5 ) Dual power failures. 
To the level of two failures, the digital system design objectives 
are realized. The software cannot be examined for generic failures 
with 100 percent confidence. within this limitation, the FMEA did not 
reveal a flight-critical single-point failure. All flight-critical 
situations resulting from two failures engage the CBS. 
A more detailed analysis was performed on the CBS system. This 
analysis was in three parts: 
(1) Analog portion (39 pages). 
(2) Logic portion (37 pages) . 
(3) Status/Engage Panel (4 pages) • 
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Only "hard over" and "passive" type failures were considered in 
the analysis. The probability of oscillatory failures is low in 
this type design, and, if significant in magnitude, would be voted out 
by the natural voting process. Only single or first failures were 
considered. However, when necessary and pertinent, particularly in 
the logic, the impact of certain multiple failures has been considered 
as well. 
The results of the FMEA showed that there are no system first 
failures that will ha\re any significant impact on either system per-
formance or system monitoring capability. 
5.1.4 Sneak-Circuit Analysis(20) 
A Sneak-Circuit Analysis was performed on the F-8 DFBW system 
hardware. This analysis technique was developed to detect latent 
circuit conditions that may cause unwanted functions or inhibit 
desired functions. These sneak circuits can cause system failure 
that is not the result of a component failure. There may be four 
basic types of sneak circuits: 
(1) Sneak Paths, which cause current or energy to flo", along 
an unexpected rout~. 
(2) Sneak Timing, which may cause or prevent the flow of 
current or energy to' activate or inhibit a function at an 
unexpected time. 
(3) Sneak Indications, which may cause an ambiguous or false 
display of system operating conditions. 
(4) Sneak Labels, which may cause incorrect stimuli to be 
initiated tbrough operator error. 
The data used to perform this analysis is electrical continuity 
information based on wire run lists and electrical schematics. Support 
data in the form of assembly drawings, overall system lever inter-
connect diagrams, and electrical schematics describing the interface 
of out-of-scope components was also used for the analysis. 
The data was coded for input into the Automated Sneak Programs 
used for Apollo and Skylab Sneak-Circuit Analysis. The computer pro-
gram searches for continuity path and generates reports from which 
network trees can be drawn. These network trees were drawn in a 
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topological form which facilitates the application of sneak circuit 
clues. These clues aid in the detection of the four basic types of 
sneaks defined earlier. 
The outputs of the analysis are: 
(1) Sneak-Circuit Report, which documents a fully investigated 
sneak circuit, including potential impact statement and 
recommendation for correction. 
(2) Design Concern Report, which documents the analyst's 
observation of a design element, which, wnile sneak free, 
presents unnecessary components, improper implementation 
of redundancy, critical potential failure points, a single 
inconsistent treatment of typical multiple circuits, etc. 
(3) Drawing Error Report, which documents discrepancies in· 
the detailed schematics upon which analysis is based. 
The Sneak-Circuit Analysis of the F-8 DFBW contained 19 Sneak 
Circuit Reports disclosing 76 conditions, 7 Design Concern Reports 
disclosing 12 conditions, and 28 Drawing Error Reports disclosing 
468 conditions. 
Unfortunately, the drawings that had to be used for the analysis 
were preliminary. Thus, most of the faults detected would have been 
detected anyway during system integration tests. The greatest value 
of the analysis seems to be that another independent group went 
through all the arawings in detail. 
One sneak circuit was discovered which may not have been discovered 
easily otherwise. This circuit involved the Yaw Trim Switt;h, and is 
shown in Figure 5-6. The wiring from the yaw trim right or left engage 
switch to the yaw trim digi/tal circuitry bypasses switch S12 and thus 
destroys it.s selectivity. For example, if 812 is in the auxiliary 
position and the left yaw trim is engaged, a sneak circuit as shown by 
the arrows supplies power to the normal side. Thus, power is always 
applied to both normal and auxiliary positions no matter what position 
S12 is in. This circuit condition is typical of the kind of problems 
that can be discovered by Sneak Circuit Analysis. More experience 
would have to be gathered before a decision could be made conc~rning 
the cost effectiveness of this method of finding this type of error. 
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Pigure 5-6. Sneak path in trim-control circuit. 
5.2 Hardware Testing 
5.2.1 Introduction 
An adequately designed and implemented test program is a necessary 
building block for any successful system development. The P-8 DPBW 
test program may be thought of as being composed of -two parts: 
(1) Development tests. 
(2) Acceptance and assurance tests. 
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5.2.1.1 Outline of Deve.1.opment Tests 
These tests are, as a rule, devised by the contractor with buyeL 
approval at the "plan" level, and consists of tests designed to support 
the development and fabrication of the system. The tests included in 
this category are: 
(1) Component Tests, which provide data on characteristics and 
failure r ates of component parts. 
(2) Des ign Evaluation , which provides data needed t o determine 
if intended system mechanization is capable of meeting 
rEO:juirements. 
(3) Subsyste~ Test, which provides a means of verifying that 
subsystems, as built, will support system requirements. 
(4) Integrated System Test, which provides data verifying that 
the system meets requirements. 
Item (4) test results are the ultimate goal, with levels (1), (2), and 
(3 ) supportive of that goal . Figure 5-7 shows the intended time 
relationship of these tests. 
SUBSYSTEM TEST 
INTEGRATED 
SYSTEM 
TEST 
COMPONENT TESTS 
DESIGN EVALUATION 
BREADBOARD 
IRON BIRD 
FLIGHT 
BREADBOARD 
IRON BIRD 
FLIGHT 
I 
I --------
I I 
[ I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
Figure 5-7. Time relc!ltionship of developmen't tests. 
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5.2.1.2 Outline of Acceptance and Flight Assurance Tests 
The acceptance and assurance tests are contractual requirements. 
The details of the test plans and procedures are devised by the manu-
facturer, and are reviewed and approved by the user. These tests are 
intended to show that the system meets its requirements as detailed 
in the statement of work. The tests consist of: 
(1) Initial Acceptance Tests, which are performed at the manu-
facturer's facility, and use simulated interfaces. 
(2) Flight Assurance Tests, which are performed at the manu-
facturer'ti facility, and test operation throughout the 
expected aircraft physical environmental range of vibration, 
temperature, and altitude. 
(3) Sys tern Acceptance Tests, which are performed at the use.r' s 
facility, and test operation in the DFRC iron bird, in-
cluding a functional demonstration, failure modes and 
effects tests, reliability test, and EM!. installation tests. 
5.2.2 Development Tests Performance 
5.2.2.1 Component Tests 
Component testing varied greatly depending upon several factors. 
The tests performed depended on answers to the following questions: 
(1) \vas it tested by the manufacturel';'? 
(2) will it be difficult to replace during later stages of 
testing? 
(3) Will adequate testing occur in later stages of testing? 
(4) Is performance an important factor? 
(5) Is it expensive? 
Some examples of the above applied to specific qomponents are: 
(1) . \, Rate Gyros and Accelerometers-Both of these ~tems were /1 
- I' 
tested by the 111anufactureri however, the relatively high'\ 
cost and the importance of adequate performance were 
sufficient to justify component testing. These sensors Were 
purchased as off-the-shelf devices, and, in general, the 
performance exceeded that required by the D.FBW system. 
Consequently, the tests were designed to ensure that DFBW 
system perrormance requirements were met. 
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(2) Integrated Circuits--In general, these devices were purchased 
to conform to l>lIL-STD-833B Level B where possible. Some 
exceptions were made as an expediency. MIL-STD-833B addresses 
manufacturing processes as well as tests of the finished 
device. Testing of ICs after receipt from the vendors was 
generally found to be costly and time inefficient. 
5.2.2.2 Design Evaluation Performance 
Design evaluation tests began as rUdimentary tests early in the 
design stage and c,ontinued throughout the program, becoming most 
important during the build and operation of the first system bread-
board. The objective of the design evaluation tests was to determine 
the adequacy of the design to meet system requirements. The most 
significant portion of the test relating to system redundancy was the 
failure modes and effects test and its relationship to the failure 
modes and effects analysis. 
5.2.2.3 SUbsystem Test Performance 
'l'he'system is divided into four subassemblies: 
(1) Interfaoe unit/computers. 
(2) cockpit panels, 
(3) Encoder/decoder. 
(4) Sensor assembly. 
An interface and control test console was built for each subassembly 
to enable verification of interfaces, operational redundancy and correct 
internal operation. This level of testing was performed on all three 
systems to ensure functional equivalence. 
The tests were intended to verify that the major SUbsystem parts 
met the appropriate requirements. The tests were further designed to 
provide assurance that the systems (breadboard, iron-bird, and flight) 
were functionally identical. In retrospect, wiring errors have been 
found in the iron-bird system tha't were not uncovered during subsystem 
or integrated system testing, which lends support to the idea that no 
matter how well conceived or carried out a test is~ it is stirl fal-
lible. Testing! in gf.'.!neral, and particularly at the subsystem and 
integrated levels, needs to be well thought out and thoroughly reviewed 
by design and system personnel to minimize oversights. 
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5.2.2.4 Integrated-System-Test Performance 
The system-integration testing \'1a.s performed in 
\. (1) Operation of system with test software al)ld 
(2) Operation of system with simulated ~c5C~it 
flight simulator. 
two stages. 
static data. 
and hybrid-
Initial test of the system used simulated aircraft interfaces and test 
software to verify correct interface operation. Preliminary tests of 
system response to transient power failures and loss of redundancy 
due to hardware failures were performed. 
Following initial testing, to show correct system hardware 
operation, the system was interfaced with a simul~ted cockpit and a 
flight-simulation facility to verify oper~tion of system in a simu-
lated flight environment. Response of system to external signal 
interruptions and transient power failures was determined. 
5.2.3 Acceptance and Flight Assurance Tests Performance 
5.2.3.1 Initial l'-~ceptance Test 
The intent of the lriitial acceptance test was to demonstrate that 
the system was in working order prior to shipment to DFRC. The following 
tests were included: 
(1) Verification of all analog input and output calibrations. 
(2) Verification of discrete and serial I/O operations. 
(3) Synchronizat.i.on performance. 
, (4) Crosslink 
(5) Built-in test. 
(6) Simulated bus failures. 
(7) Low- and high-power-bus operation. 
(8) Interface with accelerometers and rate gyros. 
(9) Correct display operation with and without power-bus 
failures. 
(10) Computer redundancy management. 
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5.2.3.2 Flight Assurance Tests 
The flight assurance tests ''lere performed by the use of two 
procedures: vibration and temperature altitude. The system was 
'Ii 
tested at the subsystem level to l!Jrovide maximum access to inter-
faces. 
Vibration-Figure 5-8 defines the vibration input to the articles 
under test. The test consisted of a logarithmic sweep from 5 to 500 
to 5 Hz over a l5-minute period. Resonant points were no'ted for each // 
axis, and a, resonant dwell of 2 minutes for each axis was performed ii 
following the sweep test. 
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" Figure 5-8. Flight assurance test-vibration ~Jofile. 
Temperature-Altitude-The intent of the tempe'~::~re-altitude test 
was to expose the system to combined extremes of temperature and altitude, 
which exceeded those expected in flight. Figure 5-9 shows the tempera-
ture altitude profile through which the system ~as operated. Cockpit 
panelS'were operated by remote manipulators during the test. 
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-18 o 
TEMPERATURE DC 
65 
Figure 5-9. Flight assurance test-temperature/altitude profile. 
Test procedure--Ouring exposure to the vibration and temperature-
altitude test environments, the subsystem assemblies were connected to . 
external test equipmen'c, which provided control, interface stimulation, 
and monitoring capabilities. Figures 5-10 to 5-13 illustrate the 
test configuration. The test of the pallet assembly consisted of 
a combination of automatic test with automatic/manual monitoring and 
manual test with manual monitoring. 
The automatic test was accomplished by "wrapping" analog outputs 
(dynamic profiles) through external wiring and back into the system as 
analog inputs. These inputs were interpreted by test software residing 
in the digital control computers. Notification of failure was provided 
to the operatpx;~by a coded message supplied on the interface console. 
Operator-induced "failures" were performed periodically during the 
test to demonstrate correct operation of failure-monitoring software. 
The test of other subsystem assemblir/s was entirely by manual 
insertion of inputs and by manual moni tor~:hg. 
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Figure 5-10. Static test technique. 
5.2.3.3 system Aoceptance Test 
The system acceptance tegt consisted of three parts: 
(1) Functional demonstration. 
(2) Failure modes and effects test. 
(3) EMI. 
The above tests were performed with the flight system installed in the 
iron bird at DFRC. The failure modes and effects test \'las performed 
with the breadboard system installed in the iron-bird facility. 
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INERTIAL 
SENSOR 
ASSEMBLY 
STJ1 STJ2 
INERTIAL SENSOR ASSEMBLY 
TEST UNIT 
Figure 5-11. Inertial sensor assembly test configuration. 
ENCODER 
DECODER 
ENCODER/DECODER 
TEST UNIT 
POWER 
SUPPLY 
Figure 5-12. Encoder/decoder assembly 
test configuration. 
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B4Jl B4J2 B4J3 
CIP 
B2Jl 
COCKPIT PANEL ASSEMBLY 
TEST UNIT 
AP DAPP 
B1Jl B3Jl 
Figure 5-13. Cockpit panel assembly test configuration. 
Functional Demonstration--The functional demonstration was in-
tended to show correct operation of system installed in the iron bird by: 
(1) Operation of subsystem assemblies. 
(2) Operation of system using aircraft cables for sUbsystem 
interconnections. 
(3) Interfaces with other aircraft interfaces. 
5.3 Software and Systems-Level Test Facilities 
There are a variety of test facilities available for verification 
and validation of digital flight-control systems. In fact, one of the 
important program decisions involved allocation of effort and reso~rces 
in the test program to the various test facilities. All possible tests 
cannot be run on all possible facilities. A reasonable test matrix can 
be achieved only by partitioning tests so that tests are run on facilities 
producing the most realistic results, without unnecessary repetition. 
In addition to major test facilities, some fundamental tools were 
also available for software development and digital computer testing. 
There were: 
(1) Assembler and link editor support software for producing 
flight code and load tapes. 
(2) Computer test set (CTS) for software and hardware debug 
(Figure 5-14). 
(3) Function test pr.ogram (FTP) for thorough testing of the 
digital computer. 
(4) Real-time software for online debug of software. 
(5) Tape drive, CRT, and printer for load, verify, and test. 
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Figur 5- 14 . Computer t s t s et . 
It is importunt to no t e t ha t t he piece s of manufacturer- supplied 
roun - tes t equipment general l y presume a single comp u ter o peration , 
nd by themselves do no t provide n adequate in rface wi th a multi-
compute r system . 't'his eq u ired multicomputer test t ools to be built 
f r om t h gro und up . Th s e t ols i ncluded: 
(1) M ans to 10 d mu l t icomputer syst m. 
(2) Sp cial real-t i me displays of mUlticomput r ope r a tion. 
( 3) Spe c ia l in te rnal log s a nd t a ble s t o store multicomputer 
data follow i ng a bnorma l oper t ion . 
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__ -----m~7~E~v~e~n~w~l.~' :l:.t:b::t~p:_e:~:c:-ro:61.s, it was fom;a-that ;isibility into the 
multicomputer system was lacking, result,i-~ in lengthier troubleshooting 
l_,. 
procedures. 
Several test !acili ties were used in the }~"':8 DFBW program for 
software and systems-level tests. These are described in the followin~ 
sections. 
5.3.1 Digital Computer Emulator 
The AP-10l instruction simulator, or emulator, is a large soft-
ware program that resides on an IBM 360/370 or equivalent host computer. 
The emulator can be used to run and test the flight software even before 
the actual flight computer is available. The emulator provides an 
instruction-by-instruction simulation of the flight computer's processing 
of the flight software. This allows the programmer to trace the exact 
execution sequence and to examine all intermediate computational results. 
This provides high visibility into the code a~d is a good debugging 
aid. Figure 5-15 illustrates {the type of outijut available from the 
emulator. 
An emulator executes flight code very slowly, from 100 to 300 
times slower than real time. This makes the emulator very expensive 
to use. An emulator also simulates only a single computer, and thus 
cannot be used to test multiflight computer software. Because the 
emulator executes in predetermined steps, it cannot accurately simulate 
the occurrence of random events, such as external interrupts. One 
additional aspect must also be recognized: the emulator yields results 
according to the flight-computer configuration as designed, and not 
always as it actually exists. 
5.3.2 Single Flight Computer with Triplex Interfaces 
This facility was used at the contractor's facility for software 
and interface hardware development, It provided early real-time 
experience on the flight 'software before all the flight computers 
were delivered. This testbed provided a controlled interface for 
initial systems tests. Figure 5-16 shows the functional operation of 
this testbed system. 
This kind of a system, however, generally cannot be used with 
confidence to identify and fix problems associated with timing or 
intersystem communication. Outside of strictly single-string computa-
tions, it is never possible to say for sure what tests have validity 
when run on this type of system. 
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Figure 5-15. 
r--- INSTRUCTION COUNTER 
.r--- LOCATION 'IN MEMORY 
INSTRUCTION CODE IN MEMORY 
LABEL 
Typical output from 
computer emulator. 
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Figure 5-16. Single computer system testbed. 
5.3.3 Multicomputer Triplex System in Iron Bird 
OUTPUT 
A 
---.,.-.-
OUTPUT 
B 
OUTPUT 
C 
There were t\~O systems used in the F-8 DFBN development. Both 
used a triplex flight-computer set and a triplex interface unit. One 
interface unit was configured as a breadboard, but was electrically 
identical to the flight system. These triplex systems were installed 
in the NASA DFRC iron bird. Figure 5-17 shows the iron-bird configura-
tion. A decommissioned F-8 aircraft formed the backbone of the iron 
bird. The equipment complement consisted of: 
(1) Triplex primary digital system. 
(2) Triplex analog-computer bypass system. 
(3) Full set of flight actuators. 
(4) Triplex electrical buses with batteries. 
(5) Triplex hydraulic systems. 
(6) Operable auxiliary aircraft systems (flaps, wing, gear/ 
speedbrake actuators). 
(7) Operable cockpit instrumentation. 
The iron bird interfaces with a nonlinear simulation of the F-8 
aerodynamics, which uses actual surface positions as input, and which 
drives both cockpit instruments and sensor lines to the flight-control 
system. The control surfaces are not artificially loaded, although 
predicted flexibility effects are included in the aerodynamic simulation. 
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digital computer -
Equations of motion 
Sensor models 
Simulation 
interface unit 
Figure 5-17. Iron-bird configuration. 
Surface positions 
The iron-bird facility was the key element in the system verifica-
tion, validation, and flight qualification. It exposed the real system 
problems (described in a later section), allowed subsystem interface 
problems to be resolved, and especially provided a high degree of 
confidence in the verification and validation test results. The iron 
bird also provided the all-important pilot interface. 
It should also be recognized that an iron-bird facility is expen-
sive to CO.T1struct and to maintain, being more like an airplane than a 
simulator. 
5.3.4 Flight System in Aircraft 
The aircraft itself is an important test facility, for only in 
the vehicle are all the subsystems in their true flight configuration. 
Final flight-readiness tests are best accomplished on the vehicle 
itself. If iron-bird testing has·been properly accomplished, only 
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higher level systems tests need be performed on the vehicle. The pri-
mary disadvantages of using the aircraft for substantially more than 
£inal system readiness tests are that the all-up airplane is available 
quite late in the development cycle, it is more difficult to tie in;, 
• v 
special test instrumentation, and there is a limited amount of time 
available on the aircraft for systems testing. 
The fli;ht-test program is also part of the sys'tem validation 
ri,'!:;Oce"Efs. The flight environment provides those unmodeled characteristics 
that are not included in the simulation. The hardware itself is exposed 
to simultaneous temperature, vibration, and operational situations, 
which never seem to be covered ih ground-test matrices. The pilot/crew 
interface with the system is st[;essed by mission or task factors that 
are not reproduced in ground 'simulation. 
In the case of a flight-critical digital flight-control system, the 
flight regime r.epresents a very hazardous verifiqation and validation 
environment.' Obviousl:(, the core system must alr~~ady be qualified to 
'I 
a high degree of confidence or must have ,;:1 safe f1lll-back capability, 
or both, in order to make the first flight. In the c;::ase of the F-8 
system, both conditions were required. With that in mind, the flight 
program proceeds as any other, but with a definite conservatism about 
it. 
'\\ 
j\ 
The flight environment, while providing the only tru~~r credible 
qualification results, has obvious drawbacks as well. There are 
generally only a small number of test hours, visibility into the system 
--"_: 
operation is limited by instrument'ai ton capability, and the cost is 
very high •. 
5.3.5 Actual Test Distribution \ 
\ 
/-::-.:> 
--: "-"~ 
Tables 5-1 and 5-2 show th~ estimated test distribution on the 
basis of man-hour percentages for the F-8 DFBW system. Table 5-1 
d 
applies to the testing that was accomplished at the Draper Laboratqry. 
The emulator was used primarily for the executive software verification, 
and also for testing of short code sequences early in the software 
development. Those functions that could be tested on a single computer 
systi.~m were verified almost exclusively on the single computer test-
bed. This facility was found to be a poor testbed tor multicomputer 
software testing, however, because it failed to expose several problems 
which \Olere found only when actual multicomputer operati~ns began. 
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Table 5-1. Percent man-hour test-distribution 
estimates (CSDL testing). 
-
Test Facility 
Single 
Test Area Emulator Computer 
Executive 50 25 
Input-Output 80 
Computer Redundancy 10 
Management 
Sensor Redundancy 90 
Management 
Self-Test (in-flight) 25 75 
Preflight Test (ramp) 80 
Control Laws 5 90 
Cockpit Displays/Controls 90 
Ground-T~st Programs 90 
Table 5-2. Percent man-hour test-distibution 
estimates (NASA DFRC testing). 
Test Facility 
Test Area Iron Bird Aircraft 
Executive 100 --
Input-Output 90 10 
Computer Redundancy 95 5 
Management 
Sensor Redundancy 90 5 
Management 
Self.-Test 100 
--
Preflight Test 50 50 
Control Laws 95 5 
Cockpit Displays/Controls 95 5 
Primary/Bypass System 90 10 
Interface 
Actuator/Electronics 60 40 
Interface 
Electrical/Hydraulic 50 50 
Power 
Sensor Hardware Int,'~rface 10 80 
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Multi-
Computer 
25 
20 
90 
10 
0 
20 
5 
10 
10 
--
Flight 
--
--
--
5 
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
10 
Table 5-2 shows a similar breakdo\'/n for the testing done at NASA 
DFRC. Only four areas received substantial attention on the aircraft 
itself: 
(1) Preflight test software. 
(2) Servo electronics/actuator interface. 
(3) Electrical/hydraulic systems. 
(4) Motion sensor interface. 
The preflight test program was verified on the iron bird, but was 
validated and qualified on the aircraft because of the need to show 
proper operation with the airplane configuration. The servo electronics/ 
actuator interface was performed on the airplane principally to off-
load work on the iron bird, which was heavily committed to software 
and digital system testing. The electrical and hydraulic systems 
were laid out and tested initially in the iron bird, but of course, 
had to be qualified in the aircraft itself. 
Although all sensor I/O and redundancy management software was 
verified/validated/qualified on the iron bird, the hardware interfaces 
were also tested and qualified on the airplane itself. Because of 
cost, the iron bird was not normally operated with actual sensors, and 
had no provision for an actual air-data interface. Special closed-
loop resonance tests were also performed on the airplane in which 
structural mode excitation margins were determined. This required an 
all-up system and sensor configuration, which was available only on 
the actual vehicle. 
The only deliberate validation tests slated for the flight-test 
phase of the program were the sensor failure-detection threshold 
tests, which are dependent on actual sensor-output characteristics 
in the flight environment. 
5.4 Software Verification 
Software verification-the determination that the generated code 
correctly performs its intended function-ideal~y begins in the 
design phase. A software program consists of many modules of 
varying size, which together accomplish the total intended purpose 
of the program. If the individual modules are adequately defined and 
controlled from the design phase on; the verification is made less 
complex and costly in both time and expense. 
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5.4.1 Quality Assurance in Design' (! 
Quality assuran~~ in design depends upon two important factors: 
(1) The software specification document. 
(2) Programming ground rules. 
Careful and full attention to these two factors will greatly ease the 
complexity and time necessary to perform software verification. 
5.4.1.1 Software Specification 
The interpretation of the requirements must be clear and straight-
forward and mutually agreed to by all parties involved. All changes 
or additions must be tightly controlled and documented. All approved 
changes must be published and communicated to all programmers working 
on code generation. Figure 5-18 is an example of software specifica-
tion change form. 
5.4.1.2 Programming Ground Rules 
The establishment of programming ground rules is essential to 
the production, testing, and modification or updating of generated 
code. 
Logic Diagrams--The first and foremost rule is: no code must 
be written until a logic diagram has been generated. As in the 
building of hardware, one needs blueprin~s to correctly build a piece 
of equipment. A programmer needs a logic-flow diagram to correctly 
code and document a particular' computer function. 
Module Specification--The specification of maximum module entry 
and exit points (no more than two of each), self-contained temporary 
storage, and minimum external references ensure that each module will 
be self-contained to the maximum level, and, once tested and proved 
to perform its function, will not be altered by the addition of 
another modUle to the developing program. Each module must be single 
purpose in function and that function must be carefully and fully 
specified. The execution of the module's function must be independent 
of other modules, except for common library routines which may be 
called by the module, and all necessary manipulation of arguments 
must be self-contained within the module. 
The number and form of entry and exit arguments must be specifically 
called out and identified. 
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SOF'IHA.RE SPEC:::FICATION G:-LA..NGE NOrrCE 
F8 D?B'.·J PROGRu..!·l 
Name Date 
Szalai 3/3.1/75 ;'/ 
I Nur:tber . seN -75-B-003 
Pages 
T4 
Title of'Cha~e GearL~g Dependency on SUbmode of CAS 
(Positive OT.' Neutral Speed Stability') 
Description of Change 
Provid.e for dependency of EGE.n-RJ .,ESGE.I\R on PSS or NSS 
in pltch CAS. 
Reason for Change 
Static Gain change occurs when removing effective forward 
loop integration. 
~m-~-~--=p~r-o-j-e-c-t-;-¥r~_a-.~-.a-g-e-r-----'-n~.~-t-e------'------------------···~ 
~-O~ f) l~-.-:- 4--/$,.7..r 
C L ..,. t" 3D lmpac 
Figure 5-18. Typical Software Specification Chang~ form. 
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Maqros-· The development and useef "macros" to accompli9h common 
subroutines in each modtile again reduces the level of testing, which 
must be performed to verify each module. 
Instruction usage-Most computers, unless specifically designed 
to meet a given functional role, 'have an instruction repertoire. far in 
excess of coding requirements. Many of these instructions are,complex 
in execution and require extreme care in us~.-. Totally eliminating 
or tightly controlling the use of complex r;structions will make 
program verification and debug less complex and costly. Straight-
forward programming may cost:,-";9}ne penalty in core requirements and 
execution time, but save considerably in the long run. 
5.4.2 Module Verification 
The verification of a module I s function begins prior to code. 
generation. The first step is the construction of the logic-flow 
diagram, which basically describes the module's functions and serves 
as the programmer's guide in writing the module code. The generated 
code is checked against this flow diagram by both the programmer 
and some other programmer, which both verifies the logic diagram and 
code generated. 
Module Testing--The programmer e~tablishes the type anq degree 
of te;sting to which a particular module "will be exposed. This written 
document is approved for completeness and correctness by a controlling 
body. The module's function is than tested on either a computer 
emulator or, even better, by execution in the a.cutal target computer. 
Nhen testing execution of module code, extreme care is required to 
ensure that any dummy routines used in the testing of the module do 
not cover up some error in the module .code. 
Program Library--once a module has been satisfactorily tested 
and provE'f~ to perform its intended function, access control to the 
Ii' ' 
module ib restricted to the program librarian. The program librarian 
maintains a file of all verified modules and ensures that all changes 
made to a module in the library are completely documented and publicized. 
Change Documentation-The doc.umen'cation required .to change a 
module in the program library should contain ... the change, the reason 
for change, effects upon code execution, changes in core requirement, 
and approval of a change control agent. Figures 5-19 ,nd 5-20 are 
examl?les of change documentation forms. 
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F-a. DIGITAr fLY.-By-WIRIi PROGRAM CHANGE REQUEST / '""' 
ORIGINATOR ~IZATION mli: ~ ~"","~. 
k'.$ZALAJ N'A~A OF£'( "3:-'11 -78 fi,e.. 91> 0102-
DESCRIP'.tJj;)& G'" ... 
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PIlCJ\I,,,r; e~q(t- CAPABILITy ru AD"3S E~-r or 
ntAN'fI!bfJ.T PRA ~f aN J:LWItlG ~l4fLI"ES. 
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WILL ,« ..... SO..fA S~o!' CSDL PROG. ,.jO-~. D!\TE 
/'"p~.f9.J t:'1v' ~:;; r:;-c/{l£" OEi.~'() eJ,'.!,:f1'l: "'·MeGNA ;:7 - ::2.1- ?8 
APPF:OVE 
DISAPPROVE 
P.E.~iJE.S l' 
DE'D-.I!...ED 
J~·rA!..JUhTIO·X 
SOF'l"!A-C,E CCI~TF..Or... BOARDAtCl'lON 
.~ 
o 
o 
Figure 5~19. Typical Progress Change Request originated by NASA. 
142 
,,\ 
Originator 
R. B:drnsfather 
'l':t tle of Change 
F-8 DFBN 
P:ROGR.1\.N CHANGE NOTICE 
organization 
CSOL, Inc. 
Date 
5/22/78 
Fix Flagbit Ma~ks for Rel. 10 
Description of Change 
Release Number 
10 l'-f '/ 
v 
1. Turn off TRHlFAIL al1nunciator lamp at restart by the SOWOl bit mask definiti.on 
IALLRAVS with the definition IALLRAVS+ITRIM. (in CLAWS) . 
2. Clear flagbit APENGL of wOI'd ~lpDECHNG at the end of the control law cycle by 
replacing the flagbit mask definition CBSAlMOD with the definition CBSALNOD+APENG 
(in macro FLAGADV) 
Reason For Change 
1. The trim fail flagbits are cleared at a restart, and the annunciator lamp 
shoul d refl ect th i s fact. 
Z. Ol'iginally the flag \~ascleal"ed aftel" use by the outer loop initialization. 
However, current initialization uses flagbit lONAPENG, and flag-change bit 
APENG ceased to be cleared. The continued existence of APENG , once set in 
NODECHNG., caused modul e X~10DINT to be entered every pass, l'edundantly. 
RSJ11al:ks 
---------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
Figtir.e 5-20. Typical Program Change Notice. 
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Whenever a module in the library is changed, it receiv~) a new 
revision number. The inclusion of this revision number within the 
body of the module serves as a means of verifying that an integrated 
program consisting of many modules contains the latest revision of the 
particular module. Figures 5-21 and 5-22 are the computer listings of 
the process-used to implement the changes in the modules requested in 
Figures 5-19 and 5-20. Reverification of the module function must be 
performed before it is returned to the program library. 
5.4.3 1>lodule Integration on Flight Computer 
When the program library contains a sufficient number of verified 
modules to begin generation of an integrated program, the program 
librarian initiates a production of the program. The program generated 
will contain the verified modules and any dummy routines necessary 
for program execution. Tables 5-3 and 5-4 are examples of program 
contents for an executable computer program. Table 5-3 shows the 
modules for the execution, synchronization, redundancy management, etc. 
Table 5-4 shows the modules for the control laws. 
The program is then executed in the flight computer, preferably 
in a full system configuration. Extensive use is made of available 
ground-test equipment to ensure that the program execution is correct 
and as planned. 
The execution of a program on a computer emulator is not 
recommended as this does not fully and truly simulate actua.l target-
computer or system operation. An emulator is not normally capable 
of genel'ating all the random interrupts and time slicing which occurs 
in the actual system configuration. This factor is extremely impor-
tant when dealing with multicompute:t; systems. On the F-8 program, 
the inability to test software changes on a multicomputer system at 
CSDL prior to release has proven troublesome. A program may execute 
correctly in a single computer and fail miserably when exposed to the 
randomness of operation in the actual multicomputer configuration. 
5.5 System validation 
The system validation tests are performed on hardware and soft-
ware that are essentially operational, i.e., all major hardware and 
software components are functioning in a nominal manner. This is 
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, 
IIRl\61591U J08"638S,BAIRNSFATHER.R. T'IHE=( ,10) ,REGION=64K.PRTY=1, 
II NOTIFY=RRB1591 
I/l< LIPUPl31 
II EXEC LIPSVC,ACCT=NOTIFY 
IIL.SOURCE DO OSN=RR01591.F8.LIPFILE,DISP=OLO,VOL=SER=,UNIT= 
lIL .tIYPOS 00 OSN=RRB1591. F8C.AStl,OISP=OLO ,UNIT=,VOL= 
IIL.SYSIN 00 * 
.I FILE SOURCE 
.1 EXCLUDE AUTO LIST 
.1 CHANGE •• TO .~ 
.1 IIODIFY CLAHS REVISION 19 TO 19.1 
.lAUTHOR BAIRNSfATHER 
.~ PCR-062: TRANSPORT DELAY MODIFICATION FOR SHUTTLE SUPPORT TESTING 
.0) PER~IAHENT CHANGE: FIXEO-POINT GAIN SWnCH VALUES. 
+! CLAI~S. LIPREV 19.1 lOG: 14:07:52 03/::017& 
SPACE 
• 3120/781 ' SPECIAL VERSION IMPLEMENTING TRANSPORT DELAY OF 
)+ PITCH/ROLL STICK utPUTS TO SUPPORT SHUTTLE TESTING 
SPACE 
TITLE '*~11 CSDL Fa DIGITAL FLY-ElY-lURE CSECT Cl.AWS *** 
DLAWIODl STIC:< TRANSPORT eELAY tlODULEI 
OlAnlODl 
TITLE ,.~* CSDL Fe DIGITAL FLY-SY-WIRE CSECT CLAWS *** 
DLAY~tOD~ TRANSPORT DELAY POINTER tIODULE' 
+I HANIPULATE POINTERS AND INITIALIZE FOR DELAY tIOOULE. 
OLAYMOD::: 
EJECT 
DLAn~O;)3 
.1 FETCH AND LIST CLA~S REVISION 19.* HYPDSCCLAWS) 
./ MODIFY CLCDNEXT REVISION 3 
.1 AUTHOR SAIRNSFATHER 
.~ PCR-06f!: TRM1SPORT DELAY ~tOOIFICATION FOR SHUTTLE SUPPORT TESTING 
• ii) PER~\ANEm CHI\NGE: FIXED-POINT GAIN SIUTCH VALUES. 
)+ CLCONEXT. LIPREV 04 LOG: 14::37:15 03/17178 
EXTRN PGAINFIX PITCH GAIN SWITCH POINTER (FIXED POINT) 
EXTRN RGI\INFIX ROLL GAIN SIUTCH POINTER (FIXED POINT) 
EXTRN YGAINFIX YAW GAIN SWITCH POINTc:R (FIXED POINT) 
.1 FETCH AND LIST CLCONE:n REVISION 11 t'IYPDS(CLCONEXT) 
.1 MODIFY OISCNUD REVISION 9 TO 9.1 
./ AUTHOR OAIRNSFATHER 
.cl rCR-06:!: TRMISPORT DELAY ~IODIFICAnOH FOR SHUTTLE SUPPORT TESTING 
.<.1 DESIRE NSS/PSS CHANCr:OVER AT TOUCHDO~N INSTEAD OF GEARDO:.lN. 
M DISCMOD. LIPREV 09.1 LOG: oa:30::!3 03/21/78 
SPAC!: 
* 3120178: SPECIAL VERSION UIPLHIENTING TRANspotrr DELAY OF 
11 PITCH/ROLL STICK INPUTS TO SUPPORT SHunLE TESTING 
SPACE 
DERIVED FLAG MODULE LOG: 08:38:49 03/Cl/78 
~tODIFIED FOR SHUTTLE LANDING APPROACH STUOIES 
DESIRE NSS/PSS CHANGE AT TOUCHDOWN. 
IN 'SSFLG' REPLACE GEARUP' IUTH \~HTONWHL. 
AP~\ISFLG II~HTDll~HL TO 
IF 
CHI 
ELSE 
lRB 
OP~~OT=SO 1 liEN 
R4,GEARUP SET GEARUP-BIT IF WHTON~IL=O 
CLEAR GEARUP-BIT IF WIlTON:~HL=l 
EfmIF 
.I FETCH t.~I:) L"ST DISC~IOQ REVISI@ 9. lI. ~IYPDS( OISCttOD 1 
./ tREATE MlD 1l'!::l'ICR DLf,YltCD1 REVIs:::m~ 1 
./ AUl"Hm~ n;\H~:-::;;rATH~q 
Figure 5-21. Typical' computer listing of change 
being made in library module. 
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00000300 
00000303 
00000305 
00000315 
00000317 
X000l1150 
00011160 
00011170 
XOOO~3750 
000231)50 
000~3950 
00024050 
00027850 
00027855 
00000100 
00001630 
00001640 
00001650 
00000300 
(}0000303 
0()0003C5 
00111,O:n5 
001\(;0317 
d&I,isooo 
0c\Cl59l:0 
O'j)OiS925 
00015930 
00015935 
00015'1(+0 
00015945 
00015950 
00015955 
00015960 
IIRRS1591U Jon 63850 ,Bb.IRNSFATHER.R, TUIE=( ,101 ,REGION=64K,PRTY=1, 
II NOTIFY=RRB1591 
11* LIPUP144 
/1 EXEC lIP5YC,ACCT=NOTIfY 
Ill. SOURCE DO D5N=RRB1591.F8.lIPFIlE,DISP=OLD,VOL=SER=.UNIT= 
/IL. MYPOS 00 05N=RRB15910 f8C. ASH, DISP=OlO ,UUIT=, VOL= 
l/L.5YSIN DO * 
.1 FI lE SOURCE 
.1 EXCLUDE AurOlIST 
.1 CIIM~GE • * TO • ., 
.1 tIO:JIFY CLA\~S REVISION 2l 
.1 AUTHOR BAIRtlSFATHER 
.0) PW-147 :EXTINGUISH TRINFAIL LANP AT RESTART TO CONFORN TO FAILBITS 
* CLA~S. LIPREV 22 LOG: 16:50:39 05/22/78 00000300 
ZB SO\~tll,IAI.LRAVS+ITRIH TUR~1 OFF RAV LAtIPS; NOT TOUCHED 00007600 
.1 FETCH MlO lIST ClAI~S REVISlml * HYPDS(CLAWSl 
.1 t:C:JIFY FLAGAOV REVISIOH 3 
." AUTHOR BAIRHSF /\THER 
.Ol FCN-147 : REMOVE APENGL FROM HOOECHNGi LONAPENG INITIALIZES OUTER LOOP 
* FLAGAOY. LIFREV 04 LOG: 16:53:47 05/22/78 00000300 
zo t\OOECmlG,CBSALl100+APWG CLEAR ALL BUT AP NODS 00002900 
.I FETCH MlD LIST F LAGAOV REVISION. * MYPOSl FLAGAOV 1 
.1 r:OJIFl AAALIPUP REVISION 143 
.1 AUTHOR BAIRNSFATHER 
• ., FO~ FILE IDENTIFICATION: USE LIPUP 1: FOR REV NUtlBER 
* LIPUP 144 REL 10 LOG: 16:48:05 05/22/78 00000100 
.I FETCH AllO LIST AAALIPUP REVISION * MYPostAAA!..IPUP) 
Figure 5-22. Typical computer listing of change 
being made in library module. 
important because every minute of operating time is an implicit test, 
exercising hard\vare and software interfaces hundreds of times. During 
·this period of close scrutiny, it is critical that as much of the 
system as technically possible be operating, so as to expose deficiencies 
that occur during the tes·t phase, but outside of the test plan. System 
validation is accomplished by carrying out several different types of 
tests (refer to Section 4.2.4). This section relates actual system 
test experience. 
5.5.1 IndepeHdent Verification and Validation 
A test team at NASA DFRC that peaked at 7 man-months per month 
was responsible for these tests. These tests comprehensively verified 
individual functions and validated major system operation. Many of 
these tests were duplicates of those accomplished by the programming 
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Table 5-3. List of modules (except control laws) 
for executable program. 
CSECT 
F8PSA 
F8DAT 
F8TRN 
F8FST 
F8MAN 
FBSYNC 
FaRUP 
FBDLN 
FBSER 
FBIO 
FaXLI 
FBCIP 
FaSLF 
FBRMlS 
FaRMl 
FBRMID 
FBPTP 
FBDSP 
FBLD 
MACRO 
EQERR 
EQJOB 
EQICR 
EQSVC 
EQREG 
LIPSVC 
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Revision 
38* 
88* 
29 
50* 
8 
33 
20 
21* 
64* 
63 
58* 
40* 
30 
75* 
94* 
71* 
74 
33 
17* 
15* 
1 
1 
1 
1 
NUmber 
Table 5-4. Control-law modules for an executable program. 
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R~V 
lEV 
~::V 
R": V 
R3 V 
f;.:;V 
a:: v 
RSV 
R"'V 
r. :: V 
R:: V 
Ri:: V 
[l': \1 
R2 V 
Ri: V 
RSV 
iE V 
REV 
R~V 
RSV 
RSV 
a::v 
R.:.V 
RJ::V 
RC:V 
RSV 
R3V 
R3V 
R;:;V 
REV 
REV 
R2V 
REV 
RSV 
REV 
R ~\' 
REV 
R::V 
R~V 
REV 
asv 
RSV 
R::: V 
BEV 
R~V 
~EV 
~:: V 
i'3V 
R:: V 
RO:V 
RSV 
2 
3 
2 
2 
3 
3 
14 
1 1. 
:2 
3-
2 
1 
10· 
S 
, 
.. 
4-
3 
6-
4 
1 , 
!j 
!j 
6 
2 
14· 
1 
9· 
2 
3 
4 
3-
'5-6-, 
9-
6-
2 , 
12-, 
4* 
5-
7* 
3-
3-
SENVA R 
S::~l Vr:~ ! 
~n! V: :': T 
S:' C !' .. s 
S':'K'10D 
5!'KPF.OC 
SY:"LI1H' 
SY r~L III if 
'IH:!'A:o!O 
'!'RHlIN 7G 
'IRI1L0 ::: 
IIVAl-GUt: 
W:ONZS7 
W:NGHNS 
WINGL~ OD 
W!NGPO T 
!D~. C!'IOn 
XI!O DIN T 
Yl.W CL 
Y:C'EN~ 
Y:ON::t:T 
rCOllS 
lCDIRCL 
rSASCL 
1S:17:1f 05/23/78 
R~V 
I'EV 
R:: V 
H2 V 
REV 
R!: V 
k::V 
it::V 
iE V 
FEV 
R::V 
fi ::V 
REV 
H3 V 
REV 
R? V 
RZV 
R2V 
REV 
R3V 
R::V 
REV 
F.::V 
REV 
1 
2 
, 
17· 
5 
9· 
7-
2 
1 
2· 
3 
20· 
6 
16· 
3 
4 
1 
15· 
7* 
4* 
3* 
10* 
1 
7* 
: ... 
team. A key difference in these tests was that they were carried out in 
the environment of a fully integrated and nominally operational system 
on the NASA iron-bird facility. 
Software verification and validation testing covered the following 
functions: 
(1) Control Laws 
(2) Executive 
(3) Computer I/O 
(4) Computer Redund~ncy Management 
(5) Sensor Redundancy Management 
(6) In-Flight Self-Test 
(7) Preflight Test 
(8) Displays/controls 
(9) Primary/Bypass System Transfer Laws 
(10) Downlink 
A description of results_representative of these categories of tests is 
given in the following sections. 
5.5.1.1 Control-Law Verification 
These tests broke down into two categories: those that were 
essentially single-string tests, and those that involved multicomputer 
operation. Single-string testing dominated the control-law verification. 
Figure 5-23 illustrates the control-law software verification test 
strategY. The software functions are isolated into single-input 
single-output modules where possible. Then, using test access points 
built into the program, the individual functions are verified against 
the software specification. For nonlinear functions, the entire function 
is tested in a dynamic sense by sweeping the input over a range larger 
than the function expects, and then examining the output. In the F-8 
program, all such functional test results were automatically plotted 
from a real-time data-acquisition system. 
The nature of software makes it imperative that all functional 
relationships be examined using an automatic cross-plot system, because 
a software fault may affect only one I/O point. High visibility is 
required of all software operations. 
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Figure 5-23. single-string .. ,~9ntrol'-law software verification. 
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Figure 5-25. F-8 DFBW filter verification result. 
l( . . ' 
! 
Figure 5-26. F-8 DFBW scheduled gain 
verification result. 
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Figure 5-27. Major pallet assembly 
test configuration. 
OUTPUTS 
In the F-8 control-law validation, some limited open-loop dynamic 
tests were conducted f which examined the dynamic relationship between 
the input and the output, without closing the loop through the actuators 
and airplane simulation. The responses were then compared with inde-
pendent computations. 
Control-law software validatton consists primarily of performing 
closed-:oop dynamic tests. These include obtaining closed-loop dynamic 
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responses and comparing them with independent computations. In the 
case of the F-8 DFBW system, these responses were also comp~red with 
an independent control-la,w prototype program. This is illustrated in 
Figure 5-28. These tests are identical to those performed on analog 
systems. Actual system responses were obtained on the iron bird as 
in path A. In path B, the Same aerodynamic model was used, but an 
independent real-time control-law program and software models of the 
actuators were used. In pat'h C, a nonreal-time analysis program was 
used to generate predicted dynamic resRons~s. 
Figure 5-29 shows an actual comparison of the responses from 
the iron bird and all-digital simulator as described in Figure 5-28. 
The c<,ntrol-law verification and validation tests were quite 
time consum~~g, but insofar as things are ever straighttorward, they 
could be cla~i,fiEi!d as relatively routine. These tests were performed 
,:::--~ 
essentit1lly as they would have been if the system had been single 
string. Figure 5-30 illustrates the fact that each of the channels 
produces an output which matches that of its partners. The digital 
commands of the three computers are in fact identical to the last bit. 
'l'he verification and validation task was substantially eased by the 
fact that test access had been built into the flight software. 
5.5.1.2 Sensor Redundancy Mana,gement (Rl-n Verification 
The sensor RH software contains many modes of operation, depending 
on the multiple sensor status. Each sensor triad or pair is processed 
by the R."1 software each 20 milliseconds, and the algorithm c;:onfigura-
tion may change in that period of time. This means that a t~ery pre-
cise and repeatable Verification method was needed. Because of the 
large number of sensors, the test needed to be autor.\ated as well. 
Table 5-5 lists the tests that were requil:edfor the analog sensor Rl-1 
sofhmre. 
The method developed to accomplish this Sof't:''/llre verification is 
illustrated in Figure 5-31. \Vithin the real-time simUlation is a 
multisensor model which can represent various sensor qualities as 
listed. The multisonsor model is under real-time operator control, 
and was also programmed to. generate a particulal;' pattern. The multi-
senSO,t; output is then routed to the digital system in the iron bird. 
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Figure 5-28. Dynamic control-law validation. 
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'rable 5-5. Analog sensor ro1 tests. 
r-----------.-----------------~-------------------------------------------------~ 
'res t CI:1 tegory 
l'riplex 
Duplex 
Type of Tests 
verify no failure for transient 
< windm'/ width. 
Verify correct midvalue selection. 
verify first trip lavel. 
Verify proper downmode to averaging. 
verify second trip level. 
verify proper default value. 
Verify altlltlnciator warning and 
log entry. 
verify resulting inhibits/activations. 
verify correct averaging. 
verify trip level. 
Verify proper default value. 
verify annunciator warning and 
log entry. 
verify resulting inhibits. 
~------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
r-----., AIRCRAFT r:~:::-:-L-""l-~A_.J 
,\IRPLANE STATES TRIPLEX B 
DYNAMIC 1----.... '"1 (OR DUAL) 
MODEL SENSOR MODEL C 
SENSOR 
QUALITIES 
NoisE 
DRIFT 
SCALE FACTOR/BIAS 
JUMP AND HOLD 
HOLD 
TRANSI ENT JUMP 
OSCI LI.ATORY 
F-8TRIPLEX 
AIRG'ORNE 
COMI'UTER 
1---.... _---
REAL-TIME DIGITAL FLY-BV-WIRE 
SIMULATION SYSTEM 
Figure 5-31. Real-time redundant sensor model. 
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The pattern generated by the sensor model is shown in Figure 5-32. 
Six separa.te test segments are run in approximately 35 seconds. This 
test pattern completely exercises the sensor-redundancy-management al-
gorithm and verifies all of the functions listed in Table 5-5. Test 
Segment No. 1 verifies operation under provisionally failed conditions; 
Segment No. 2 verifies the selection algorithm for unfailed sensors; 
.. Seglllent No. 3 verifies midvalue selection, and Segments No. 4 through 6 
/! ;2 
verify fault-detection and isolation operation. 
Because of the amount of logic in the sensor RM algorithms, an 
automated test was necessary to exercise all the software branches. 
This is extremely critical because a branch of soft~'are that escapes 
execution during the testing may contain an error that may cause the 
entire program to fail. Thus, one rule of software verification is: 
assure all software paths are executed at least once during testing. 
5.5.1. 3 Miscel:;aneous Single-String Software Verification 
/') 
Several other software' 'modules were tested without regard to the 
fact. that they were being executed in a multicomputer system. Modules 
that fall into this category are in-flight self-test and preflight 
self test. Verification of these modules followed 'a silnple pattern. 
It was first verified that no faults were declared ~n normal operation. 
Then, one at a time, faults were introduced of the type that were to 
be detected by these algorithms, and error logs were examined to see 
that the errors were in fact detected. Figure 5-33 displays an actual 
test result from the F-8 DFBW in-flight ~i\lf-test program verification. 
In this example, the memory sum check fund'\:ion was tested by deliber-
ately altering' the contents of memory. P10per fault detection and 
proper response to the fault were actual:y1 determined in this test. 
These tests were accomplished for every ~(~lf-test function, and 
again, were performed in a single-string manner. 
Similar techniques were applied to the downlink routine, the 
executive, and to the special computer-input-panel-initiated routines.,· .. · 
In summary, then, much software verification and validation can be 
accomplished as if the system were single string, provided those 
II 
functions have modular independence from the r~aundancy management 
algori thms. This quality becomes more importa~:t when the time comes 
(and it,always does) to make a change to the app'lications software. 
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Figur/i1 5-32. F-8 DFB\v ill! sensor model pattern. 
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Typical test burst 
for N = 5 case 
91987 
0198F 
00001 
10000 
LOC CONTENTS 
INITIAL ALARM TABLE 
.~ 903 DUE TO START UP 
~ 10000 10000 
10000 10000 00002 
10000 
VERIFY NOMINAL VALUE 
1000Q 10000 10000 
C[ill:D<1§I~ 3E8F3 2190A 209FB 30018 3A2/tC 3A028 2DD04 
~ ALTER CONTENTS OF MEMORY (ONE BIT) 
C[ill:D~ 3ESF3 
/NOGO 
DUMP LOW CORE TO VERIFY 
COMPUTER DESTINATION 
00010 ~ 04011 01000 
01987 10005 
DUMP ALARM TABLE 
TO VERIFY ALARM NUMBER 
r PROG. INTERRUPT 
10903 ~ 10903 QOA72 
-019SF 10000 10000 10000 00002 
MEMORY TEST ERR IN XLNK 
/NOGO 
~ 10000 10000 
Figure 5-33. Memory sum check test example. 
5.5.2 t-1ulticomputer System and Software Verification 
This category of verification and validation is the most critical, 
because the integrity of the entire flight-control system hinges on 
the ability to realize the theoretical reliability figures of redundant 
channels. In order for a redundant system to truly provide the 
theoretical MTBF, the probability that the entire system will fail due 
to a common mode fault must be smaller than the probability that 
successive independent faults will disable the system. At the present 
time, there is no known way of computing the probability that such a 
co~non mode fault exists. This means that design practice and verifi-
cation testing must be relied on to produce a system that has a high 
degree of immunity to common mode faults. 
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By its very nature, verification and validation testing of the 
multicomputer system emphasizes abnormal operation because normal 
operation reveals nothing of the true character of the system. The 
fact that a triplex system operates in a synchronized condition for 
many hours does not in any way indicate that it can survive even the 
most elementary fault or that it can provide any more fault tolerance 
than a single-channel system. In fact, with regard to multichannel 
performance, normal quiescent operation yields data only on the 
nuisance fault statistics of the system. 
The multichannel system validation test approach is listed in 
Table 5-6. The tests fell into four major categories and are des-
cribed according to purpose and content in the figure. The first 
category of testing established nominal operation. The second category 
of test involves the systematic verification of the Failure Detection, 
Identification, and Recovery (FDIR) software, and also the Failure 
r-Iodes and Effects Test (FMET). There is overlap in these tests. The 
stress tests are conducted in order to evaluate system operation in 
configurations and conditions which fall outside of the controlled 
verification tests. In many cases, this involves reducing system 
operating margins to zero to establish ultimate breakdown boundaries. 
The piloted fault injection tests seek to verify tha.t normal 
pilot response to fault conditions do not adversely couple with 
automatic FDIR actions. It is also essential that the system response 
to real faults, which occur during the test program, be analyzed. Each 
such fault is an extremely important test because real faults occur in 
circumstances and sequences not always considered in formal testing. 
In the F-8 program, each such case was intensely analyzed to evaluate 
the system FDIR. As it turned out, there was ample opportunity to 
observe the FDIR process for natural faults, due to early problems 
with computer reliability. 
The actual experience gained during these tests, and the impli-
cations for future applications are described in the following sections. 
5.5.2.1 Unfailed System Performance Tests 
The first performance measure of interest was that of synchroni-
zation capability. The parameters of interest were the amount of time 
required for all channels to acquire sync, and the skew between 
channels as they exited the sync routine. Figure 5-34 illustrates the 
161 
Table 5-6. r-lultichannel system validation test approach. 
Test Category Purpose of Test Types of Tests 
-
Unfailed system • Establish nominal ~ulti- • Synchronization performance tests channel performance Tinling • 
• Intercomputer 
communication 
integrity 
Fault detection, • Verify correct FDIR soft- • r-lodule verifi-isolation, and ware response to inserted cation 
reconfiguration faults. Failure modes (FDIR) • 
• Verify no common mode and effects faults for inserted single- tests 
channel faults. 
Stress tests II Establish operating • Timing overload 
margins for extreme Phantom job 
operating conditions. • 
Verify common-mode • Random power • no transients faults for catastrophic 
single-channel faults. e Parametric 
variations 
.. Induced operator 
errors 
Piloted fault • Verify no adverse pilot • Fr-lET subset injection test coupling with FDIR logic. 
I» Subsystem 
• Demonstrate fault catastrophic tolerance. faults 
measured results of the sync acquisition tests. The primary system 
was operated in a closed-loop mission simulation for long periods of 
time, after which internal test counters were examined. The distri-
bution of "look loops" shO\"s that the channels acquire sync very 
quickly. The distribution did not change when the test was repeated 
on the flight system with a different set of flight computers. 
Synchronization skew was measured using an oscilloscope and 
was found to be highly variable in the original software release. 
This led to the discovery that the synchronization job was being 
scheduled at a point that was subject to timing variations, and led 
to a software modification. The synchronization skew was found to be 
steady and typically less than 10 microseconds Hith the modified 
program. 
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LOOP 
NO 
LOOP 
NO 
YES "SYNC" 
"RUN" 
YES 
CONTINUE 
100 
PERCENT OF 
MINOR CYCLES 
99.6 
0.3 0.1 0L-__ L--L __ -4~1-__ -C~_ 
o 2 
NUMBER OF LOOPS - SYNC STATE 
100 99.7 
PERCENTOF 
MINOR CYCLES 
0.3 
O~--~O-L--~~L-------­
NUMBER OF LOOPS - R UN STATE 
Figure 5-34. Synchronization performance. 
These two tests produced insight into system operation that was 
not possible from cursory operational performance observations. Visi-
bility into the internal operation of the logic was necessary to gain 
this understanding. 
System timing is another performance measure of interest. Special 
test software was used to measure the execution times of major modules 
of the program. This measurement technique is illustrated in Figure 5-·35. 
A special software routine computed execution time by m~asuring elapsed 
time and then subtracting overhead time. Timing figures were compiled 
over long periods of time, with both the average and maximum ti~es 
noted. This data was used to establish the maximum timing load of the 
flight program under normal conditions. Figure 5-36 presents the data 
taken on the software release used for the first F-8 DFBW flight. 
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Figure 5-35. System timing technique. 
In order to determine the quality of inter~omputer communication 
ar. 1 I/O, internal logs were examined at the end of the operating day. 
Th,' following parameters were examined: 
(1) Number of restarts. 
(2) Number of I/O errors. 
(3) Number of sensor miscompares or failur.'es. 
(4) Number of alarms indicative of faulty intercom'l?uter 
communication. 
Even for the very early releases it was observed that the normal and 
usual number for each of these parameters was zero. This was not to 
be the case, however, in later stress testing. The conclusion drawn 
from these unfailed p(':!rformance tests was that the mul tichannel systE,;m 
operated with a high degree of integrity under quiescen~ operating 
conditions. 
During this early test phase it was frequently observed that a 
channel would sporadically lose sync, or that a channel, or occasionally 
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nll tllJ:ce. channels, would fail to achieve sync at turn on. 'l'his 
impLi.cit testing' was to generate the majority of software design 
changes, BS is described later. 
5.5.2.2 Failure ~todes and Bffects Tests (FI-lETS) 
FHE'l'S are. designed to systematically verify that the digital sys-
tem is fllil-operational after a single disabling channel fault, and 
fail-pllssive (to CBS-}: aftar a second channel fnilure. 'rhese tests were 
parfOl.:lllQd after isol1:1tad soft\~nl:e modules had been verified for correct 
functional operatlOlI. ',~t\ble 5-7 sUllunarizes the Fr-1E'l' sb:ategy for both 
hl:ll:dware and sof t\\'a.l.'o .fa ul ts . 
'ruble 5-7. FDIR test procedure. 
~------'-"---------------------------r----.-------------------------------""--, 
:tnserted Fnult Verification Steps 
---.---.. ~~,--, ... , .. ,.~-----+----------~-- -------1 
Transient fault in one 
or more channelS 
• Successful restart. 
• continued operation 
• 'No perlllD.;-,cnt: e",lL1.t:.s 
• No udve~se surface motion 
~~--------,---------------~-------+---------~~, ---.----------------~~~ 
p(:u:)'I\t\nont fault in 
Ol\~ channel 
• Resto~~ attempted 
• Chnnn~l declared hard failed 
• Proper internal reconfig-
\Ir<lt.i.on 
• Annunciation to pilot 
• System operutional 
• No adverse surface lIlotion 
r--' ----~-,~---,.. -------~-----~--.-------.., 
~ermDncnt, liko fnults • Restart attcmpted 
in two challn0.1s (sllccessive) 
• Alito t:..l.-<ll1sf<u· to bYPll~S 
systcm 
I 
· ProPQ.l." interntd. stutus 
• No advorso surface 
L.... __________ . " ••• "~~ _ __''_~o tiOt_l ____ . ______ ~, __ _ 
'l'hc-scloction of the fuult Hmtrix presents {l VCX'Y d.U:ficult pro-
blom ftl.l:' n syst'.al1\ SUch us t\l;i.s. It .1.& apparent that a component-by-
compot\ont OJ: \~irQ-by-\".trQ oven/short fault tast. nmtd.x is impossiblo. 
'rho ptLl:tS COUllt und nlimbel: of .fullun:) modes p.t"ccludcB ~vcn 0 modest 
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attempt at verifying FDIR operation in this manner. Thus, the strategy 
used \~as to inject faults at the functional level and judge integrity 
on the basis of the FDIR response to these functional faults. An im-
portant thing to note at this point is that the system must be de-
signed at the outset to be testable. If the FDIR scheme is extremely 
sophisticated, involving operations on a large amount of data and a 
largcnu"(\ber of intricate steps to detect and isolate faults, it is 
quite possible that the system will be ullVerifiable. That is, the 
number of tests required to establish correct response, even for those 
faults that can be thought of, exceeds the test capability available. 
'1'he F-8 DFB\\I FDIR design and Fr-IET approach are based on the 
following assumptions: 
(1) The ability of a channel to maintain synchronous operation 
and to conmlullicate \>Jith its partners is a primary indi-
cator of channel health. 
'I'"~ (2) A relatively small amount'bf information exchanged between 
channels can be used as a further basis for this determining 
channel health. This information can be thought of as 
vital signs. 
(3) Fault detection, isolation, and reconfiguration can be 
based on the manifestation of a fault, :rather than on the 
~ection of the fault itself. 
(4) The restart mechanism will provide automatic transient 
fault protection without having to identify the source of 
the fault. 
These assumptions dramatically reduce the test matrix. It is no\~ 
possible to approach the. failure modes and effects tests in the 
following manner: 
(1) Verify that the FDIR ~esponse to abnormalities in the small 
number of vital signs is correct. 
(2) Verify thnt all built-in test hardware produces warning 
signals to the FDIR for the types of faults they are de-
Signed to detect. 
(J) Verify that the restart process r<:!stores normal operation 
for transient abnormalities in the vital signs or for the 
built-in test \V'arni1l9 signals. 
167 
(.4) verify that the restart mechanism will suspend its attempt 
to restore operation for unrecoverable faults. 
(5) Finally verify the fail-operational fail-safe performance to 
all permanent faults. 
These assumptions and observations produced a relatively modest test 
matrix which provides an extremely thorough coverage of the functional 
validation of the FDIR process. The test matrix is tabulated in 
sununary form in Table 5-8. No assumptions were made relative to the 
similarity of channels. That is , faults were induced for all combina-
tions of two channels. 
Table 5-8. FDIR test matrix. 
r----"-' -.--.. ---"---r--'----------~---------------.,....., 
Location of 
Injected Faults 
Interface ur.it 
Encoder/Decoder 
Computer lIard\.,.are 
Approximate 
Number of Faults 
200 
400 
20 
Types of Faults 
Injected 
• I/O data lines 
• Crosslink communica-
tion line:> 
• Synchr~nization lines 
• Loss of entire card 
• Loss of entire 
connector 
• Loss of power 
• Data lines 
• strobe lines 
• Clock lines 
• r/o connector 
• Spurious interrupts 
• Loss of power 
I------".------.--!I----~------._t-------------___i 
computer Software 150 
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• Faults producing 
program interrupts 
• Faults producing 
machine interrupts 
• I/O communication 
errors 
e Vital sign errors 
Breakout boxes \,'ere used to insert the major'ity of encoder-decoder 
faults and some of the i~lterface Uili.t fa,ults. For Illost of the IFU fault 
injection tests, how<:tver, special hardware was used which was built-in 
specifically for the failure modes testing. 'l'his hardware provided the 
capability to break signal paths or to simulate fail-high or fail-low 
conditions. 
(1) 
C2 ) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
Specific, data paths modified \\16re: 
Interrupt linGs (open or ,continuous) 
Crosslink transmi~i('{6n 
, Il Input data transmi~~ion 
Input data recePti~\l 
i Ji 8ynchron zation d!scretes 
Flgm-:e 5-37 illustrates the mechanization used for inserting sync dis-
crete faults into the system. Figure 5-38 ShO\o1S hO\" crosslink and data 
line faults \"ere in,troduced. 
OUT 
COMPUTER COMPUTER COMPUTER 
A 
DISCI'ETE 
IN OUT 
LEFT RIGHT 
B 
DISCI'ETE 
FAIL HIGH 
NORMAL 
IN 
FAIL LOW 
FAULT CIRCUIT 
I~IGHT 
C 
OUT 
Figure 5-37. Mechanization of synchronization 
fault introduction. 
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nTDATA 
FROM 
LEFT 
TO L.eFT J------------------II .. AND RIGHT 
DATA INrUT-D-<ALT~A-F~A'-IL---*""'~ 
ALL. BUS 
DRiveR" 
Figure 5-38. Mechanization of interchannel data bus 
and crosslink failure introduction. 
'1'he computer test set \\las generally used to insert software 
faul ts, although some special-purpose soft'\lare \<las required to simulate 
certain faults. Table 5-9 lists in more detail the types of software 
faults introduced. 
'1'he results of these FMETs axe summarized in Table 5-10. A 
remar!"ably small number of anomalies occurred / wi th only one being 
seriolls: the input data stream double fault. The encoder/decodel- faults 
affects display operation in a benign manner. The key observations 
are that the fail-operati.onal fail-safe requiJ;"ement \\las demonstrated 
in all but one condition. Although stress testing was to expose 
several restal-t recovery problems, it is significant that the system 
operation was verified to the extent demonstrated. The second item of 
significance was that all transient faults introduced were survived 
by the system. 
5.5.2.3 stress Tests 
This class of vel:ification exposed more anomalies per test than 
any other. Tho stl:CSS test procedures ar~ listed in Table 5-11 for 
each of t.he test types. 'l'hese tests were, for the most part, conducted 
with the full iron bird operat.io~lal, including actuators. Surface 
commands were monitored db:ectly, and post-t.est core dumps were examined 
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Table 5-9. Examples of simulated 
sofb."are faults" 
r-------.----------------~----.--------.----------~------------------~ 
Faults Introduced 
• Ill~gal-operation code 
.. Privileged instruction 
• Fixed-point overflow 
• Significance test 
• Unnormalized floating-point 
operation 
• store protect violation 
• Exponent underflow and overflow 
• Divide check 
Result 
Program 
Interrupt 
~----------------.--.----------------------------~------------------~ 
• CPU and memory pari ty errol.-
• Timeout (No-Go discrete) 
Machine 
Interrupt 
~---------.------.----------.------------------.----~------------------; 
• Discrepancy in channel-
identification tag 
• Discrepancy in computer time 
• Discrepancy in computer functional 
mode 
• Recognition of restart request 
• critical error in crosslink trans-
mission list 
• Error in self-test program 
Direct 
Restart 
~--------------------------.--------------------~----,------------.----
to establish recovery or fault sequences. The results of these tests 
fl.re summarized in Table 5-12. 
The stress tests exposed problems not apparent in the more 
controlled and systematic module verification tests and distinct 
failure modes and effects tests. Both classes of tests are necessary, 
of course, but stress testing tends to produce sequences of operation 
that were not considered in the design Bh~rse or produced in the con-
trolled fault testing. 
The stress tests exposed problems that existed almost exclusively 
in the restart recovery process. The modifications improved nuisance-
fault inuuunity substantially without materially affecting fault-
detection capability. 
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Table 5-10. Summary of FDIR test results. 
Anomalies 
Synchronization 
• Continued operation for some sync faults 
Input Data Stream 
• No CBS down mode for dual input data line loss 
Encoder/Decoder 
• One type of first fault not detectable 
• Software wrap test incorrect 
Computer Software 
• Some faults detected by means not predicted 
Observations 
• System was fail-operational for every first fault 
• System was fail-safe for all but one second fault 
• All injected transient faults were survived 
Timing Overload--A common-mode software fault, which causes a 
program "hang up", is designed to cause a transfer to the bypass 
system. Temporary overloads in one channel may be recoverable through 
the restart process. No anomalies were found in these tests. 
Phantom Job--This test exposed a software error in the do\.,rnlink 
routine and also showed that an asynchronous job could cause interfer-
ence in the sync program. Asynchronous jobs were ruled out for future 
implementation. No other anomalies were found. 
Parametric Variations--Minimum operating values were determined 
for key parameters, as shown in Table 5-13. The nominal program 
values were increased in some cases where margins were too small. 
Power Faults--Major problems with the sync and restart software 
were iden"i::.ified in this test series. An example of the type of fault 
observed is shown in Figure 5-39, where anomalous surface command 
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Table 5-11. Stres,,-test procedures. 
Test Type Procedure 
Timing Overload Increase sample rate until 
minor-cycle period equals 
compute time. 
Phantom Job Insert asynchronous job 
which "drifts" through 
minor-cycle period, and 
also overflow job queues. 
Parametric Variations Reduce timing tolerances 
and fail-counter values 
during quiescent and power-
transient conditions 
(during restarts) . 
-
Power Faults Interrupt or reduce prime 
-28-Vdc power in one or 
more channels. 
Induced Operator Erroneous operation of mode 
Errors panels and cockpit controls. 
Table 5-12. stress-test results. 
Test Type Result 
Timing Overload • No errors found --
Phantom Job • Error in downlink soft-
ware exposed 
• Interference Wi~l s:inc process noted 
Parametric • Ninimum acceptance values Variations determined 
• Margins sufficient 
Power Faults • Exposed major software problems in recovery 
process 
• Sync and restart software design errors 
1\ Insufficient tolerances 
on failure counters 
Induced Operator • No system FDIR software Errors errors found 
• Applications t;oftware 
errors found 
. 
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Table 5-13. Parameteric variation test results. 
* Parameter Final Flight Minimum Good 
Program Value 
Consecutive I/O 10 2 
Interrupts 
Consecutive Restarts 10 6 
-Crosslink Wait Time 200 llS 100 llb-
Sync Nait Loops 10-10 6-2 
Consecutive Crosslink 10 4 
Errors 
* Under most severe power transient conditions. 
behavior was observed on only one of several consecutive power cycles. 
The problems were caused by a combination of design errors and insuffi-
cient tolerances on timeout and fault counters. The modified software 
demonstrated an ultra-high tolerance to pm.,er transients, as shown in 
Figure 5-40. An uneventful transfer to the bypass system occurred 
for reduction in prime dc level below the 22-volt set point. 
Induced Operator Errors--No system FDIR errors were detected by 
these tests. This was due to the modular separation of applications 
software and system FDIR software. A few applications software errors 
were detected, however. 
5.5.2.4 Piloted Failure Modes and Effects Testing 
The formal and systematic open-loop failure modes and effects 
tests are genally conducted under static conditions, that is, under 
conditions which approximate cruise flight. Although many failure effects 
can be evaluated independently of the environment in which the system 
is operating, it is not possible to evaluate all failure effects in this 
manner. In the F-8 DFBt'l program, a closed-loop piloted F~1ET series 
was performed. Figure 5-41 lists the type of tests accomplished. These 
tests were performed in the iron bird in a real-time nimulation mode 
with all systems active. The pilot was aware of the fault to be in-
jected and the time it was inserted. This was done so that the pilot 
could analyze the fault and select conditions where the consequences 
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Fig ure 5-40. F-8 baseline restart performance--
flight so ftware . 
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TEST METHOD 
• INDUCE SINGLE AND MULTIPLE LIKE FAULTS DURING CLOSED-LOOP PILOTED SIMULATION ON 
"ALL- UP" IRON BIRD 
• PILOT IS AWARE OF FAULT TYPE AND INSERTION TIME 
• PI LOT/SYSTEMIVEHICLE RESPONSE IS ANALYZED 
FAULTS INDUCED 
• MOTION SENSORS 
- RATE GYROS 
- ACCELER OMETERS 
- ATTITUDE 
• STICK /PEDAL TRANSDUCERS 
• COMPUTER / IFU 
- ONE, TWO, THREE CHANNELS 
• TRIM FAILS 
- OPEN 
- RUNAWAY 
• BUS POWER 
- ONE , TWO, THREE CHANNELS 
• HYDRAU LIC POWER 
- PCI , PC2, UTILITY 
• ACTUATION 
- IND IVIDUAL CHAN NELS 
- ~I NGLE SURFACES 
- ONE HORIZONTAL, ONE AILERON RUDDER 
- BOTH AILERONS 
- BOTH AILERONS, ONE HORIZONTA L 
• TOTAL PRIMARY SYSTEM FAILURE WITHOUT ANNUNCIATION 
- PILOT MUST SELECT BYPASS SYSTEM 
Figure 5-41. Piloted FMET series . 
might be most severe. In many cases, the same fault was inserted 
s veral time s to permit the pilo t to examine the results under various 
dynamic conditions. 
Thi s phase of testing is very critical. Faults are coupled with 
pilo t response and the total system performance can be assessed in 
realistic circumstances . This is impor tant not only i~ uncovering 
problem areas, but lso, if the d esign is sound, in g iving the pilot 
a measure of confidence in overall system integrity. This is ultimately 
a critical step in the flight qualification process. 
n the F-8 system, serious faults tend not to p roduce transients 
in the airc ra f t motion. For example, successive hard-over faults in 
t he pitch-rate - yro set are undetectable from vehicle response charac-
teristics (Figur e 5-4 2). In the figure , the aircraft was deliberately 
mi str imm d before th fi rst and second failures . The hard-over faults 
produce no vehicle motion . Faults of lesser magnitude and rate do pro -
duce slight vehicle motion , out, on the other hand, are handled almost 
routinely by the pilot. 
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TRIM 
1 
! PILOT 
TRIM 
GYRO 'A' FAIL 
1 
1 I- I 
NORMAL t 
ASCELERATION O~----------~---t----~~------------~~--------------·---~ 
~ 
- (9) -1 I-
HORIZONTAL 
STABILIZER 
(deg) 
5 RESULTS: DOWNMODE TO DIR 
O~------------r-!----------------r-------------~ 
~ I 
Figure 5-42. 
I 
, .• I I • I, ,I I i ~-
TIME (l-s increments) 
Successive hard-over pitch-rate-
gyro:::'i-nduced failures-pitch SAS 
mode. 
The results of these pilot FMETs are summarized in Figure 5-43. 
Problems were identified and corrected, although very few actually 
occurred. It must be noted here that the pilot had been ~,nvolvelj in 
the development of the system reconfiguration policy and held evaluated 
interim configurations prior to the formal FMET series. 
The overall test results were significant. For all survivable 
faults, the pilot was able to maintain control of the aircraft. This 
was not the case in the Phase I F-8 DFBW program, where a category 
of faults in the single-channel digital system coupled with normal 
pilot responses produced some unrecoverable conditions. This was 
due to detection and reconfiguration processes taking up to I second. 
No such cases exist in the triplex Phase II DFBW system. 
PROBLEM AREAS 
• OPEN FAILURES ON STICK/PEDAL LVDTs NOT DETECTED QUICKLY ENOUGH (BIAS AODED) 
• SOME ANNUNCIATION OF. FAILURES CONFUSING (LOGIC CHANGED) 
• RUNAWAY RUDDER TRIM DETECTION TIME TOO LONG (LIMIT TRIM AUTHORITY) 
• CHANGE OF STICK TRIM WITH AUTOMATIC RECONFIGURATION REQUIRES PILOT ACTION 
OVERALL TEST RESULTS 
• NO LOSS OF CONTROL FOR ANY SURVIVABLE FAULT CONDITION 
• AUTOMATIC RECONFIGURATION DID NOT COUPLE WITH PILOT RESPONSE 
• THE AIRPLANE CAN BE LANDE!? WiTH THE FOLLOWING SURFACES ACTIVE: 
- ONE HORIZONTAL STAB I r::"iZER 
- ONE AILERON OR RUDDER (LAKE-BED RECOVERY WITH NO AILERONS) 
• FAIL-OPERATIONAL RESULTS FOR ALL FIRST FAULTS 
• PILOT NOT REQUIRED TO TAKE UNUSUAL ACTION FOR ANY SURVIVABLE FAULT 
Figure 5-43. Results of piloted FMET series. 
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'rhe independencG of all concrol surfaces ullol>",cd tho aircraft to 
be contro110d suff.l.ciontly well enough for ~\ landing with only one 
h01;izontnl sl:.nb.U1.zer t\nd one 1:011 control sur,tnco (ono td.loron o,r tho 
ruddor) ac~tva. All first faults were demonstratod tb leave a fni1-
opcl~ntional system for the primary flight control 1\10d05 (S011l0 out~r 
loop functions nro fail-passive). 
A f.i.nal important result was that for nny thoo.l:ctically sllrviv-
nblo fault, it \,las not rcqllir-od that tho pilot toke any Ul1usulil action 
in ordo.!: t~o l\w1.ntain control;. 'i':::;~'\\!~nL~Yr H:wt\s .l:cquil.·ct! that the 
pilot occasionally halt induc~~ aircrnft rates and r~trlm to level 
flight f:or somo mtllt:lpll?-eailuro condil!ions. 'rhin tQ~t saries contri-
buted signiftcnnl:.ly to tl~ project teum's confidence that the primnry 
l)E'I3W flight-control system could survive l11l.lS$J.vc J:tllllts {\Ild still 
p(~rmit the pilot to rCcbvcr the a.Lrcrnft. tI'he vtlU,dity of: tim t~!l$ts 
wns further accepted beCtlllSO tlHJY \"erc~ccompll.shcd on ~ test rig tIlL\,\: 
camQ vcry c lOBe to dl.lplicli.\ t1.ng the f1i.,)'h t cnv .I..l:ollmcn t. 
5.5.3 l'\ilotQ.d-!-lis~~~l:££ofnc 'ro!'lting 
'rhcso tests c()ni3isb~d of pil.ot evnlunt.i.nns of the functiQnal 
POl.'fo.t'I11:lnCl' of tho t)fUI" cOllt.ro1. system em tho iron b.l.l'd dlld,nq I:cnl-
t1l11o 811\\llla tion. '1'hasa ttJsts SQ1;VCt! scvornl purposes: 
(1) Ht~fl.ncmaJ\t ()f control ].m"5 for best fly.i.ng ql.lU,Li,tics. 
(2) l'}Xl,lt)Slllt{-' of: fUncti.onal purformuncc p.l:oblQl1\s due to d'.)s.i.tJn 
or softwDr0 dafi~lQnelcs. 
(3) OetQrl1\i.nntiol\ of tho dcgrcc of sy~t()m lIuls.::mcc-J',\ult 
Iml\\Ulli ty tllldOl' nOl~mtll opern clnq contii tlons. 
\ 
(4) D('IIIt)llstl'ntion of aystt:'11l lntcqr.lty to tho [J.Uot t anll, in 
ttH~t, to th0 entLra P.t:'ojGct! team, dll,d,n9 condic:lons closel.y-
s.i.111t11QtJn~T tl.i.(Jhl;. 
It ,lS no\:; only impo.rtnnt in tho. tI .. U';t phnsc t.o dOI\\OIU,l:.l:nl:.o tlwt 
th(~ fllqht-cont;l'ol nysb.111\ ctln tol(),\;'nt~() J:n\.l1.ts, but also thnt ovel~ n 
p('I~h)l,l of 11\{)]1ths tho systcm C~lll be .1:cli(.1d upon to parfo.t'm it:s intended 
fUm;tions without pl:oblcl1\s. '1'h1s is t\nol~l\(:ll: cd.Ucnl Gtcp 1n the 
.f.tight-q\luj,lf.i.cnt.i.cm process. A system \~l\:i.ch .t:t111s J:.l'cq\lCnt:ly llndar 
11 01: mtd, apC'C'n\:in\,l cOlll1H.i.QIU; docs not producotho cOl\f:l.doncc thn\;, it 
\dU. pcr.l:oJ:l\\ the 1l\t~lHJmi job when llcodad most. l\ IIltS.Sallee ,i;uult. 113 
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more than a nuisance. In a system like the triplex F-8 DFBW primary 
flight-control system, a nuisance fault is indistinguishable from a 
permanent hard\-,rare failure if it causes loss of a channel or a sensor. 
The integrity of a system th~n can be thought of as that quality which 
makes it both reliabile and fault tolerant. It is a system that can 
be depended on. The mission-profile tests provide information on the 
integrity of the system. 
The results of these tests are sununarized in Figure 5-44. As 
expected, several control-law refinements were nece~sary. This type 
of refinement extended into the flight phase of the program as well. 
1\ few software errors were exposed, but they were relatively minor. On 
the other hand, several design deficiencies were identified. Listed 
in Figure 5-44 are those found which were significant. 
• CONTROL-LAW ADJUSTMENTS NECESSARY 
- STICK SENSITIVITY 
- TRIM RATES 
- CONTROL-SYSTEM GAINS AND FILTERS 
• A FEW SOFTWARE ERRORS FOUND 
0< MOOE SELECTION IN AUTOPILOT 
- OTHER MISCELLANEOUS ERRORS IN PREFLIGHT TEST PROGRAM 
• SEVERAL OESIGN DEFICIENCIES IDENTlFIEO 
•• MODE SWITCH DISCRETE RM THRESHOLD TOO lOW 
~ HARD OV!:R FAULT-DETECTION LEVEL TOO LOW 
.< ADVi:!RSE MANEUVER EFFECT ON ROLL TRIM 
TRIM OISCRETE RM THRESHOLD TOO LOW 
- AUXI LIAfW TRIM-SWITCH PLAClOMENT POOR 
• NUISf\NCE FAULTS RARE 
• SYSTEM INTEGRITY ESTABLISHED 
~ VERY FEW ANOMALIES DURING THESE TESTS 
- OPERATION ON n'llo CHANNELS WAS UNEVENTFUL 
• FULL COMPLEMENT OF FLIGHT HARDWARE PERFORMED FLAWLESSLY 
Figure 5-44. Sunmlary of piloted mission-profile 
test results. 
with early software releases, design problems caused some nuisanc&-
fault declarations at turn-on, but nuisance sync loss or fault declara-
tions during operation were extremely rare. No nuisance faults occurred 
\~ith the release of the software that \"o1S flown on the first flight. 
'rhe overall integrity of the DFBN system, the bypass system, and the 
actuators was positively established during these tests. The systems 
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were operQted in real-time simulation throughout the flight envelope 
and in a variety of maneuvers and dynamic conditions. Anomalies were 
rare. Durin9 periods of time when only two digi tal compu'cers were 
available for the iron-bird facility, operations \'1ere routinely car-
ried out with no difficulties. Surprise faults introduced during 
these simulations were handled routinely by the pilot and control was 
never lost. 
These tests resulted in some software and system modifications, 
but no major system redesign was necessary. The final series of pilot 
evaluations were accomplished with the actual flight pallet and bypass-
system hardware which would be used for the first flight. The per-
formance of the system was flawless. This fact was another critical 
S0tp in the flight qualification process. 
5.5.4 Aircraft Inteqration Tests 
Finul integration tests \"ere accomplished, on the F-8C aircraft 
itsolf. The total sysLcm operating time in the aircraft prior to 
flight was 400 hours. In addition, over 1000 hours of operating and 
test experience had been achieved in the iron bird. The tests per-
formed in the aircraft are listed in Figure 5-45. It was not possible 
to close the simulation of the F-8C around the aircraft itself, so the 
tests wore open-loop in terms of the aerodynamic environment. 
The tests listed in Figure 5-45 are all straightforward and were 
accomplished relatively easily. Some problems were identified during 
this phase of testing: 
(1) Power-transient susceptibility of bypass system during 
primary-systom power cycling. 
(2) Scale-factor discrepancies in instrumentation system. 
(3) Errors found in preflight test program software in 
routines not tested on iron bird. 
(4) ToleJ:ance adjustments required ii1 several preflight test 
program routines. 
(5) Channel failure frequently callsed by computer hardware 
problems. 
(6) Excessive mechanical offset of stick LVDT. 
8~1I testing was composed for two sepsl:ate test cntegorics. 'l'he 
first involved tho superposition of noise on the source 28-Vdc power 
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INSTALLATION TESTS 
- POWER CONNECTIONS 
- CONTINUITY CHECKS 
- SENSOR SIGN VERIFICATION 
END-TO-END TESTS 
- STICK-TO-SURFACECALIBRATIONS 
- DYNAMIC SURFACE RESPONSES 
FUNCTIONAL CHECKS 
- MODING OF FLIGHT-CONTROL SYSTEM 
- PRIMARY/BYPASS TRANSFER DYNAMICS 
RESONANCE TESTS 
- INCREASED LOOP GAINS TO IDENTIFY STRUCTURAL RESONANCE PROBLEMS 
PREFLIGHT SELF-TEST CALIBRATION 
- SELF-TEST TOLERANCES 
- VERIFY OPERATION!PASSABILITY 
~MI SUSCEPTIBILITY/RADIATION 
..., EFFECT OF AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS ON DFBW SYSTEM 
- EFFECT OF DFBW SYSTEM ON AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 
ENGINE RUN 
- FUNCTIONAL TESTS 
- DRY RUN OF PREFLIGHT TEST 
Figure 5-45. Aircraft integration tests. 
lines with the system operating in a normal manner. The second test 
iQvolv~d the operation of all electrical systems on the aircraft during 
norfual operation of the OFBN system. There were no observed anomalies 
during either test. 
Formal lightning qualification tests were non performed on the 
Phase II syste~. These tests are planned for 1979. Thus, the F-8 
DFBlv aircraft is currently restricted from flying during electrical 
storms. 
All other test r8sults were positive. With cOhtr~l system loop 
gains set to four times their maximum value, no adverse structural-
mode interactions occurred. The identified problems were corrected 
and the aircraft was prepared for high-speed taxi tests and tirst flight. 
The higll-speed taxi tests are considered to be potential flights ih the 
event of an unusual problem which would force a takeoff. Thus, th:6 
system has to be declared flight-ready prior to these tests. 
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5.5.5 Flight-Readiness Determination 
,/ 
The determination that the F-8 DFBW/isystem met the requirements for 
first flight was based on three factors: 
(1) Technical performance of the system. 
(2) Flight Readiness Review Board findings. 
(3) Flight operations assessment. 
The technical performance of the system ultimately forms the 
basis for all flight-readiness decisions. That is to say, the actual 
tested, measured, and observed performance of the system over several 
hundred hours of operation on the iron bird and on the aircraft are 
weighted much more heavily than the theoretically predicted performance 
over the next million hours. 
Reliability or MTBF figures were used only to assess the proba-
bility of loss of the aircraft due to independent hardware faults. 
This procedure consisted of updating the estimated MTBF figures for 
various hardware subsystems with values derived from actual field 
experience. In the case of the F-8 DFBW system, no credit was taken 
for the bypass system in determining that the primary system was 
ready for flight, based on hardware MTBF figures. The bypass system 
was installed primarily for protection against a conunon-mode fault in 
the primary system for which no MTBF figure was available. The 
specific requil:ements that had to be met by the DFDW SYStElll' in order to 
be considered technically ready for flight are: 
(1) The FME~ shows that no single fault can result in the loss 
of the entire primary system, outside of a potential common 
mode software fault. 
(2) The FMET shc;l,ws: 
«a) No exceptions to the FMEA which reduces fault tolerance. 
(b) No primary-fault sequence which prevents a transfer 
to the bypass systemt 
(3) operation of the proposed flight software on the iron bird 
and on the aircraft must be without system anomalies which 
indicate a level of fault tolerance less than the FMEA/FMET 
results. 
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(4) No open anomalies exist which would indicate a fault 
tolerance less than predicted in the FMEA,--or demonstrated 
in the FMET. 
(5) No function which could be used in flight exists which has 
not been executed. 
(6) No known fault sequence exists for which the pilot cannot 
determine his proper course of action from onboard informa-
tion only. 
(7) Each test conductor has verified that tests for which he is 
responsible have been performed and passed, or have 
noncritical open anomalies. 
The independent Flight Readiness Review Board found no cause to restrict 
or postpone the first flight, based on a review of the test data for 
each subsystem in the DFBW systef\1.. The Flight Operations Directorate, 
to which the project pilots report, found no data or experience which 
would prevent a first flight. 
5.6 Pilot's Role in Validation and Evaluation 
The pilot's role in the validation. testing and system evaluation 
in the F-8 DFBW program was critical to the flight-qualification pro-
cess because it was the pilot who ultimately had to make the Go/No-Go 
decision relative to the first flight. Pilot participation in the 
F-8 DFBW program did not start during the validation phase, but rather 
during the conceptual design, 2 years earlier. For an experimental 
system like the F-8 DFBW system, this was an obvious necessity. In 
the F-8 program the same pilot that participated in the requirements 
definition phase also was prime pilot in the validation and evaluation 
phases. This was a very beneficial situation in terms of bringing the 
system to the flight-qualified stage. 
The pilot's participation in the process of validating the 
system design can be represented as occurring in the following phases. 
5.6.1 Breadboard System Evaluatio~ 
system breadboards were built and installed in the iron bird 
prior to delivery of the flight hardware. Pilot evaluations of these 
systems in closed-loop simulated flight led to several design changes 
and firmly established the design in several areas, such as displays 
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and controls. Formal validation-like testing was not accomplished 
during the early evaluations". Rather, the pilot attempted to stress 
test the overall system to expose design deficiencies. Changes were 
only modera.tely expensive if they could be defined during this period 
of time. 
5.6.2 Failure Modes and Effects Testing 
As was previously noted, the formal Fl>1ET involved over 750 tests. 
It was not possible, nor iscit generally desirable, to have the pilot 
involved in all of these tests. There was generally an in-line analysis 
of computer log data required following each fault case. It is unrea-
sonable to expect a pilot to participate in this form of testing. In 
the F-8 DFBI'l program, the pilot did evaluate each different type of 
failure mode, however. Here again, if the system has 1001 different 
failure ,node manifestations, it would be mandatory for a pilot to look 
at most of them. In the case of the F-8 DFB\\1 system, the number of 
different manifestations was small, and hence, the pilot could evaluate 
all of them. 
The pilot's responsibility during the Fl>1ET phase is to make the 
follO\~ing determination for each of the failure modes examined: 
(1) Is the fault potentially catastrophic in the worst possible 
condition at which it may occur? 
(2) Is the pilot's required response reasonable and natural, 
given the demands of the total flying task? 
(3) Is the fault annunciation adequate and clear? 
(4) Arc additional fault-handling systems or features required 
to assist the pilot in recovering from the fault? 
(5) Are there actions which must be avoided in the pilot's 
recovery process? 
(6) Are there special emergency procedures which must be written 
to assure proper recovery actions are unders·tood? 
In addition to these explicit determinations, the pilot must also 
form an overall impression of system integrity. This can b~ done only 
if the same pilot is able to assess the fault-response characteristics 
of the system over several weeks or months. This assessment, as 
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quifJ.itative as it is, plays an important part in determining flight 
readiness. These qualitative factors might include: 
(1) Consistency of system response to repeated faults of the 
same type. 
(2 ) Predictability of system response to 
response to similar faults. 
given its 
(3) Success in recovery, including type of recovery action 
and post-recovery flying qualities. 
These factors are difficult to quantify, but they establish 
in the mind of the pilot an impression of the integrity of the system. 
5.6.3 Mission-Profile Iron-Bird Testing 
During this phase of te~ting, the system was operated in as 
normal a fashion as possible. Surprise faults were induced as part of 
the pilot training process, however. The majority of the work done 
by the pilot in this phase of testing consisted of flying quality 
evaluations, and did not differ materially from the type of work usually 
done on a closed-loop simulator in preparation for an experimental 
or prototype airplane/system evaluation. 
~'he implicit system evaluation again is most important during 
these tests. The factors which the pilo~ ~ust determine are: 
(1) Does the system perform consistently during the ev~luations, 
or do mysterious d~ ... ,\at;i{/~~ occur for which no explanation 
can be found? 
(2) Are nuisance faults conunon or rare? 
(3) Is familiarization time short or does it take some length 
of time to proficiently accomplish the planned mission 
profile? 
(4) Are surprise faults able to be handled routinely? 
In these types of observations, the pilot's role is no different 
than .th~t of the operator on any piece of equipment. lIe will, by 
sheer experience, formulate an impression of the system that is inde-
pendent of predicted MTBF or fault-tolerance characteristics. It is 
this qualitativQ assessment, which is a complex integration process 
in the human mind, that ultimately determines that a technically qualified 
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system is in fact flight ready. ~vhere he is not satisfied, the pilot 
must be able to identify specific problem areas, hOl.,.ever, in order 
that corrective action can be taken. 
5.6.4 High-Speed Taxi and E1!.ght Test 
The pilot's role in these phases of test and evaluation is, of 
course, primary. Although the DFBlv system comprises the experiment, 
it is also the primary flight-control system of the F-SC. Therefore, 
the pilot's first task is to evaluate the characteristics of the 
airplane. The sole cr iter ia of the acceptabili t.y of the primary DFBW 
system in the high-speed taxi test and first flight is that the 
airplane is controllable, assuming the s::t'stem does not fail. Thus, 
the pilot is primarily responsible for assessing the vehicle/system 
as an entity in the early flight testing, and in this task, his role 
as a test pilot is fairly well understood. 
The high-speed taxi tests and first flight were conducted accord-
ing to a detailed flight plan. The test philosophy was to demonstrate 
normal sys'tem performance. This philosophy precluded the deliberate 
insertion of faults during the flight-test program. 
5.7 System Flight-Test Experienca 
For purposes of this discussion, the engine runs and taxi tests 
are considered part of the flight-test program. As a matter of policy, 
DFRC requires t~he airplane and system to be flight qt:.alifiecl prior to 
the taxi tests. The flight-test program is the ultimate validation 
test. Here, the system and airplane demonst.l:ate the mission suitability 
of the design inthc actual flight environment. This section reviews 
the experience with the DFBlv system during the flight-test program, 
both on the ground and in flight. 
5.7.1 Engine Runs 
Three full-scale engine runs were accomplished, with the third 
run including lo\.,.-speed taxi tests. The systems pel"formed 6;-ttremely 
well during these three engine runs, with no anomalies. Th~ low~$peed 
taxi run, preceded by a full ramp preflight test, was accolnplished 
on 11 August 1976. During this test, the various flight-contrt;>l modes 
were engaged during low-speed taxi. Postrun computer data analysis 
showed no alarms or anomalous operation. On the basis of these results, 
testing proceoded to tho high-speed tClxi runs. 
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5.7.2 High-Speed Taxi Tests 
The taxi test plan is reproduced in Figure 5-46. It consisted of 
two runs, the first to 70 knots indicated airspeed (RIAS), the second, 
to 100 KIAS. The unstick speed for the airplane weight during these 
tests was approximately 146 KIAS. The results of the taxi test on 
23 August 1976 were as follows: 
(1) Directional control was excellent. 
(2) Pitch and roll control were not overly sensitive. 
(3) No aircraft electrical system EMI effects occurred. 
(4) Channel A failed during the shutdown procedure. 
1. AIRCRAFT MUST BE READY TO FLY 
2. NORMAL PREFLIGHT CHECKS Tv HE RUN EXACTLY AS ON DAY OF FLIGHT 
3. l'AXI TO RUNWAY 04 UNLESS WIND IS 10 kn OR GREATER, FAVORING RUNWAY 22 
4. LAST-CHANCE INSPECTION 
5. TAKE ACTIVE; RUNWAY, CHECK ALL SYSTEMS AND RELEASE BRAKES 
6. ACCELERATE TO 50-70 KIAS MAKING SMALL CONTROL INPUTS IN PRIMARY DIRECT. WHEN SATIS-
FIED, DOWN-MODE TO CBS AND REPEAT SMALL CONTROL INPUTS 
7, TURN OFF AT FAR END OF RUNWAY 
8. REENGAGE PRIMARY SYSTEM AND TAXI BACK TO SELECTED RUNWAY 
9. LAST CHANCE TO INSPECT BRAKES AND TIRES, IN PARTICULAR, AND AIRPLANE IN GENERAL 
10. REPEAT ITEM G 
11. ACCELERATE TO 100 KIAS AND REPEAT ITEM 6 
12. TURN OPF AT FAR END OF RUNWAY AND RETURN TO NASA 
REOUIREMENTS WILL INCLUDE FUSELAGF. FUEL ONLY IN THE F-B, TM VAN NEAR THE ACTIVE RUNWAY, 
NORMAL FIRE-TRUCK SUPPORT, AND ONE NASA MOBILE TRUCK, IN ADDITION TO THE CONTROL ROOM 
Figure 5-46. F-8 DFBN taxi test plan. 
The channel failure was found to be due to inadvertent crew 
operation of ohe of the built-in fault-injection circuits on the 
ground-test cart. Post-test computer dumps showed the system opera-
tion to be nominal, including the response to the injected fault. 
All aircraft electrical and avionics systems ,.,ere cycled during the 
taxi back to DFRC facility. No El-II effects on the DFEN s'ystem were 
noted. On the basis of these results, testing proceeded to the 
flight phase with no syste:m changes required. 
5.7.3 First Flight 
'l'he fir.-st flight ,.;as accomplished successfully on 27 August 1976. 
The general l:light plan is reproduced in Figure 5-47. One significant 
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N:,\ TIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE AD1IJNISTRA TION 
HUGH L. DRYDEN FLIGHT RESEARCH CENTER 
Flight Request 
Flight No. _8_0_-_4_3_-_1 __ Aircraft F-8 DFBtv - 802 Dute of Request 8-19-76 
Crew: ______ K_R_T_E_,R ________ ------------------- Date of Flight 8-27-76 
Purpose '~f Flight:, ___ E_" V_A_. L __ U_A_T_I_O_N_O_F_D_F_B_\'I_P_R_I_H_AR .... Y_._A_N_O_B_y_- _ P_A_S_S_S_Y_S_T_E_' ~_IS __ _ 
1. Normal preflight « taxi 
2. Take rumlaY 04 and close airfield 
3. Takeoff in primary and climb t:o 7000 HSL, retract gear 
and open airfield. 
4. Climb to 12, 000 r·1SL and lower wing 
5. Accelerate to 250 KIAS and climb to 250 KIAS to 20,000 HSL 
6. Perform shallow turns left and right 
7. Perform control system inputs, doublets, and pulses in each 
axis 
8. Mild climbs & dives 
9. Downmode one axis only in yaw and evaluate CBS. Reengage 
pri!ll:lry. Repeat in roll and then in pitch. Retut'n to OIR. mode 
10. Descend to 15,000 
11. Slow to pattern speed and rais,e \\ling and l.mver gear. Evalua te 
flying qualities 
12. Downmode one axis only in yaw and evaluate CDS. Reangage 
primary. Repeat in roll and then pitch 
13. Raise gear, lower wing and accel to 250 KIAS 
14. Enter pattern for a straight in full stop approach to 
la!:ebcd 18 
Director of Flight Op~r~tions 
OFRC 242 (5-5-76) 
Figure 5-47. NASA DFRC flight plan. 
189 
point is that the primary digital system was used for takeoff and 
landing. During the 40-minute flight, the primary DIRECT and bypass 
system modes were evaluated in low-speed flight. In the crawl-
before-walk philosophy used, the augmented modes were not engaged until 
the fourth flight. The results of this flight can be summarized as 
follows: 
(1) Handling qualities in the primary and bypass modes were 
satisfactory. 
(2) Moding transients were small. 
(3) The triplex wing-up discrete set was declared failed by 
the RM software due to mechanical flexing of the wing 
during the takeoff. 
(4) The heading gyro set was declared failed. 
Item number (3) was a surprise. Even with the liberal 300-
millisecond tolerance on discrete failure declarations, the switch 
contact skew was sufficient to cause the set to be failed. A 
mechanical adjustment was made to alleviate this problem. 
A bad heading gyro caused a valid miscompare leading to item (4). 
It was replaced. 
5.7.4 In-Flight System Performance Summary 
The performance experience of the DFBW system covered 50 flights 
and approximately 55 flight hours. It is of special interest to relate 
this experience to the ground-test program, in order to assess the 
reasonableness and thoroughness of the verification and validation 
approa~h taken on the F-8 system. Figure 5-48 summarizes the in-flight 
system experience for the first 50 flights. The following sections will 
discuss these items in more detail. 
(1) ALL TAKEOFFS ANO LANDINGS HAVE BEEN IN THE PRIMARY DIGITAL SYSTeM. 
(2) REVERSION TO THE ANALOG BYPASS SYSTEM HAS NOT BEEN REQUIRED. 
(3) SINGLE-CHANNEL HARD FAILURES HAVE OCCURRED ON THREE FLIGHTS. 
(4) CHANNEL FAI LURES WERE ALL DUE TO HARDWARE FAULTS. 
(5) NO HARD OVER OR OTHERWISE HAZARDOUS SURFACE COMMANDS HAVE BEEN GENERATED. 
(6) ONE TRANSIENT CHANNEL FAULT HAS OCCURRED. 
(7) SOFTWARE-DESIGN ERRORS HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED IN POSTFLIGHT ANALYSES. 
(8) SEVERAL CO,~ fROL LAW REFINEMENTS WERE NECESSARY. 
(9) NO FLIGHT WAS ABORTED DUE TO A SOFTWARE FAULT. 
(10) NO SOFTWARE FAULT AFFECTED FLIGHT PERFORMANCE. 
(11) FEW SENSOR NUISANCE FAULTS OR ACTUAL FAULTS WERE NOTED. 
Figure 5-48. In-flight system performance summary. 
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5.7.5 In-Flight Computer/IFU Fault Experience 
Table 5-14 describes the in-flight computer and interface-unit 
failure experience. The computer faults on Flights 2 and 3 provided 
fail-operational experience earlier than expected. The system FDIR 
response was nearly identical to that observed during ground testing. 
In both cases, the two remaining channels declared the offending 
channel hard-failed, and operation continued with no deqra.dation in 
flying quali tics. Precautionary but routine landings 1,/ere made on the 
remaining two channels. Postflight analysis of the fault on Flight 3 
did disclose a software design error, which is discussled under software 
experience. 
Flight 
2 
3 
17 
19 
22 
Table 5-14. In-flight computer and IFU 
failure experience. 
Failure Comments 
Computer memory fail • Memory parity erro.t: unrecov-
erable 
• Multiple restarts could not 
restore operation 
Computer memory fail • Channel declared failed by partners 
• No surface transients 
• pilot did not observE?: per-formance change 
• Routine landing on two 
channels 
~ 
Interface unit I/O • Restar, restored ~ (transient fault, operat~on 
failed hard on ground) 
• No surface trcll1sient 
• Flight continued per plan 
" 
Computer stopped • Partners assumed it was od 
execution 
• No restarts 
• Routine landing on two 
channels 
IFU Component • Channel failed by partners/ 
self 
• Routine landing on two 
channels 
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The computer outputs and airplane response during the computer 
failure on the second flight are shown in Figure 5-49. Multiple 
restarts occurred between the time the memory parity error occurred, 
and the point at which a hard fault was declared. During this time, 
no surface deviations occurred. The vehicle responded normally on 
two channels after Channel A had been declared hard-failed. 
ROLL STICK 
COMMAND 
em 
CHANNEL A 
ROLL OUTPUT, 
deg 
CHANNEL B 
ROLL OUTPUT, 
deg 
CHANNEL C 
ROll OUTPUT, 
deg 
AILERON 
DEflECTION, 
deg 
CHANNEL A 
FAIL DISCRETE 
4~' I , o , 
-4 1 ! 
2 
o 
Parity Error 'VChannel A 
Occur. ----"'1, Hard-Failed 
., 
TIME,s 
Figure 5-49. In-flight computer failure. 
5.7.6 Software Anomaly Experience 
Software anomalies have occurred during the period of system 
operation since the first flight. This represents approximately 
1750 hours of operating time. Table 5-15 categorizes the software 
anomalies encountered during this period of time. As the figure 
shows, no software errors have been found that would invalidate the 
fail-operational requirements. 
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Software 
Subsystem 
System 
redundancy 
management 
Control 
laws 
Input/ 
output 
Ground-test 
programs 
(loader, 
displays, 
preflight 
test) 
Table 5-15. Software anomaly experience. 
Types of 
Anomalies 
Fault-detection 
logic 
Deficiences in 
fault recovery 
logic 
Sensor fault 
logic errors 
Restart initial-
ization 
Miscellaneous 
flag handling 
Incorrect inter-
nal interrupt 
handling 
Nuisance-type 
faults 
- How 
Found 
Analysis of 
flight-computer 
fault 
Analysis of 
ground-test data 
Ground operation 
Conunents 
_ Design error 
_ Noncritical 
• Could prevent 
recovery from 
multiple 
transient 
faults 
_ Minor system 
effects 
Ground operation _ Minor system 
effects 
Ground operation _ Minor system 
effects 
Ground-test data 
analysis 
_ Resulted in 
occasional 
restarts on 
ground and 
one in 
flight 
_ Noncritical 
Ground operation _ Noncritical 
_ Minor effects 
The transient I/O fault on Flisht 17, due to a failing compo-
nent in the IFU, was serious enough to cause a restart which restored 
operation. The only indication to the pilot was a resettable light. 
The execution suspension on Flight 19 appeared to the other two 
channels as a power down. No restarts occurred, and an uneventful 
landing was made on the remaining two channels. The faulty computer 
ran when powered up later and achieved normal sync with its partners. 
The IFU fault on Flight 22 was handled routinely by the system FDIR 
routines and looked identical to the pilot as the previous channel 
failures. These in-flight faults increased the confidence in the 
fail-operational capability of the system. 
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Table 5-16 slunmarizes the in-flight internal performance of the 
computer IFU redundancy management software. Other than the restarts 
which occurred concurrently with permanent hardware faults, only one 
other restart has occurred in flight, that due to the I/O problem on 
Flight 17. 
Table 5-16. In-flight computer redundancy management 
software performance. 
Fault Quantity Comment 
Restarts* 1 Flight 17 
transient 
failure 
I/O errors* 8 Estimated 
I/O 
1010 
I/O operations 
False fault None 
declarations 
Alarms indi- None 
cating serious 
abnormality* 
* Excluding those accompanying hard failures. 
Eight detected I/O errors have occurred during the estimated 
1010 I/O operations which took place in flight. There have been no 
channel faults declared in flight where a real fault did not occur. 
Finally, there have been no alarms logged which would indicate any 
serious abnormality in the executive, self-test, or crosslink 
communication operations. These results indicate an extremely high 
level of false-alarm immunity in the FDIR software. 
Performance of the flight software during the 20 months and 
1750 hours of operation is also ey.cellent. Figure 5-50 summarizes 
ground experience during this period. No sofblare fault has been 
found during this 20-month period which would have invalidated the 
system flight qualification had it been known prior to first flight. 
One final software fault experience is germane to this subject. 
An error in the manufacturer-supplied support software for the 
computer resulted in an erroneous load tape for a new software release. 
This error was not detectable by ordinary means and was only discovered 
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• ALL KNOWN FAULTS DETECTED BY SYSTEM 
• NO HARDWARE FAULT CAUSED MORE THAN ITS OWN CHANNEL TO FAIL 
• NO VERIFIED NUISANCE-CHANNEL FAULT 
- APPROXIMATELY SIX OPEN ANOMALIES TENTATIVELY ATTRIBUTED TO HARDWARE AND 
PROCEDURAL CAUSES 
• NO COMMON MODE SOFTWARE FAULT HAS OCCURRED WHICH WOULD OISABLE PRIMARY SYSTEM 
• NO AUTOMATIC REALOR NUISANCE TRANSFERSTO THE BYPASS SYSTEM 
Figure 5-50. Ground experience with flight 
software (1750 hours). 
in ground testing because it was in executing code. This error was 
in an area of the code which had not been modified in the new release, 
and which ordinarily would not have been reverified. This emphasizes 
the point that software faults can be introduced in a very subtle 
manner when code is modified after qualification. This potential error 
source was eliminated by a specially developed procedure applied to 
the tape manufacture step. 
5.7.7 Software Mod:~ication Experience 
In the course of the F-8 program, 10 software releases have been 
flmm which implemented both minor software fixes as well as major 
new features. The reverification record has been perfect. No known 
error has survived the reverification process. This is an implicit 
indication of the degree to which modularity actuallY exists in the 
software. In addition, several overlay tapes have been made to 
change gain constants in the control-law-refinement task. No 0rroneous 
number has survived to the fligh~ tape. This is due to virtually 
foolproof automatic bookkeeping and verification methods which are 
available. 
are: 
The rules governing software modification on the F-8 program 
(1) All changes must be positively verified and validated on 
the iron bird. 
(2) All changes must be evaluated by a pilot in real-time 
simulation on the iron bird. 
(3) A change to the system redundancy management software 
requires all FMET st.eps applicable to that subsystem 
be repeated. 
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Software changes involve more risk than the generation of the original 
software because they are exposed to fewer hours of operation prior to 
use. Thus, new software does not receive the implicit verification 
that often exposes errors. 
Some additional cbservations can be made based on the minor and 
major modifications made to the F-B DFBW software during the course 
of the program. 
(1) For some straightforward types of changes, the fact that 
it was a software change meant that implementation could 
be accomplished in significantly less time than if it had 
been made in hardware. This includes verification and 
validation time as well. 
(2) For changes affecting more than a small isolated area of 
software, or affecting more complex functions, implementation 
effort seemed to be comparable to hardware changes of the 
same magnitude. One advantage of the software implementation 
was that the hardware did not need to be requalified, and 
the existing system could be used until the new software 
was ready. 
(3) The careful reverification and revalidation of new software 
to the original standards on an iron-bird facility, appears 
to be an acceptable method of qualifying that software. 
(4) Changes in gain constants, filters, and gain schedules 
could be made routinely in one day with a lOO-percent verifi-
cation process 
(5) Where flow charts were not available, changes seemed to 
incur more interference problems, and reverification was 
more likely to turn up problems. 
5.7.B Software Reliability 
A measure of the reliability of software may be deduced from 
the "failure" history of the program. Software failures are those 
deviations in the operation of the digital program which result in 
violating the performance specification. Recent work in attempting 
to quantify software reliability has involved the analysis of software 
errors found during the verification, validation, and operational use 
of the digital program. During the F-B DFBW flight-control system 
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software development, records were kept for all anomalies which were 
found in officially released software. These records did not include 
errors found in the debug process preceding the production of an 
executable progr~~. 
Anomalous software operation was arbitrarily classified as serious 
or minor. In the first category were all anomalies which could lead 
to a false fault declaration, reduced controllability of the aircraft, 
or could prevent the detection of a valid fault. Figure 5-51 shows 
the F-8 DFBW flight software-anomaly experience sinc,e release of the 
multicomputer software program. Also displayed in this figure is the 
total system operating time over the same period of time. Edited 
from the total anomaly figures are those anomalies associated with the 
implementation of new functions and those resulting from procedural 
errors. 
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Figure 5-51. Software-anomaly experience. 
Both serious and total anomaly histories follow the same trend 
over what was a constant operating rate. Obviously, most of the 
anomalies are exposed in the detailed verification and validation 
tests. It should be noted, however, that the nature of the research 
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program resulted in considerable reverification work as various new 
functions were added to the program. Thus, the system software has 
been under almost constant testing over the period of time shown in 
the figure. Some observations can be made from the anomaly data and 
from an examination of the particular anomalies found. 
(1) A period of approximately 290 hours of operation without 
a software anomaly preceded the first flight. 
(2) Serious software deficiencies were found after the first 
flight as a result of intense an~lysis of actual in-flight 
and ground hardware failures. 
(3) The "serious" software deficiencies found after the first 
flight were "potentially" serious in that the conditions 
under which the'problem would manifest itself did not 
actually occur. 
(4) The "failure" rate of the qualified flight program is not 
zero. 
(5) The software allOmalies are not randomly distributed over 
all modules. 
(6) No common mode catastrophic faults have been found in the 
flight-qualified software. 
It is apparent that serious faults may be exposed in a flight 
critical control system which are no't necessarily catastrophic. This 
test philosophy, however, is dependent on having an alternate control 
mode (bypass control system). The alternate control mode could 
reasonably be comprised of resident independent software in the pri-
mary digital system. The "failure" rate of the fliqht-qualified 
software does yield a qualitative degree of confidence in the inte-
grity of the software. Quantitative measures may be derived provided 
very detailed records are kept of software faults in a format amenable 
to analysis. A standard recording format may be useful in this 
regard. The fact that the software anomalies were not randomly 
distributed over all software modules or functions clearly indicates 
that it is not possible to generalize from the data of Figure 5-51 
and apply the failure rate trends to a different software program. 
The data does reveal much about the specific program being developed, 
however. 
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5.7.9 Sensor Redundancy Management Experience 
The F-8 DFBW experience with sensor redundancy management has 
been very good. Flight-test data were used to refine the fault thresh-
holds for the dynamic motion sensors. Table 5-17 illustrates the 
margin for sensor fault-declaration false alarms. Cross plots of each 
sensor pair of each triad and duplex set w'ere examined to determine 
the maximum differences in moderate turbulence. These differences 
are all well below the actual fault-tolerance levels. 
Table 5-17. Flight II sensor tracking in 
moderate turbulence. 
Sensor Set 'rolerance Max. 
Pitch rate (deg/s) 4 
Roll rate (deg/s) 10 
Yaw rate (deg/s) 4 
Axial accelerometer (g) 0.1 
Lateral accelerometer (g) 0.1 
Normal accelerometer (g) 0.5 
pitch C stick (em) 1.0 
Roll C stick (em) 1.0 
Rudder pedals (em) 0.5 
Angle of attack (deg) 2.0 
Left secondary actuator (em) 3.5 
Right secondary actuator (em) 3.5 
pitch attitude (deg) 15 
Roll attitude (deg) 15 
Heading (deg) 15 
Mach number 0.05 
Altitude (m) 150 
Deviation 
0.68 
1.036 
0.22 
0.066 
0.061 
0.060 
0.086 
0.092 
0.03 
1.148 
0.167 
0.209 
1.85 
2.81 
3.52 
0.036 
6.7 
Table 5-lB lists the in-flight sensor failure experience to 
date. As can be seen, very few problems have been encountered. Of 
the three hard failures which have occurred, two have been actual 
faults. Ground experience has been about the same. It is also 
significant to note that the sensor RM algori'chms in the F-8 software 
are very simple. No known sensor fault has gone undetected. 
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Figure 5-52. Fligh t-test 
control-s pitch ystem SAS res 
(Flight 5). pense 
Table 5-18. F-8 DFBW in-flight sensor 
failure experience. 
Number of 
Sensor Ha~d Failures Cause 
Lateral Acceleration 1 False Alarm 
Heading Gyro 2 1 - Bad Gyro 
1 - False Alarm 
Wing Discrete 1 Switch contact 
(entire set) skew and wing 
mount flexing 
5.7.10 Control-System Performance 
The performance of the control system has been very good. All 
control modes have been flight tested. The general observations of 
the control system are: 
(1) Closed-loop airplane responses closely match the analytic 
predictions as well as the responses obtained on the 
iron-bird simulator. 
(2) The control-surface responses and the airplane responses 
are indistinguishable from those of a single-channel 
control system. 
(3) No adverse effects of sample rate or quantization have 
been observed. 
Figure 5-52 illustrates the type of airplane and control-system 
responses obtained during the flight-test program. The control-surface 
motions are smooth and regular, and do not differ from what would be 
expected in a single-channel system. The airplane response in this, 
the pitch SAS mode, is well damped and regular. 
The active flap modes have been evaluated for handling qualities 
effects, but all performance testing is not yet complete. Figure 5-53 
illustrates the operation of the maneuver-flap mode. With the flap 
mode active, nearly all the increased load factor in this mild turn 
is produced by the flap deflection, with almost no increase in angle-
of attack. In maneuvering flight, this translates into lower lift-
induced drag, and hence higher performance. The ride-smoothing,system 
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Figure 5-53. Maneuver flap (MF) performance. 
has been evaluated at reduced gains in moderate turbulence and at design 
gains in smooth air to verify closed-loop operation. Flights in moder-
ate turbulence with the full design gains are planned for the near 
future. 
The angle-of-attack limiter has been evaluated a.nd has been 
found to produce a hard limit. It is not possible for the pilot to 
increase the angle of attack above the reference value as long as con-
trol power is available. Figure 5-54 shows the operation of the limiter 
during one of the flight-test maneuvers. Here, the reference angle of 
attack was set at 9 degrees for test purposes. The pilot moves the 
stick full aft while the control system maintains the vehicle at 9 deg-
rees for test purposes. The pilot moves the stick full aft while the 
control system maintains the vehicle at 9-degree angle of attack. There 
are no di$continuities as the system limits the aircraft motion and 
state. 
Autopilot performance has been good. Attitude hold is reason-
ably tight, and the outer-loop functions operate within fairly narrow 
boundaries. Figure 5-55 shows the operation of the altitude-hold mode 
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Figure 5-54. Alpha limiter test (Flight 20). 
in ascents and descents, with the hold function engaged from a steady 
climb or ~ive. In general, the aircraft returns to the re~erence 
altitude without oscillations, and achieves a steady-state error less 
than 20 meters. 
Closed-loop damping in the lateral-directional axes is good, 
with the response being nonoscillatory almost everywhere in the flight 
envelope. 
Simultaneo us operation of active control modes was demonstrated 
with a pull-up in the control-stick steering mode deliberately made 
into the alpha limiter mode with both the ride-smoothing and maneuver-
flap modes active. The maneuver was uneventful. 
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Figure 5-55. Autopilot performance-
altitude hold. 
5.7.11 Flying Qualities 
The handling qualities of the F-8 DFBW have been found to be 
generally good to very good. Some problems have been encountered in the 
roll axis, however, with oversensitivity being apparent in close-
formation flight. This was alleviated by shallowing the parabolic 
shaping sufficiently to increase the force-per-roll-rate/roll-
acceleration ratio. General pilot observations concerning the airplane 
flying qualities are: 
(1) The airplane is very good in the ta'<eoff and the approach 
and landing configuration. 
(2) Control is very smooth for large maneuvers. 
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(3) Gunsight tracking is comparable to in-service aircraft 
of various types. 
(4) Formation flight is not as good as in the best airplanes, 
but is very satisfactory. 
(5) Pitch control improves with the active flap modes 
operating. 
(6) The aileron-to-rudder interconnect needs some tuning 
at specific points in the flight envelope. 
(7) There is nothing in the airplane response to indicate 
that the control system is multichannel or digital. 
Cooper-Harper pilot ratings are generally all better than 4. Some 
flying-quality tuning is still planned in order to improve some minor 
deficiencies. 
5.7.12 Control-System problem~ 
Some problems have been encountered in the flight program. 
Although these problems did not occur because t.he system was digital, 
or fly-by-wire, it is of interest to note their occurrence. 
(1) The wing flexure of the aircraft was sufficient to cause 
the triplex position switches to open, making it appear 
to the software that the wing w'as up. The software 
selected wing-up loop gains, resulting in a small amplitude 
limit cycle in the roll axis. 
(2) Investigation of wing bending and shear moments with the 
maneuver-flap mode active showed that although the lateral 
center of pressure shifted inboard with the flap deflecting 
downward, the wing bending and shear loads increased about 
15 percent. This was due to the adverse pitching moment 
of the flap, and the resultant increase in wing lift 
required to restore lift lost by the downward-loaded hori-
zontal tail surface. 
(3) The rudder response due to the aileron-to-rudder inter-
connect ter.m was too abrupt, and could be detected by the 
pilot as a directional lurch. This required the activation 
of a low-pass filter in this path, which was not indicated 
in the design. 
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(4) The pitch CAS mode was found to be poor for wing-down 
landing approaches in the 200 KIAS regime. The gain was 
determined to be too low at the low end of the speed range 
for precision maneuvering. A modified gain schedule im-
proved the CAS mode to be equal or' better than the SAS 
mode at the same conditions. 
(5) It was discovered that gear strut compression could trigger 
the rate check module in the pitch-augmented modes due to 
high-frequency low-amplitude oscillations on the res~ltant 
pitch-rate signal. The rate check threshhold was increased 
to alleviate this possibility. 
5.7.13 Miscellaneous Hardware Experience 
No in-flight faults have occurred in the computer bypass system 
or in any of the secondary actuators. One common mode fault did occur 
in the digital mode and gain panel during a preflight test. One of the 
DIRECT push buttons mechanically jammed in the depressed position, making 
it appear that the pilot was requesting that mode. Selection of other 
modes would result in a mode transfer for as long as the pilot held the 
second mode button in. After releasing the button, the mode reverted 
to DIRECT. This problem was traced to a manufacturing defect. 
5.7.14 Preflight Test Program Experience 
Because of the experimental nature of this system, a hangar 
preflight test is accomplished prior to each flight. The tests per-
formed are essentially those performed on the ramp by the pilot prior 
to flight. The flight-line preflight takes approximately 40 minutes, 
including all aircraft checks. In all fairness, however, it must be 
noted that no attempt was made to minimize this portion of testing as 
if it were an operational aircraft. The digital systems tests consume 
approximately 5 minutes of flight-line test time. 
There have been no problems associated with the computer load 
process. In the F-8 program, the memory is loaded prior to each 
flight, not because of memory alteration problems, but because of crew 
interrogation and testing after flight. 
The philosophy on this experimental program was to overtest 
rather than undertest. Experience has shown that the system is over-
tested prio~ to flight. The only flight-line abort due to a preflight 
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test was due to a fault in the analog self-test circuitry itself. No 
part of the preflight test ch~cks software functions. Only sensor and 
controller interfaces are checked. The computer load process is a 
100-percent verified process to assure that the software has been 
l oaded correctly. From that point on, the assumption is made that the 
s oftware will work as validated. Table 5-19 lists the preflight test 
tolerances on several of the parameters examined during the automatic 
test sequence. 
Table 5-19. Preflight test ~rogram tolerances. 
Parameter 
Alpha 
Mach 
Altitude 
Rate-Gyro Torque 
Pitch/yaw 
Roll 
Accelerometer Torque 
N
x 
N 
Y 
Pitch attitude 
Roll attitude 
DAC outputs and surface 
posit ion 
Pitch 
Roll 
Yaw 
End-to-end gearing checks 
Pitch 
Roll 
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Tolerance 
t 2 deg 
t o.05 
tl50 meters 
0.575 t 0.225 
0.175 t 0.075 
-1.8 t 0.5 Vdc 
2.4 t 0.5 Vdc 
-2.1 :!: 0.5 Vdc 
2.1 :!: 0.5 Vdc 
-1.7 :!. 0.5 Vdc 
2 .7 t 0.5 Vdc 
7.5 :!: 5.0 deg 
0 :!: 5.0 deg 
:!: 2 deg 
±3 deg 
±2 deg 
Vdc 
Vdc 
1. 7 :!: 1 deg/cm 
7.07 :!: 1.5 deg/cm 
2.62 :!: 0.75 deg/cm 
5.7.15 Flight-Test Summary 
Figure 5-56 shows the flight-test history of the F-8 DFBW air-
craft in summary fashion. Following the computer fault on the second 
flight, several computers went through a rework program. There were 
no flights during this period due to the computer MTBF experience. 
Since flight testing was resumed in January 1977, the flight program 
has progressed in a relatively nominal fashion. The shuttle software 
evaluation flights and the transport delay evaluation flight test 
series were both in direct support of the shuttle program. 
There have been no in-flight faults in the last 28 flights. 
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Figure 5-56. Flight-test summary. 
SECTION 6 
COMMENTS ON VALIDATION METHODS 
The purpose of this section is to offer comments on validation 
methods based on experience on the F-8 DFBW program and on k:.1owledge 
of other programs and methods that are in use or being developed. It 
is hoped that these comments will contribute to the body of experience 
that must be obtained before the policies for the validation and certi-
fication of advanced-capability electronic flight-control equipment can 
be developed. No single organization is in the position of identifying 
a complete validation program that would be appropriate for all electronic 
flight-control equipment intended for production civil use. It is not 
even possible to identify all of the critical questions or all of the 
areas where further development is necessary. Acceptable validation pro-
cedures will have to be developed jointly by all elements of the industry 
and by the appropriate government agencies. This development process will 
take several years and will be perfected only in an evolutionary manner 
by the discipline of validating actual production systems as they begin 
to be introduced. The experience gained with the first truly fly-by-wire 
system can, however make valuable contributions to this development 
process. 
In this section, a review is made of some of the validation methods 
used on the F-8 DFBW, where they were most effective, and where improvements 
would be recommended. Also described are other available techniques that 
were not used. A special discussion of software is included which is a 
relatively new area, and an area of special concern. More questions may 
be raised than answered, but it is hoped that by raising those q~estions 
the process of obtaining a solution may be accelerated. 
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6.1 Review of Validation Methods 
Many of the validation methods used during the F-8 DFBW program 
are not basically different from methods already in common use. Most 
of these methods will continue to be useful in the validation of future 
systems. There are, however, at least three characteristics of emerging 
advanced flight-control systems which will require some of these methods 
to be modified and expanded, and new validation concepts to be developed. 
The three characteristics identified here are the increased level of 
system functional reliability required, the increased degree of system 
complexity, and the more extensive use of software programs. The 
special characteristics of software will be discussed in Section 6.2. 
The increased levels of reliability required are moving systems 
further and further away from levels that can be analyzed and demon-
strated with conventional methods. Individual electronic units with 
failure rates in the range of 10-3 to 10-4 per hour can be analyzed 
by conventional methods such as FMEAs, using established experience 
for component failure rates. The predictions made by these methods 
can be rather accurate and can be confirmed by actual service experience. 
A typical production unit will accumulate hundreds of thousands of 
operating hours per year and will experience many failures, giving a 
statistically significant estimate of its actual ~eliability. However, 
to achieve the very high rel,iability required of a flight-critical system, 
several units have to be i:htegrated into a '3ystem which can tolerate 
faults and still operate. The reliability of this total system has 
to be assessed theoretically, based on an analysis of the reaction 
of the system to failures within the individual units. The reliability 
of individual units is an important input into this system analysis. 
Thus, conventional unit-reliability analysis will continue to be impor-
tant. However, the methods used to combine this data to give the 
tot",} system-failure rate are still being developed. We believe the 
contribution to the system failure rate due to combinations of random 
failures of individual components within units can be determined with 
theoretical (albeit complex) analysis techniques. We do not know of 
any method for demonstrating the absence of potential common-mode 
failures or generic design faults to this low level of probability. 
If a method were proposed, it is obvious that it could not be demon-
strated by service experience, since the goal of the design is to 
-----produce a low probability of one failure in whole fleets of aircraft 
over their entire life spans. 
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Another characteristic of emerging systems is their greatly 
increased complexity. This complexity is due both to the increased 
capabilities of the systems and to the necessity for redundancy and 
the associated redundancy management necessary to meet the reliability 
requirements. Conventional reliability-assessment methods can usually 
still be applied to these systems. However, the great increase in 
the number of different combinations of paths and conditions make the 
usual detailed fault analysis very complex and difficult to perform. 
They are also difficult to understand; thus, their usefulness and cost 
effectiveness is reduced. New validation methods can make a valuable 
contribution to increasing the confidence that the system actually is 
able to meet its reliability requirements. 
Several reliability-assessment tools have been developed to aid 
in the analysis of complex systems. These analysis techniques use 
a variety of analysis methods and simulation procedures, and ar:e 
normally implemented in large general-purpose computer programs. These 
tools were not used formally in the F-8 DFBW program. Two of these 
methods, however, will be described here briefly to give an idea of 
their purpose and characteristics in order to show what contribution 
these methods might make in future validation efforts. 
The first technique is the Complementary Analytic-Simulation 
Technique (CAST). (21) CAST allows the best features of both analysis 
and simulation to be used in analyzing system reliability. Analytic 
modeling can be very flexible and rapid. However, for the more complex 
systems, tne mathematical model can become very involved and almost 
unmanc;>geable. Simulation can more easily handle system details but is 
slow and expensive. These methods are effectively combined in CAST by 
using an engineering characterization of the computer system to provide 
input to a fault-driven sinlulation, which minimizes simulation costs. 
The simulation produces modeling parameters that are used in the 
analytic modeling to measure the fault tolerance of the system. This 
process is shown in Figure 6-1. Results of applying CAST to typical 
system configuratiofis is shown in Figure 6-2. 
Another analysis program is the Computed Aided Redundant System 
Reliability Analysis (CARSRA). (22) CARSRA is a general-purpose 
reliability-analysis program that handles modular~redundaht reconfigurable 
systems, taking into account such factors as fault coverage and transient 
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Figure 6-1. CAST activity sequence 
and information flow. 
faults. The complexity of a system is overcome by dividing it into 
stages; a stage is a set of identical redundant modules. The reliability 
of each stage is described by a Markov model; a typical Markov model for 
a triplex stage is shown in Figure 6-3 , where the potential states are 
shown for the stage ending in the states of either detected or undetected 
f ailure. The symbol A represents the rate at which a stage transitions 
from one state to another. For example A12 is the probability that anyone 
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Figure 6-2. Effects of computer system redundancy and 
a daptabil ity on failure probability. 
modul e fails in the first stage. An assumption made in this particular 
model is that there is no transistion from state 1 to a failed state. In 
other words, there is no single-point failure mode. This model shows two 
possible transitions from the one failure state. In one case, a 
second failure causes the stage to fai l, and in the other, the stage 
continues to operate on the one remaining good module. The ratio 
between these two transition rates is a function of how well the system 
can identify the failed module by self-test or other techniques. 
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NO' FAILURE 
ONE FAILURE 
TWO FAILURE 
STAGE FAILURE 
DETECTED UNDETECTED 
Figure 6-3. Typical Markov stage model. 
The Markov models for the individual stages are related by a 
dependency tree as shown in Figure 6-4. This dependency tree shows 
how the failure of a module in one stage will cause the failure of 
modules in other stages. For example, the failure of a multiplex and 
AID module will cause the 1.oss of one set of modulas of all sensor 
stages that provide information as analog signa:s. The numbers in each 
stage are the levels of redundancy. The circles on the ~ight side 
indicate functional elements needed for the system to survive. The '7 
indicates voting is used to combine the redundant signals. When the 
Markov models for each stage, the transition rates, and the dependency 
are defined as inputs to the CARSRA program, the program computes 
the functional readiness and failure probabilities for the system. 
General analysis techniques such as CAST and CARSRA often prove 
to be difficult to apply to actual specific systems. More often than 
not, there is some system characteristic that is not well modeled 
by the general method. In most cases, systems are most efficiently 
analyzed by programs specifically tailored t9 that particular system. 
These general techniques, however, do provide insight into the failure 
characteristics of advanced systems, and provide a baseline from which 
the detailed analysis of specific systems can be developed. 
Theoretical analysis and simulation can only provide an aid in 
support of the validation process. Theoretical analysis can derive 
the system failure rates due to the expected failure rates of components. 
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Figure 6-4. Flight-control system dependency tree. 
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Redundant fault-tolerant systems are purposely configured to account 
for these faults, and can be designed to achieve an arbitrarily low 
failure rate due to this source of failure. Although difficult, the 
problem of determining this system failure rate is a solvable problem, 
and these techniques help solve the problem. Of more concern are 
specification faults, design errors, and induced failures. Analysis 
and simulation methods have very little ability to detect these types 
of faults. 
Present experience indicates that the primary validation method must 
exercise the actual system, including as many of the real peripheral de-
vices as possible, with simulated stimulus inputs that are as realistic as 
practical. Every possible fault that can be imagir::;l should be considered, 
and, where possible, induced during system tests. In order to effectively 
induce faults, the system must have been designed from the beginning 
to allow fault introducti·::m. The system must be stressed to the maximum 
extent possible. The philosophy of the testing should not be to show 
that the system works properly but to try to make it fail. 
This type of testing was the primary validation method used on 
the F-8 DFBW system. Even more detailed tests are recommended for 
future systems; one example is the introduction of transient faults. 
In the F-8 DFBW system tests, some of the simulated hardware failures 
were injected as "hard failures" only. Furthermore, no attempt was 
made to synchronize these failures within the control cycle. An 
expanded test would be made more detailed by 
(1) Simulating.failures as both "hard" and "transient". 
(2) Vary the length and period of transient failures. 
(3) Control and vary the relationship of the failure to the 
control cycle of the sys.tem. 
6.2 Special software Considel':ations 
Software is one area where digital systems are unique and differ-
ent from conventional systems. Thus, it is one of the areas of most 
uncertainty and concern, particularly for the peopie responsible for 
the validation and certification of these systems. In this section, the 
nature of software and its comparison to hardware characteristics are 
discussed. An outline is also given on some of the techniques that are 
being proposed to assure that reliable software is produced and adequately 
tested. 
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There seem to be two extremes of opinions on digital systems and 
software, particularly in what is required for system validation and 
certification. At one extreme is the opinion that the technology 
used inside the box should not influence how it is tested or certified. 
In this view, what is important is to show that the outputs from the 
system perform the intended function when the necessary inputs are 
supplied and the system is exposed to the required environmental 
extremes. At the other extreme is the opinion that software is some-
how special and thus requires special consideration during test and 
certification. The most appropriate opinion would seem to be somewhere 
between these two, and would depend on the particular design and 
application. Consderable experience will have to be gained within 
the industry before the proper perspective can be achieved. 
6.2.1 Nature of Software Failures 
Software does not fail in the same way as hardware fails. Soft-
ware cannot wear out or develop a fault as it operates, as does hard-
ware. As a source of system failures, software problems are part of 
the software from the time it was written. However, the particular 
unique circumstance that would cause the problem to result in a failure 
may not appear until the system has been in service for a number of 
years. 
To illustrate the problem of a latent software failure, take 
the hypothetical situation involving an airline with an inertial 
navigation system. When the software was written, a mistake was made 
in how negative latitude was handled. The airplane was used success-
fully in domestic u.S. service until years later when it was used on 
a South American charter, and there was a system malfunction when the 
aircraft crossed the equator. The magnitude of the failure in this 
hypothetical situation could have been either large or small. A major 
error may be less hazardous because the condition would be quickly 
noticed and the emergency dealt with by using an alternate means of 
navigation. The error could be in a more minor compensation term, 
which might not be easily noticed. The problem would not be helped 
by a dual or triple installation. Each system would have the same 
results. This example shows how an inherent software fault can look 
to the user like a hardware failure. 
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Since failures due to software errors are inherent in the design 
and are not due to wear out or random physical failures, software 
failures will have characteristics that are different from normal 
hardware failures. Hardware-failure rates normally follow the classical 
bathtub curve as shown in Figure 6-5. Hardware-failure rates are 
normally high at the beginning due to infant mortality and design errors. 
During useful life, the failure rate is usually constant, and the 
reliability can be characterized by a constant mature mean time between 
failure (MTBF). The useful life is ended by an increased failure rate 
due to wear out. Software, on the other hand, has a failure rate that 
will continue to drop as errors are discovered and corrected (assuming 
great care is taken to keep from introducing new errors when corrections 
are made). Software-failure rate is thus not constant and cannot be 
characterized by a constant MTBF. 
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Figure 6-5. Comparison of hardware and 
soft~lare failure rates. 
Software errors have the same basic nature as design faults in an 
analog system. The big difference is in the magnitude of the number 
of opportunities for errors. Although analog systems can become very 
complex, the probability that a design error will not be detected 
during test, verification, and validation is very small. The number of 
different paths through the system are numerous but more visible and 
manageable. The possible paths in a large computer program approach 
infinity. Exhaustive testing becomes ilnpossible. It has been estimated 
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that the execution of all possible paths through the TITAN missile 
navigation and guidance software would take 60,000 hours or about 
7 years. (23) Even if this testing were done, it would still not prove 
there were no errors. There may be an error in interpretation of 
requirements or a missing path. A famous quote by Dijkstra(24) is: 
"Program testing can be used to show the presence of bugs, but never 
to shm.; their absence!" It is virtually impossible to prove that a 
practical program is error free. 
This possibility of a software error can create a distinction 
between digital and nondigital systems in some situations. with 
effective discipline in the preparation of programs, and with a well-
constructed test program, the probability of a software fault can be 
reduced to a low level compared to the probability of a random compo-
nent failure. In a situation where digital technology is raplacing 
analog technology within a conventional unit, there may be little 
change because of digital technology. In other situations, a change 
to digital technology may have significant impact. For example, in a 
system \.;here redundancy is used for high reliability, the potential 
for a software error that would be common to all channels is high 
enough that no one has yet had enough confidence to use digital in 
place of analog with no dissimilar backup. The problem of a generic 
software failure and potential solutions will be discussed later in 
this section. 
6.2.2 Review of Software-Validation Techniques 
It is worthwhile to review the software-validation techniques 
used and those not used in order to put the F-8 DFBW effort in per-
spective and also to make some predictions about future directions. 
The softwar.e-validation effort closely paralleled the hardware valida-
tion task. Several techniques were developed to improve the visibility 
of the software so as to make it more testable. This has, in a sense, 
made the software appear more like hardware, with the ability to apply 
test ipputs easily and to make measurements on small pieces of the 
software which perform a limited and well-defined function. These 
techniques included: 
(1) Providing access to indiviudal software functions. 
(2) Providing a real-time data-acquisition system with auto-
matic verification plotting output. 
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(3) Providing internal trace areas and logs. 
(4) Construction of special software driver programs for 
automated verification of complex logic (sensor and 
discrete redundancy management). 
More significant than the test tools and techniques, however, are 
the design features of the system that make it testable. The technology 
is available to build parallel-channel synchronized digital flight-
control systems. The ability to actually verify, validate, and flight 
qualify a system in a flight-critical application is very dependent 
on the experience of the designer, however. In systems that utilize 
very capable digital processors, the problem will be the maintenance 
of simplicity. The designer must produce a system design which is 
elegant because of its simplicity not because of its complexity. 
Improvements are being sought in software testing, verification, 
and validation. Several tools are in various stages of development 
and use at the present time. (25) These include: 
(1) l-1ethods of verifying that all logical branches in code are 
exercised during the test program. 
(2) Methods to automatically analyz0 a program to determine 
conformance to programming st.andards, rules, or good 
practices. These techniqu(J,s also have the potential for 
diagnosing the code for t:'ertain classes of errors. 
(3) Multicomputer ground-t",.st hardware, which is specifically 
designed for dl:!bug, v/~rification, and validation of real-
time multicomputer f,.:>ft·ware. 
(4) Methods to automat/.cally verify code against the specification, 
which is written ·J.n a form to be automatically compared with 
the code itself. The specification takes the form of a 
software langua~,a itself. 
(5) Formal proofs qf. program correctness using mathematical 
logic. These 'iJroofs can become very complex and obscure 
!" in proving relatively small pieces of code. It is unlikely 
that they wil,}. provide significant assistance in improving 
software reli3.bility in large real-time programs in the 
foreseeable future. 
(6) Statistical r~stimation of software reliability. These 
estimates hZ,ve not been well defined, but two techniques 
have been ulled. 
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One method of estimating software reliability is to observe the 
rate at which errors are found. Early in testing, of course, errors 
will be found at a rather high rate. As testing progresses, the number. 
of errors will falloff exponentially, as indicated in Figure 6-5. 
By looking at this early history, some indication can be obtained of 
the rate at which errors are likely to continue to be found. A plot 
of this type was made for the F-8 DFBW as shown in Figure 5-51. It 
would not be possible, however, using this technique, to say how many 
more errors were present. 
A similar method of estimating the nunilier of errors remaining is 
to purposely embed errors in the program. The completeness of the 
software testing is then measured by how many embedded errors are 
found. This method also cannot prove that no other errors remain. 
The fact that someone recognized that a particular type of error was 
possible in order to plant it in the program means that he would also 
be likely to test for it. The most likely errors to remain are those 
that no one thought of as possible. 
The best way to be sure there are no errors in software is not 
to put any in in the first place. The statement has been made: "the 
only way to assure that the last bug is found in a program is to never 
find the first--no matter how much the program is tested and used." 
A significant quotation from Dijkstra(24) is: " ••• the extent to 
which the program correctness can be established is not purely a 
function of the program's external specification and behavior but 
depends critically upon its internal structure." In other words, the 
correct operation of a system containing a digital computer--to a much 
greater degree than an analog system--cannot be assured by external 
tests but also depends on its original design. 
It is, therefore, very important that software programs be 
written under a discipline that reduces the probability of error to 
the lowest level possible. Programming procedures are being developed 
that contribute to providing the necessary discipline. Examples of 
tools and techniques directed at producing code with fewer errors are: 
(1) Standardized high-order languages. 
(2) Structured programming (top-down) techniques. 
(3) Specification languages that enforce the statement of 
unambiguous requirements. 
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(4 ) Computer architectures and instruction sets that are 
designed to enhance software testability. 
(5) The use of standard routines for functions that are used 
in many applications (trig functions, control-system 
functions, etc.) . 
Even though some kind of programming discipline should be used 
in every development program, there is no one method that is well 
enough developed or. obviously superior to any other method to justify 
its institution as a requirement. However, the regulatory authorities 
must be familiar with the methods being used, and must be able to make 
the judgment that good practice is being followed. The content of the 
software and its construction should be made highly visible both to 
the users of the system and to the certifying agency. The airlines 
expressed their desire in an ARINC Airline Electronic Engineerinq 
Commitbee meetinq by sayinq: (26) 
The users (by virtue of being the customer, if 
nothing else!) have established their "need to 
know" and the need to be "functionally literate" 
in the area of software. 
The airlines made it quite clear to the manufac-
turers that l:'loftware must provide "functional 
visibility" GO that they, the airlines, are not 
left entirely at: the mercy of the manufacturers I 
field service and support people. In colloquial 
terms, the airlines do not want the software to 
provide a smoke screen behind which a bearded 
wizard in tennis shoes will be able to simply 
hide his sins of omission and con~ission! 
6.2.3 The Implication of Software Errors 
The key question which must be addressed is this: can the relia-
bility of the software be established at 1.0 after the application of 
the best development and testing tools? At the present time the 
answer is "no". The solution to this problem in a flight-critical 
control system has been and will continue to be a backup system that 
uses dissimilar software or a nondigital mechanization. An examination 
of several flight-critical control systems serves to illustrate this 
point (Table 6-1). Every primary digital flight-control system in 
existence or in the planning stage has a dissimilar backup system. 
As the table shows, this is not true of analog fly-by-wire systems. 
This points out the widely held opinion that some protection needs 
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Table 6-1. Flight-critical control-system configurations. 
Vehicle 
Lunar Module 
F-8 Phase I 
F-8 Phase II 
Shuttle 
YC-14 
F-4 SFCS 
(Research) 
A-7 Digital 
(Research) 
F-16 
F-18 
Primary System 
Single-channel digital 
Single-channel digital 
Triplex digital 
Quad digital 
Triplex digital 
Quad analog 
Dual digital 
Quad analog 
Quad digital 
Backup System 
Analog 
Triplex analog 
Triplex analog 
Simplex digital 
l-1echanical 
Mechanical; later 
removed 
Mechanical 
None 
Multichannel analog 
and mechanical 
(pitch) 
to be taken against the probability of a common-mode fault occurring, 
and that such a fault has a higher probability of occurring in 
software than in hardware. 
It should be noted that no fault (software or hardware) has 
occurred in the F-8 flight software, which has disabled more than one 
channel. This is based on approximately 1750 hours of operating 
time. This does not say that such a latent fault does not exist in 
the software, however. It is for this fact that the bypass system 
will not Le removed from the F-8, notwithstanding its proven per-
formance. 
Recently, there has been a flurry of interest in examining the 
potential of fault-tolerant software for flight-critical real-time 
control systems. Work carried out in university and government-
sponsored studies has been directed at establishing the hierarchical 
approach to fault-tolerant software. The basic principle is simple 
in concept: if a software error is detected, transfer to an alternate 
algori thm. In actuality,. however, the problem takes on many complica-
tions. Detection of software errors or common-mode software errors 
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is a complex task. It presumes some system sanity, even to signal 
that a fault has occurred. Recovery from a common-mode fault in a 
multicomputer system is not straightforward. Nevertheless, this 
approach of providing backup software in the primary hardware appears 
to be a reasonable solution to the common-mode-software problem. 
A conceptual design for such a resident backup software system 
for the F-8 system is shown in Figure 6-6. Existing hardware and 
software fault-detection alarms would be monitored by relatively simple 
external hardware devices., which would also contain a timeout function 
to detect "hung-up" software. It is presumed that a common-I!Iode-
software problem would affect all three machines within a relatively 
narrow window. A hardware monitor that detects coincident fault-
detection alarms from all three channels would then trigger an external 
interrupt to its computer. A computer, upon receiving an external 
interrupt, would jump to a backup software program, which would provide 
only flight-critical software. Using its own Ilo routines, it would 
set a discrete indicating it was now running in the backup mode. Assunling 
that a common-mode fault had actually occurred, each machine would set 
its corresponding discrete. A machine, upon entering the backup software 
routine, would check to see that its partners also had recognized the 
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Figure 6-6. Conceptual design of resident 
backup software system. 
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fault. If so, each machine would proceed and execute its backup soft-
ware in an unsynchronized mode of operation requiring no communication 
with its partners. A machine not finding its partners in the backup 
software routine would return to the main program and execute a restart. 
This, of course, is a simplified description of the process. 
It illustrates, however, the future directions being examined as alter-
natives to independent backup hardware. 
6.3 Combining Techniques into a Validation Program 
An important and integral part of the development program for a 
new advanced flight-control system will be the validation process. In 
this subsection. some of the goals and requirements for validation are 
discussed along with a plan for the formation of a total validation pro-
gram involving the integration of different methods and tools in order 
to cover the whole development process from definition of goals to 
production. This subsection and the report will end with candid remarks 
on certification by a test pilot who has been intimately involved in 
the validation process. 
6.3.1 Comments on Validation Goals CI.nd Requirements 
Before a well-designed validation program can be developed, the 
requirements for validation must be as well understood as possible. 
The entire validation process will not be, nor should it be, done in 
response to regulatory requirements. Validation will be performed by 
those developing the system to demonstrate to themselves and to potential 
customers, users, and regulators that a good product has been produced--
that it performs well, is economical, and, above all, is safe. We are 
not concerned here with the performance or economic validation, but 
with the safety validation, which is motivated primarily by certifica-
tion and product-liRbility requirements. The establishment of protection 
from product-liability risks Inay be the most demanding requirement for 
validation. However, any discussion of these requirements is beyond 
the scope and is not the purpose of this report. 
The certification requirements f')r civil aircraft are given in 
the Federal Aviation Regulations (FA,R). The present FARs were not 
written with some of the advanced flight-control systems concepts 
in mind. The FAA, under the Advanced Integrated Flight Systems 
Technology Program, is actively reviewing the regulations to be sure 
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they are adequate to maintain flight safety when new systems are intro-
duced, and that they do not unnecessarily restrain the introduction of 
valuable new technology. 
It does not appear that the regulations will need any fundamental 
change. The parts of the FAR that are probably the most basic for 
advanced systems are 25.1301 and 25.1309. The essence of these regula-
tions might be paraphrased by saying that equipment must do what it was 
intended to do and that it would be extremely improbable that a failure 
of the equipment would be catastrophic. The fact that these regula-
tions are so broad and straightforward may be a distinct advantage. 
Real safety may be more enhanced than it would be by a multitude of 
detailed requirements where much effort was expended in proving these 
requirements were met rather than making sure that safety is achieved. 
What is necessary, beginning from the very inception of a develop-
ment program, is an understanding between the people developing the 
system and the people that will be asked to grant the certification 
on what will be required to show that the regulations are met. 
An example of a need for understanding is the interpretation 
of "extremely improbable", and what would be required to show that 
it is met. The commonly accepted numerical value for "extremely 
improbable" is 10- 9 • There is considerable controversy on the role 
numerical analysis should play in demonstrating that this requirement 
is met. In some situations, it appears that numerical analysis can have 
real significance and make a valid contribution. For example, numerical 
analysis can be used to compute the probability of system failure in 
a redundant system due to random-component failure. Random-component 
failure rates are large enough to be demonstrated in practice. The 
mathematical techniques for combining these failure rates are also 
well established. Numerical analysis showing a system failure rate of 
10-9 per hour can then be believable. The actual value of the number 
can be significant in this circumstance. A change in this number can 
change the number of redundant channels required. 
Numerical analysis mcy have little or no value in proving that 
the probability of failure is low due to other failures, such design 
errors, common-mode failures, and generic software errors. These 
classes of faults may be the most likely. A number like 10- 9 may not 
be valuable as a legalistic number that must be "proven" with pounds 
of paper. It may be valuable as a positive goal toward which everyone 
strives. 
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The number 10-9 seems to be reasonable. It is likely that if 
advanced electronic flight-control systems can offer even a part of 
the advantages claimed for them, they will be used on virtually all 
aircraft for at least a generation. If it is assumed that an aircraft 
generation is at least 15 years, and with at least 6 x 106 commercial 
aircraft flight hours per year in the u.s. alone, a total of at least 
108 system operating hours can be assumed. The number 10-9 thus mea~s 
that the probability of a catastrophe due to a system failure is 1 
in 10. We, as engineers, would not want to have a part in developing 
a system that was much worse than that. On the other hand, a smaller 
number may not be productive. Catastrophies due to this source would 
become so low compared to other sources that the required effort may 
make a greater contribution to safety in some other area. 
A very low probability of failure for inanimate mechanical 
systems may be required by the general society. There seems to be a 
greater demand for reliability from mechanical systems than from 
human operators. It seems people can relate more readily to human 
failures. They realize that everyone, including themselves, sometimes 
make mistakes. These mistakes can sometimes be extremely tragic and 
must be held as low as possible. However, people are still willing 
to get on airplanes and accept the risk as part of the cost. They 
seem to be much less tolerant, however, of mechanical failure. There 
is always the suspicion that the failure was due to some conspiracy 
in big business and big govern:nent that allows inferior equipment to 
be used to maximize profits. In most cases, mechanical failure is also 
due to human failure during design, manufacture, or maintenance. The 
person or persons making the error, however, are not nearly as visible, 
and the personal consequences are not as high. The pilot usually pays 
dearly for his mistake. Thus, a relatively greater requirement is 
imposed on the aircraft and its equipment. 
This great reliability for systems does seem to be a realizable 
goal and can ~ontribute to a net increase in flying safety. We believe 
that the technc;~.ogy is available to meet this high reliability (although 
it. may be difficult to "prove" that it does). As greater confidence 
can be placed in automated systems and they take over more of the 
functions now usually performed by human pilots, the accident rate can 
be reduced. The probability of an accident during low-visibility 
landings is now in the 10-5 to 10-6 range. If the probability of a 
catastrophe from a failure of an automatic landing system can truly 
228 
be made to approach 10-9 , then accidents due to this cause can be 
reduced. Automatic systems can also greatly assist in continuing 
to reliably perform routine tasks when the human crew is distracted 
by sQme unusual situation which only a human crew can handle. 
6.3.2 Comments on an Integrated Validation Program 
The various validation techniques and tools that have been 
discussed, and others that have not been mentioned, provide aids in 
validating various aspects of a system. A set of appropriate methods 
must be selected and combined into a total validation progr.am that 
provides complete coverage of all aspects of the system and the 
development process where errors may have occurred. The total valida-
tion will only be as strong as the weakest area. 
The requirements necessary to validate the system and obtain a 
certification should be an integral part of the development process, 
beginning with the identification of needs, the definition of require-
ments, and the initial inception of design concepts. The ability of 
a system to be validated should be included in the basic tradeoff 
studies. The ease of validation should be weighed against other factors 
such as performance, cost, reliability, etc. A system design may be 
very elegant in its approach to fault tolerance, but if that fault 
tolerance cannot actually be demonstrated, the concept cannot be used. 
The validation process will be a much more integral part of the 
design process for advanced flight-control systems than it has been 
for many of the conventional systems. In many cases with present 
systems, equipment has been designed to perform a function and meet a 
specification. The expected reliability of the system was then calcu-
lated after the fact, many times by a separate group within the organi-
zation. In advanced fault-tolerant systems, however, a major part of 
the design effort is involved with determining how the system can fail, 
and with designing methods to accommodate these failures. Thus, 
validating the systems becomes very nearly the same thing as confirming 
the basic design. 
A simplified diagram showing an example of a total validation 
program is shown in Figure 6-7. One possible breakdown for the phases 
of system development is shown down the left side of the figure. The 
various stages of the validation process are shown along the right 
side. The arrows represent how each stage in the design is validated 
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Figur~ 6-7. Diagram of validation process. 
against the appropriate previous stages. As the process proceeds, the 
validation methods become more detailed and systematic, culminating 
in the exhaustive validation that forms the basis for certification. 
The final stage is when the customer accepts that the system meets 
his original goals. Some of the validation methods that might be used 
at each stage are noted. This example is not intended to be a defini-
tive description of a complete validation process. It is intended 
rather to illustrate how a total program might be put together and 
how the different parts interrelate with one another. A detailed 
program would have to be worked out for each system development effort. 
One final comment is made in the form of a proposal, which could 
reduce the probability of an error source being overlooked and increase 
the public confidence in advanced systems. This proposal is the use 
of independent assessment by some competent third party that is not a 
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part of the basic developing organization. This assessment would be 
of the same nature as an independent financial audit or an Underwriter's 
Laboratory approval. The entire development and validation process is 
often performed within one organization with the only review being 
performed by the certifying authority. The certifying authority will 
not normally have sufficient manpower to perform a thorough review. 
Wi~h one organization performing the major part of the effort, there 
may be a predisposition or constraint that would cause a potential 
error source to be overlooked, in essence a common-mode failure. 
The independent assessment would have to be equal in competence 
to thfi! original design effort. The most competent people in one organ-
ization would probably be assigned to the design team in the first 
place. A potential candidate for independent assessment would be 
anouther airframe manufacturer that was not a direct competitor. The 
independent assessment would be submitted along with the original 
validation data as part of the certification application. 
This process might greatly enhance the using public's acceptance 
of a complex automated system. There would still be the chance that 
a failure mode would be missed. However, this oversight would be the 
result of human error of people who could be identified within two 
competent organizations. In this situation, the risk would be easier 
to accept as part of the price for progress. 
6.3.3 Test Pilot's Thoughts on Fly-By-Wire Certification 
The thought of having to step in and certify someone else's fly-
by-wire flight-control system is sobering, indeed. So much work will 
have gone into the system that an outsider would have a very difficult 
time understanding the system unless it were verbally disassembled 
before him bit by bit and wire by wire. 
The responsibility is awesome--but the~e is a way. It means 
getting involved early as a close observer of the development process 
and this required action may be without precedent. Expect terms like 
Mean Time Between Failures to have reduced significance. substitute 
instead the ability to control the craft after multiple adversities. 
Trite as it sounds, let's start at the beginning. The operations 
research method is not a bad way to start the design of a fly-by-wire 
system. If it is determined 'that a fly-by-wire system will be des~gned, 
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then all the affected parties should meet to sketch out the guidelines 
for the system. Each group can list and discuss their requirements 
and modify them to be compatible. This is a pivotal time, because an 
error or omission at this point is paid for dearly as the system 
develops. This group should include the systems people, contractors, 
software/computer people, pilots, airline representatives, and possibly 
the eventual certifying agency representatives. 
There is a team learning concept here. The early involvement 
of the certifying agency at several levels provides exposure, personnel 
backup, completeness, and a feeling of openness. The position of the 
observer must be strictly defined to be an observer, the danger being 
that of interfering or losing objectivity by subconsciously becoming 
part of the team. 
Simulation, properly used, will eliminate a lot of potential 
problems. It is both an engineering tool and a demonstrator. Engineers 
and pilots can learn the system's real characteristics from it. In 
particular, the system should not be coddled in any way, because it 
won't be when it is eventually flown. Here is a chance for everyone 
to exercise the "what if this happens" type of thinking that is ulti-
mately so productive. The more people who fly it the better the end 
product, for the system will eventually be flown by the good and the 
not so good. 
The question of burn-in hours is bound to come up. How much is 
enough--and why. Burn-in will be accomplished on the simulator if the 
simulator has been configured to use the flight electronic hardware 
(a must!). Mean time between failure now takes on reduced meaning. 
Obviously one shouldn't go into flight test with a known flaw, but 
if a sufficient level of protection is available (determined from the 
simulator) one can fly with an untried system, thus gaining the 
experience to be able to fix its emerged faults and eventually certify 
the flight-control system. 
The pref',ight procedure should be short but complete. The 
purpose here is twofold: 
(1) To check the system integrity. 
(2) To let the air crew examine the flight-control system and 
gain their confidence that it is ready to fly. 
232 
Actual flight test seems to start a new cycle of problems and 
dec~sions. The manufacturers/owner makes the decision about when the 
flights begin. After that, it would be desirable to have a pilot 
from the certifying agency participate in some of the flights, to gain 
exposure and confidence in the system. Problems are certain to develop 
during flight test, but they will be surmounted--only the question of 
how to do it is debated. 
The handling of emergency procedures must always be in line with 
a human's natural reaction, because in high-stress quick-response 
situations, the aircrew will always revert to type--regardless of how 
long or intensely they have been trained. The system ideally should 
take each corrective step and advise the pilot by illuminating a 
warning/advisory lamp. A manual override may be provided to allow 
the crew to quickly select the most reliable emergency mode at their 
option. 
Who handles the emergency? Simulation will probably answer that. 
It depends upon the size of the crew, manufacturers' decisions, airline 
policy, etc., and probably doesn't matter--except that the person 
should always be in place during flight. 
A word about warning lights. They must always say wha·t it is 
or maybe what to do or what has been done. The message must be clear 
and unambiguous, There is a switch in one of today's fighters which 
is labeled "Flight Control Disconnect". Thank God it does not dis-
connect the flight controls! This mistake should not be made with 
the lights. Remember, the crew may be fortunate enough not to see 
these warning lights very often and they shouldn't be confused. 
It is my personal opinion that simulation will reveal which lights 
will ultimately be required. I also think the user should have the 
final say about lights, hopefully by explaining why they are/are not 
needed. 
The airplane will eventually fly just the way the project team 
wants it to fly. It will undoubtedly appear very conventional to the 
passenger but will reduce the workload of the crew. 
Should the airplane have a dissimilar backup flight-control 
system? A difficult question. For a passenger-carrying aircraft I 
would say yes. Many years of experience will be needed to ,'bring out 
all the faults in the system and an analog "get home" backup m",y "ave 
the reputations of the manufacturer, the airline, and the certifying 
agency. 
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Lightning is a serious unknown. I think the test airplane will 
have to seek out lightning and take many strikes. I think this should 
be a mandatory part of the certification procedure. It shouldn't be 
left for the airline pilot making an approach to JFK with your mother-
in-law on board. Or should it? 
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